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Abstract  
The EU network codes and guidelines are a detailed set of rules pushing for the harmonisation of 
national electricity markets and regulations. A total of eight network codes and guidelines entered into 
force by the end of 2017: three grid connection codes, three market codes and two (system) operation 
codes. This text focuses on the market codes (FCA, CACM and EBGL) and their interaction with the 
system operation guideline (SOGL). More precisely, this text is intended to guide the reader through 
the sequence of electricity markets in place in the EU: forward markets, the day-ahead market, the 
intraday market and finally the balancing markets. First, the establishment of these different markets 
in a national context is discussed, then their integration. In each section basic market design concepts 
are explained, we highlight what is in the codes, and we also refer to some of the relevant academic 
literature.   
 
Keywords: National electricity wholesale markets, Integration of national electricity wholesale 
markets, National electricity balancing markets, Integration of national electricity balancing markets, 
European regulation, Market design 
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1. Introduction	
 The network codes and guidelines 
The development of network codes and guidelines has been identified as a crucial element to spur the 
ongoing completion of the internal energy market in the Third Energy Package. More specifically, 
Regulation (EC) 714/2009 sets out the areas in which network codes will be developed and a process 
for developing them. These codes are a detailed set of rules pushing for the harmonisation of previous 
more nationally oriented electricity markets and regulations.  In 2017, after a 4-year-long co-creation 
process by ENTSO-E, ACER, the EC and many involved stakeholders from across the electricity sector, 
the network codes have been developed. After the development of the network codes, the 
implementation phase shall start. 
 
In its Clean Energy Package (CEP), also known as the Winter Package, issued in November 2016, the 
European Commission proposed a recast of Regulation (EC) 714/2009, which includes provisions that 
would modify the operation of a number of the network codes and guidelines, in some cases quite 
significantly. In detail, CEP provisions attempt to alter the amendment process for existing network 
codes/guidelines, and the drafting process for newly introduced network codes.1 These proposals are 
not covered in detail in this text. 
1.1.1 Three	groups	of	network	codes	
Eight network codes and guidelines came out of the co-creating process. At the time of writing, all 
eight have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union as European Commission 
implementing Regulations. Commission Regulations usually enter into force twenty days after 
publication, unless explicitly stated otherwise. These eight Regulations can be subdivided into three 
groups: 
 
• The market codes: 
o The capacity allocation and congestion management guideline (CACM) – published on 
25 July 2015 
o The forward capacity allocation guidelines (FCA) – published on 27 September 2016 
o The electricity balancing guideline (EBGL) – published on 23 November 2017 
• The connection codes (CNCs): 
o The network code on requirements for grid connection of generators (RfG NC) – 
published on 14 April 2016 
o The demand connection network code (DCC) – published on 18 August 2016 
o The requirements for grid connection of high voltage direct current systems and direct 
current-connected power park modules network code (HVDC NC) – published on 8 
September 2016 
• The operation codes: 
o The electricity transmission system operation guideline (SOGL) – published on 25 
August 2017 
o The electricity emergency and restoration network code (ER NC) – published on 24 
November 2017 
                                                             
1 For more details on the development and amendment process of network codes as proposed in CEP, please 
consult a recording of the FSR online debate on this topic: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rjtX0RXc83Y&t=2533s 
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1.1.2 Network	codes	vs	guidelines	
The eight Commission Regulations in which common rules for the electricity system and market are 
described, often referred to as ‘The network codes’, are actually not all network codes by definition. 
Four out of eight are guidelines (CACM, FCA, EBGL and SOGL) and the other four are network codes 
(ER, RfG NC, DCC and HVDC NC). All texts were initially planned to be network codes, and some became 
guidelines in the development process. Below similarities and differences between network codes and 
guidelines are listed. 
 
Similarities: 
- Both carry the same legal weight (both are Commission Regulations and are legally binding) 
- Both are directly applicable – i.e. there is no requirement to transpose them into local law 
- Both are subject to the same adoption procedure (Comitology procedure) 
Differences: 
- Legal basis (Art. 6 for network codes & Art. 18 for guidelines of Regulation (EC) 714/2009) 
- Amendment process (Art. 7 for network codes & Art. 18(5) for guidelines of Regulation (EC) 
714/2009) 
- Topics2 
- Work to be done in the implementation phase 
A significant difference is that guidelines include processes whereby a TSO or, in the majority of cases, 
a set of TSOs at Pan-European or Regional level must develop a methodology. Usually, a public 
consultation is held before the methodology is submitted to the relevant national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) to allow for stakeholder involvement. The relevant NRAs can approve, ask to amend 
or reject the methodology. If the NRAs do not reach an internal agreement on whether to approve the 
methodology, the decision is handed over to the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) as described in Article 8 of Regulation (EC) 713/2009.3 Network codes do not have such 
processes – the implementation process can proceed locally or regionally without further 
methodological development. 
 
On the one hand, it can be argued that the amendment of the network codes ensures stronger 
stakeholder involvement, while guidelines (the primary text), at least as described by the Third Energy 
Package, can be amended by the European Commission via comitology without direct involvement of 
ACER, ENTSO-E or any other stakeholder. On the other hand, by having methodologies described in 
the guidelines more flexibility is allowed. Namely, in this way the detailed rules governing markets and 
the operation of the system can be updated in a faster way than through amendments to the primary 
text of the guideline itself. Flexibility can prove helpful as the methodologies could be subject to change 
                                                             
2 Guidelines and network codes can cover the same topics (Art. 18, Reg. 714/2009), however from practice it is 
observed that some topics lend themselves better to guidelines than to network codes and vice-versa. 
3 For a deeper discussion on ACER’s decision powers regarding the approval of methodologies please see 
‘Exploring ACER's decision-making powers’ by P. Willis posted on 24/08/17, link: 
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017/global/exploring-acers-decision-making-powers  
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as the sector evolves rapidly. Also, during the development phase of the methodologies, stakeholder 
involvement is (in most cases) facilitated by means of a public consultation. 
 
In general, network codes are more detailed, while guidelines shift more tasks to the implementation 
phase. As mentioned above, shifting tasks to the implementation phase can allow for more flexibility, 
but might also slow down or complicate the overall process. There is also a risk that with guidelines, 
due to the requirement to develop methodologies, overlaps between different deadlines are 
generated. More precisely, there are local and regional compliance requirements (e.g. regional outage 
coordination (SOGL, Article 98(3) and Article 100(4.b))) with predetermined deadlines which rely on 
methodologies (e.g. methods for calculating the influence of an asset on the system (SOGL, Art. 
75(1.a))) of which the date of finalisation is uncertain. The implementation processes of these local 
and regional requirements can be challenging when they may need to commence before the 
finalisation of the methodologies on which their implementation depends. 
 
In Figure 1 the status of the implementation of the network codes and guidelines as it was in May 2017 
is depicted. It can be seen that in the implementation phase, next to TSOs developing methodologies 
at a Pan-European or Regional level, ENTSO-E also has several tasks. These tasks are mostly related to 
monitoring, stakeholder involvement and reporting. 
Figure 1: Status of the implementation phase of the network codes in May 2017 (ENTSO-E, 2017a)  
1.1.3 Focus	of	this	report	
This report focuses on electricity markets in the EU and their integration. There is no single electricity 
market in place, but rather a sequence of markets as explained later in this introduction. The network 
codes and guidelines aim at harmonising these different markets to allow for integration. As described 
in Jamasb and Pollitt (2005), efficiency gains can be realised through market integration and trade as 
by integrating markets better use can be made of the resource diversity in the EU and across national 
markets. Also, by integrating markets more competition in the generation of electricity is introduced. 
The fundamentals of the electricity markets are described in the report and interactions with network 
codes and guidelines are highlighted.4 The most relevant network codes when talking about electricity 
markets are the market codes (CACM, FCA and EBGL). However, also the SOGL is of importance, as 
markets and system operation cannot be decoupled. 
                                                             
4 This report treats above all the text of the guidelines. The technical details of the methodologies, described in 
the guidelines and for which in most cases the development is ongoing, are generally out of scope. 
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 Why do we have so many electricity markets? 
Electricity can be considered as a commodity, just as copper, oil and grain are.5 However, electricity 
markets do differ substantially from markets for copper, oil and grain. The underlying reason for these 
differences are the physical characteristics of electricity:6 
 
• Time: large volumes of electricity cannot be stored economically (yet). Therefore, electricity 
has a different cost and value over time.  
 
• Location: electricity flows cannot be controlled easily and efficiently, and transmission 
components must be operated under safe flow limits.7 If not, there is a risk of cascading 
failures and black-outs. Therefore, electricity has a different cost and value over space.  
 
• Flexibility: demand can vary sharply over time, while some power stations can only change 
output slowly and can take many hours to start up. Also, power stations can fail suddenly. 
Demand and generation must match each other continuously, if not there is a risk of black-
out. Therefore, the ability to change the generation/consumption of electricity at short notice 
has a value. 
 
These three unique physical characteristics can explain why there is not just one electricity market. 
Electricity is not only energy in MWh. Transmission capacity and flexibility are scarce resources and 
should be priced accordingly.8 Therefore, electricity (energy, transmission capacity, flexibility) is 
exchanged in several markets until the delivery in real-time. 
 Electricity market sequence 
Different markets allow the pricing of the ‘invisible’ components of electricity and function as a 
sequence. In Figure 2 the successive markets along the three electricity components are shown. 
Additionally, the relevant guidelines are displayed per market. It should be noted that next to trading 
through organised electricity markets (exchanges), energy can also be traded bilaterally over-the-
counter (OTC) – whereby market participants (electricity generators, retailers, large consumers, and 
other financial intermediaries) agree on a trade contract by directly interacting with each other. In this 
text, electricity exchanges are the focus. Unlike bilateral contracts, products on exchanges are 
tradable, implying transparent prices. 
                                                             
5 Two characteristics distinguish commodities from other goods such as watches, phones and clothes. First, it is 
a good that is usually produced and/or sold by many companies. Second, it is uniform in quality between 
companies that produce and sell it. 
6 Electricity is not only unique due to its physical characteristics. It can be considered an essential good with 
relatively (at least until very recently) inelastic end-consumers. This is one of the reasons why, even after the 
liberalisation of the electricity sector, national regulatory authorities specifically mandated for electricity were 
established. For a more complete overview of why and how to apply electricity regulation please consult e.g. 
Chapter 3 in Pérez-Arriaga (2013). 
7 This is true for alternative current (AC) power lines. Today, the meshed onshore grid in continental Europe 
consists mainly of AC lines. Direct Current (DC) power lines are more controllable. For a technical discussion on 
AC and DC lines, please consult Van Hertem and Ghandhari (2010). 
8 In this text we focus on transmission capacity when describing the workings of EU wholesale electricity markets. 
At the time of writing, wholesale electricity markets interact mainly with the transmission system as discussed 
throughout this text. The interaction between EU wholesale electricity markets and distribution systems is 
limited. However, it is expected that in the near future the focus will be enlarged with more resources connected 
to the distribution system participating in the wholesale electricity markets. 
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Figure 2: The sequence of electricity markets in the EU and related network codes and guidelines 
(Adapted from FSR (2014)) 
Trading of electricity, with physical delivery or purely financially, can start many years ahead in forward 
markets.9 These markets can continue until one day before delivery. The primary purpose of these 
long-term markets is to allow hedging for producers and consumers. Long-term cross-zonal 
transmission rights are traded separately from long-term contracts for energy through auctions. 
Transmission rights allow for hedging of price differences between bidding zones.10 Long-term cross-
zonal transmission capacity markets are the focus of the FCA guidelines and are described in more 
detail in Chapter 3 of this report. Both physical and financial long-term transmission rights are 
discussed. 
 
Closer to delivery, electricity is traded in short-term markets. Generally, it is accepted that short-term 
markets are comprised of the day-ahead market, intraday markets and the (near) real-time balancing 
market. The day-ahead market, as the name indicates, is an auction held the day before the delivery 
of electricity. Market participants that have not yet committed their electricity supply or demand 
through bilateral contracts submit their bids to the market operator (MO). The MO, described in more 
detail in Section 4.1,  clears the auction and obtains the preliminary schedule results for the day after. 
The working and main characteristics of day-ahead markets are described in Section 4.2. At the time 
of writing, in most cases in the EU, transmission capacity is allocated jointly (implicitly) with energy in 
the day-ahead market. This process is called market coupling. The integration of the day-ahead market 
is the focus of Section 5.1. 
 
                                                             
9 In the financial literature, long-term markets with standardised products are called ‘futures markets’, while 
long-term markets with unstandardized products are called ‘forward markets’. In this report, we use the term 
‘forward markets’, however a distinction is made between trading in exchanges (standardised) and trading over-
the-counter (unstandardized). The focus in this text is on trading through exchanges. 
10 Bidding zones are explained in the Section 2.1. A bidding zones is defined as the largest geographical area 
within which market participants can exchange energy without capacity allocation. 
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After the day-ahead market, producers and consumers have the possibility to change their positions 
through intraday markets. Intraday markets are organised as continuous markets, with possible 
complementing auctions. Intraday markets and their integration are described in detail in Section 4.3 
and Section 5.2, respectively. The design rules and the ways to integrate day-ahead markets and 
intraday markets are outlined in the CACM guideline. Intraday trading is possible until a moment in 
time called the intraday gate closure time (GCT). After the GCT, the final production schedule is 
determined for all participants, and only the Transmission System Operator (TSO) can act to adjust any 
deviation. The mechanism used to ensure that supply equals demand in real-time is called the 
balancing mechanism.  
 
The balancing mechanism is supported by two balancing markets. The first is a balancing market for 
capacity. This market takes place from one year up to one day before real-time, the exact timing is not 
harmonised in the EU at present. Generators or demand are contracted to be available to deliver 
balancing energy in real-time. Second, there is a balancing market for energy. In this market the 
participating generators or demand indicate the price they want to receive to increase or decrease 
their energy injection or withdrawal in real-time. These bids/offers are supposed to have been 
submitted before the balancing energy gate closure. Generators/demand contracted in the balancing 
capacity market are obliged to participate in the balancing energy market.11 In real-time, the TSO 
activates the least-cost resources with the requested technical capabilities to fix imbalances between 
generation and consumption. The balancing mechanism is the focus of the EBGL. Also, the SOGL is 
important for this market segment as more details on the types of reserves, their sizing and the roles 
and responsibilities for ensuring real-time balance are described in that guideline. The balancing 
mechanism and its integration are the topics of Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. In some cases, the 
balancing mechanism is also used as the means of procuring some non-frequency ancillary services, 
such as reactive power.12 This aspect of the balancing mechanism is not discussed further here. 
  
                                                             
11 It is not necessary, in some Member States at least, to participate in the balancing market for capacity in order 
to participate in the balancing market for energy. 
12 For example: Ireland and Northern Ireland, for more information see chapter 8.3 of 
https://www.semcommittee.com/sites/semcommittee.com/files/media-files/SEM-15-026%20I-
SEM%20ETA%20Markets%20Consultation%20Paper_0.pdf 
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2. The	link	between	markets	and	grids	in	the	EU:	key	concepts		
Before starting the chapters describing the different electricity markets and their integration, key 
concepts relevant to how electricity markets and physical grids are interlinked in the EU context are 
illustrated. As mentioned in the introduction, electricity transmission capacity is scarce. An important 
market design question that needs to be answered is how to deal with the complex physical reality of 
the grid when trading electrical energy. To tackle this question, this chapter is split into three Sections.  
 
• The first Section focuses on the important concept of bidding zones. In the same Section, zonal 
pricing and the difference between bidding zones and control areas is explained.  
 
• The second Section introduces the concept of capacity calculation regions. It describes the way 
interdependent cross-zonal transmission capacity calculation is organised. The focus is on the 
governance framework; the (more technical) methodologies for calculating the transmission 
capacities are explained in Subsection 5.1.2. Further, the link between capacity calculation 
regions and regional security coordinators is explained. 
 
• The third Section introduces denotations of geographical areas relevant for balancing and 
system operation and links these areas back to bidding zones and control areas described in 
the first Section of this chapter. 
 Local: Bidding Zones (market) and Control Areas (grid) 
How can electrical energy trading and network flows be matched? The chosen approach to this 
problem applied in the EU today is called zonal pricing. Zonal pricing means that wholesale electricity 
prices can differ between zones in Europe, so-called bidding zones, but are homogeneous within a 
particular zone. From the market perspective, the network within a bidding zone is a copper plate – 
physical capacity is treated as infinite.  
 
Different bidding zones are electrically connected by cross-zonal interconnectors. If a cross-zonal 
connector between two bidding zones is not fully utilised (no congestion), the wholesale electricity 
prices of the two zones converge for that period. The markets are fully coupled. However, when the 
cross-zonal interconnectors are congested, the prices between the two bidding zones can diverge for 
that period. The markets of the two bidding zones are in that case split. The price differential between 
the two bidding zones is called the congestion rent, and this is a revenue for the TSOs owning the 
interconnection.13  
 
It can happen that the outcome of the market, also called the ‘nominations’ of producers and 
consumers, results in unfeasible network flows within a bidding zone. In that case, the TSO, operating 
the part of the network within the bidding zone where the problem occurs will have to take remedial 
actions. According to the terminology applied by ACER and Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER), there are different types of remedial actions. Changing grid topology is a preventive remedial 
                                                             
13 For example, imagine that during a certain hour the interconnectors between two bidding zones are congested. 
The price in one bidding zone equals 30 €/MWh and 40 €/MWh in the other. The interconnection capacity 
between the two bidding zones is 500 MW. This means that the congestion rent equals in this hour 5,000 €. 
Please note that in some cases a transmission line can also be owned by a private party other than a TSO. For 
more information on ‘market-driven’ merchant transmission investment please consult e.g. Joskow and Tirole 
(2005). 
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measure that does not result in significant costs for the TSO. Conversely, redispatching, counter-
trading and the curtailment of already allocated capacity are curative and costly measures (ACER and 
CEER, 2016). These concepts are further developed in Section 4.4. 
 
Bidding zone configurations are reviewed periodically and, once defined for a certain period, are 
constant throughout all market time frames (long-term, day-ahead, intraday and real-time). The 
criteria for reviewing bidding zones are outlined in Art. 33 of the CACM.14 Because of historical reasons, 
bidding zones in Europe are very similar to country borders. In Figure 3 (left) the bidding zone 
configuration as it is in 2017 is shown.15 
 
Two concepts which can be easily confused are bidding zones and control areas. A control area is 
defined as a coherent part of the interconnected system, operated by a single system operator. The 
system operator is responsible for maintaining the operational security of its control area. In Europe, 
the TSO is the entity which operates the transmission system and manages and owns the transmission 
assets.16  
 
In most cases, though not all, the control area matches the bidding area. For example, the Belgian 
territory is covered by one control area and one bidding zone. The transmission network is owned and 
operated by one TSO, Elia. There are also countries with more control areas than bidding zones. An 
example is Germany. The German territory is divided into four control areas, as shown in Figure 3 
                                                             
14 Enumerated criteria for reviewing bidding zones are: (a) network security, (b) overall market efficiency, (c) 
stability and robustness of bidding zones 
15 A bidding zone review study is being carried out by ENTSO-E. The official deadline for this report is March 2018.  
16 In the Americas the transmission system is not necessarily operated by the same entity that manages and owns 
the transmission assets. For a discussion on this matter please see e.g. Chawla and Pollitt (2013). 
Figure 3: Left – Bidding zones in 2017 (Ofgem, 2014). Right – Control areas in Germany (Wikiwand, 
2017) 
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(right). The country is covered by one bidding zone (together with Luxemburg and Austria).17 Lastly, 
there are also countries with more bidding zones than control areas. Sweden is an example of a country 
of which the boundaries of the control area correspond to the national borders. The Swedish TSO is 
Svenska Kraftnät. However, the country is split up into four bidding zones. 
 Regional: Capacity Calculation Regions (market) and Regional Security Coordinators 
(grid & market) 
To ensure that cross-zonal transmission capacity calculation is reliable and that optimal capacity is 
made available to the market, regional coordination between the TSOs operating the bidding zone 
borders is required. This is true as electricity flows in a meshed network are highly interdependent due 
to its physical nature.  
In order to make coordination happen, Art. 15 of the CACM requires Capacity Calculation Regions 
(CCRs) to be determined. A CCR comprises a set of bidding zone borders and is defined as the 
geographic area in which coordinated capacity calculation is applied. In October 2015, ENTSO-E 
submitted a proposal for CCRs to all regulatory authorities for approval (ENTSO-E, 2015a). This 
proposal is shown in Figure 4 (left). The regulatory authorities failed to reach an agreement within a 
predefined six-month period (CACM, Art. 9(11)). Therefore, ACER had to decide. Finally, ACER 
approved the proposal, under the condition of merging Central West Europe (CWE) and Central 
Eastern Europe (CEE) to one CORE region (ACER 2016). In the long-term, the idea is to merge more and 
more CCR if feasible. 
Figure 4: Left – Proposal of ENTSO-E (2015a) for the Capacity Calculation Regions (ENTSO-E, 2015b). 
Right – An overview of the Regional Security Coordinators in Europe (ENTSO-E, 2017a) 
In the CACM it is also outlined that all the TSOs in each CCR shall jointly set up the coordinated capacity 
calculators and establish rules governing their operation. Coordinated capacity calculators have the 
task of calculating transmission capacity, at regional level or above. CCRs are of importance in all 
                                                             
17 At the time of writing, Germany, Austria and Luxembourg are one bidding zone. In September 2015, ACER 
issued a legally non-binding opinion to split the German-Austrian bidding zone (ACER, 2015e). The splitting of the 
German-Austrian bidding zone is now on the political agenda and could be carried out by July 2018. However, a 
final decision is expected after the publication of the ENTSO-E bidding zone review study. 
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market codes (FCA, CACM and EBGL) and in the SOGL. In short, for all time frames the capacity 
calculation should be done with a harmonised methodology per CCR.18 The coordinated capacity 
calculator should receive the necessary inputs from all concerned TSOs to perform the computation of 
available capacity (for long-term, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets) at all bidding zone 
borders within its CCR. A crucial tool that is created for this purpose is the common grid model, of 
which the principles are described in a methodology following FCA (Art. 18) and CACM (Art. 17).19 
Entities strongly tied with CCR are Regional Security Coordinators (RSC) whose role was established in 
EU law with the adoption of the SOGL. In the SOGL it is stated that each control area shall be covered 
by at least one RSC. RSCs are owned or controlled by TSOs and perform tasks related to TSO regional 
coordination (SOGL, Art. 3(89)). The predecessors of RSCs were set up as voluntary initiatives (RSCIs) 
by TSOs in 2008, with CORESCO (based in Brussels) and TSCNET services (Munich) as pioneers in 
Continental Europe. In 2015, one RSCI was created in South East Europe (SEE) in Belgrade. In 2016, the 
Nordic TSOs started discussing the creation of a Nordic RSCI (ENTSO-E, 2017b). (Voluntary) RSCIs will 
evolve into (mandatory) RSCs. An overview of the geographical coverage of RSCs as planned is shown 
in Figure 4 (right).   
RSCs will be active in one or more CCRs and have five core tasks, mostly related to grid security (for 
more details, see e.g. FTI-Compass Lexecon (2016)).20 An RSC issues recommendations to the TSOs of 
the capacity calculation region(s) for which it is appointed. TSOs should then, individually, decide 
whether or not to follow the recommendations of the RSC. The TSO has final responsibility for 
maintaining the operational security of its control area. One of the tasks of the RSCs is also coordinated 
capacity calculation. The link between the coordinated capacity calculators (FCA and CACM) and RSCIs 
(later RSCs in SOGL) is described by ENTSO-E (2014, p. 4): ‘For one Capacity Calculation Region with 
more than one established RSCIs, at a given point in time, one RSCI will be responsible for assuming the 
function of the Coordinated Capacity Calculator. Other RSCIs having responsibilities within this 
Coordinated Capacity Calculation Region can assume this function at any time, as a back-up option. 
This scheme ensures consistency between coordinated capacity calculation and coordinated security 
assessment.’  
 Balancing Areas: in between markets and grids 
In order to fully grasp the way balancing is conducted in the EU, as described in Chapter 6, some 
additional concepts indicating geographical areas of importance for the balancing mechanism need to 
be introduced. Also, links between the new balancing concepts and previously introduced bidding 
zones and control areas are made in this Section.  
 
                                                             
18  The ‘all time frames’ being: long-term (FCA, Art. 21(2)), day-ahead (CACM, Art. 29 and 46(1)), intraday (CACM, 
Art. 29 and 58(1)) and the balancing time frame for the exchange of balancing energy for operating the imbalance 
netting process (EBGL, Art. 37(3)) and for the allocation of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing 
capacity or sharing of reserves (EBGL, Art. 38(2)). 
19  According to CACM (Article 2(2)), a common grid model is defined as a Union-wide data set agreed between 
various TSOs describing the main characteristic of the power system (generation, loads and grid topology) and 
rules for changing these characteristics during the capacity calculation process. 
20 Additionally, in the Emergency and Restoration network code (ER NC) it is described that RSCs will be consulted 
to assess the consistency of measures described in a system defence and restoration plan of a TSO with the 
corresponding measures in the plans of TSOs within its synchronous area and in the plans of neighbouring TSOs 
belonging to another synchronous area (Art. 6(3)). 
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In Figure 5 (left) the terminology used to indicate geographical areas in the FCA/CACM (markets), EBGL 
(balancing) and the SOGL (system operation) are summarised. Balancing is done by means of a market-
based process in the EU. However, it cannot be fully decoupled from system operation as this process 
takes place very near or in real-time. Therefore, geographical concepts in the EBGL can be more 
market-related or more system operation-related, depending on which part of the balancing code is 
considered. As depicted in Figure 5 (left), the largest geographical area is the Internal Energy Market 
(IEM) in the EU and the smallest building block is a scheduling area.  
 
The IEM is split up into different synchronous areas, as shown in Figure 5 (right), and defined as ‘areas 
covered by synchronously interconnected TSOs, such as the synchronous areas of Continental Europe, 
Great Britain, Ireland-Northern Ireland and Nordic and the power systems of Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia, together referred to as ‘Baltic’ which are part of a wider synchronous area.’ (RfG NC, Art. 2(2)) 
Synchronous areas are mainly important for the fastest types of reserves; these are dimensioned and 
operated at this scale as further discussed in Section 6.1.21 The different types of reserves are described 
in the introduction to Chapter 6. 
 
 
Also, the notion of a Load-Frequency Control (LFC) Block is important as this is the geographical area 
over which reserves (other than the fastest type) ought to be dimensioned by the SOGL. The SOGL (Art. 
3(18)) defines an LFC Block as ‘a part of a synchronous area or an entire synchronous area, physically 
demarcated by points of measurement at interconnectors to other LFC blocks, consisting of one or more 
LFC areas, operated by one or more TSOs fulfilling the obligations of load-frequency control’. A proposal 
regarding the determination of the LFC Blocks will be done by all TSOs of a synchronous area 4 months 
after the entry into force of the SOGL (SOGL, Art. 141(2)). 
                                                             
21 The main task of the fastest type of reserves (Frequency Containment reserves) is to dampen/stop a sudden 
drop or rise in system frequency.  
Figure 5: Left – FCA/CACM (markets) vs EBGL (balancing) vs SOGL (system operation) terminology 
to denote geographical areas (adapted from ENTSO-E, 2014b). Right – the different synchronous 
areas in Europe (ENTSO-E, 2017l). 
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The frequency restoration process is (jointly) operated by the TSO(s) of a Load-Frequency Control (LFC) 
Area (SOGL, Art. 141(4)(b)).22 In the SOGL (Art. 3(12)) an LFC Area is defined as ‘a part of a synchronous 
area or an entire synchronous area, physically demarcated by points of measurement at 
interconnectors to other LFC Areas, operated by one or more TSOs fulfilling the obligations of load-
frequency control.’ A Monitoring Area is defined in SOGL (Art. 3(145)) as ‘a part of the synchronous 
area or the entire synchronous area, physically demarcated by points of measurement at 
interconnectors to other monitoring areas, operated by one or more TSOs fulfilling the obligations of a 
monitoring area’. The real-time active power interchange of the monitoring area is constantly tracked 
by all TSOs in each monitoring area (SOGL, Art. 141(3)). In most cases, the LFC Area is equal to the 
Monitoring Area and to the TSOs' Control Area (ENTSO-E, 2014b). 
 
Finally, a Scheduling Area is considered the smallest building block for system operation. It is equal to 
one or more Control Areas, but can never be bigger than a Bidding Zone. More precisely (SOGL, Art. 
110(2)):  
 
• Where a bidding zone covers only one control area (e.g. Belgium), the geographical scope of 
the scheduling area is equal to the bidding zone.  
• Where a control area covers several bidding zones (e.g. Sweden), the geographical scope of 
the scheduling area is equal to the bidding zone.  
• Finally, where a bidding zone covers several control areas (e.g. Germany), TSOs within that 
bidding zone may jointly decide to operate a common scheduling process. Otherwise, each 
control area within that bidding zone is considered a separate scheduling area.  
 
The notion of Scheduling Area is important because important actions related to the balancing 
mechanism are done at the level of the scheduling area, i.e.: 
 
• Contractual positions by Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs) are communicated to the TSO of 
the scheduling area (SOGL, Art. 111(1)) 
• The measurement of the ‘system’ imbalance is done per scheduling area (EBGL, Art. 54(2))  
• The Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) participating in the balancing capacity or balancing 
energy market belong to the same scheduling area (EBGL, Art. 16(8))23 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
22 This process is operated at LFC area scale but is well-coordinated with the synchronous area. The frequency 
restoration process can be described as the process in which reserves are activated to release FCR activated at 
synchronous area scale and to restore the frequency back to the nominal value if imbalances between generation 
and consumption occur in real time. In more technical terms, the frequency restoration control error (FRCE) is 
regulated towards zero. 
23 The integration of balancing capacity and energy markets between scheduling areas is the focus of Chapter 7. 
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3. Forward	markets	
Trading of electricity, with physical delivery or purely financially, can start many years ahead in forward 
markets. These markets can continue until one day before delivery. Competitive and liquid forward 
markets are essential for market participants to hedge their short-term price risks. Prices in shorter-
term electricity markets can fluctuate, e.g. due to high/low renewable energy infeed. Also, well-
functioning short-term markets can deliver sharp scarcity prices. These scarcity prices are crucial to 
signal the need for flexibility at a particular time and place and to incentivise new investment 
(adequacy) in the longer run. However, not all producers want their business case to be dependent on 
hard-to-forecast fluctuating prices and occasional price spikes. Also, large consumers or retailers might 
want to stabilise their expenditure. Therefore, there is a demand for forward markets with long-term 
contracts for electricity supply.  Newbery (2016) states that ‘a lack of forward markets and long-term 
contracts might not be so critical if the future were reasonably predictable and stable, but that this is 
far from the case at present.’ Also Genoese et al. (2016) and Neuhoff et al. (2016) argue that the 
provision of long-term price signals will become (even) more important in the future, one important 
argument is that long-term contracts can reduce the cost of capital of renewables and flexible 
generation, characterised by high upfront investment costs. 
 
The integration of forward energy markets is crucial to allow a more efficient functioning and higher 
degrees of necessary liquidity. Therefore, long-term cross-zonal transmission rights are auctioned. By 
acquiring these rights, market participants can trade cross-zonal in forward markets. Without these 
rights, the risk related to price differentials between different bidding zones can significantly reduce 
the appeal of such cross-zonal trades.  Also, cross-zonal transmission rights are of importance to be 
able to hedge risk across different time frames within a certain bidding zone. This would be the case 
when there is limited variation in the duration of long-term electricity contracts in a given bidding zone, 
while in another bidding zone (a so-called hub) a greater range of contracts with many different 
durations are offered. 
 
First, forward energy markets are introduced in this chapter. After the integration of forward markets 
is discussed, the implications of the FCA guideline are highlighted. 
 Forward energy markets 
Long-term electricity contracts can be traded on unstandardised forward and standardised future 
markets. The design of the (national) forward electricity markets is not covered by the network codes. 
Instead, the allocation of long-term cross-zonal transmission rights are the focus of the FCA. Long-term 
cross-zonal transmission rights are needed to allow the integration of these forward markets. 
Integration can help these markets function more efficiently.  
 
The analysis in ACER and CEER (2016) shows that, in general, the liquidity of forward markets in Europe 
remained low in 2015, except for Germany, the Nordics, France and GB. In Figure 6, the churn ratio for 
the most relevant European countries is shown.  
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Figure 6: Ratio of traded volume in forward markets over 2014 consumption (ACER and CEER, 2016) 
The churn ratio is a way to measure liquidity and is defined as the volumes traded expressed as a 
multiple of physical consumption. A churn factor of three could be considered to be a minimum value 
(ACER and CEER, 2016). Very few countries reach that threshold. It is also interesting to note that 
liquidity decreases with increasing forward periods (Genoese et al., 2016). 
 Integration of forward markets: long-term (cross-zonal) transmission (capacity) rights 
Long-term transmission rights are a necessary tool to allow for a further integration of electricity 
markets. In the recent past, multiple sets of rules were in place to regulate long-term cross-zonal 
transmission capacity trade among Member States (MS) (Rakhmah and Yanfei, 2016). ACER and CEER 
(2016) describe that in 2015 the persistence of high absolute values of assessed risk premium in the 
valuation of transmission rights point to different problems in the markets for these products.24  
 
The goal of the FCA guideline is to foster the trade in long-term cross-zonal transmission capacity 
rights. With FCA in force, TSOs are obliged to issue long-term transmission rights on a bidding zone 
border unless the competent regulatory authorities of the bidding zone border have adopted 
coordinated decisions not to issue long-term transmission rights on the bidding zone border. When 
adopting their decisions, the competent regulatory authorities of the bidding zone border are required 
to consult the regulatory authorities of the relevant capacity calculation region and take due account 
of their opinions. (FCA, Article 30(1)). All TSOs issuing long-term transmission rights shall offer long-
term cross-zonal capacity to market participants for at least annual and monthly time frames (FCA, 
Article 31(2)).  The allocation of long-term cross-zonal transmission capacity is conducted through 
explicit auctions. Explicit auctions mean that transmission capacity and electricity trading are 
auctioned separately.  
 
This section is split up into four subsections describing key components of the market in long-term 
cross-zonal transmission capacity rights. Please note that this description is not necessarily exhaustive. 
                                                             
24 For instance, transmission right prices reflect inefficiencies such as lack of market coupling, the presence of 
curtailments in combination with weak firmness regimes, and periods of maintenance reducing the offered 
capacity, which dampen the value of transmission rights (ACER and CEER, 2016). 
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3.2.1 Allocation:	Harmonised	rules	and	a	single	European	platform	
Different rules for different borders did not allow for efficient cross-zonal trade of long-term electricity 
supply. The goal of the FCA guideline is to harmonise the existing multiple allocation rules at the 
European level.  
 
A first step in that direction is to introduce harmonised allocation rules (HAR) for long-term 
transmission rights. According to the FCA, all TSOs had to submit a proposal for these rules 6 months 
after the entry into force of the Regulation (FCA, Art. 51(1)) covering several aspects in the forward 
capacity allocation (FCA, Art. 52), inter alia returns and transfers of long-term transmission rights as 
well as firmness and curtailment compensation rules. In addition to these harmonised allocation rules, 
specific regional requirements or requirements for individual borders where long-term transmission 
rights are allocated can be proposed (FCA, Art. 51(1)). Given the importance of this task, TSOs have 
proposed harmonised allocation rules already before the entry into force of the FCA as part of the early 
implementation of the FCA. In the framework of the official implementation of the FCA, all TSOs 
submitted the updated proposal of the harmonised allocation rules and the specific border/regional 
requirements in April 2017 (ENTSO-E, 2017c). All NRAs did not reach an agreement and the decision 
was handed over to ACER. The proposal was finally adopted in October 2017 after minor modifications 
by ACER. 
 
Moreover, a key instrument towards the integration of cross-zonal long-term markets is the setup of 
a single European platform for the allocation of long-term cross-zonal transmission rights. Some steps 
have already been taken in that direction. On 24 June 2015, the two regional allocation offices for 
cross-zonal electricity transmission capacities in place at that time, approved the merger agreement 
to create the Joint Allocation Office (JAO). The JAO is a joint service company of twenty TSOs from 
seventeen countries. It performs mainly the yearly, monthly and daily auctions of transmission rights 
on 27 borders in Europe. In their proposal for the Single Allocation Platform submitted in April 2017, 
all TSOs proposed JAO to be named as the Single Allocation Platform (ENTSO-E, 2017d). In September 
2017 all NRAs approved this proposal. 
 
A practical example of the importance of a single European platform and harmonised allocation rules 
is the timing and length of different cross-zonal transmission rights. If long-term transmission rights 
are not allocated simultaneously, market participants who need to ‘cross’ several borders cannot 
efficiently hedge their cross-zonal short-term price risk. 
3.2.2 Calculation	of	future	cross-zonal	transmission	capacity	
As stated in the FCA guideline: ‘Long-term capacity calculation for the year- and month-ahead market 
time frames should be coordinated by the TSOs at least at regional level to ensure that capacity 
calculation is reliable and that optimal capacity is made available to the market.’ 
 
What ‘coordination on regional level’ exactly aims at are that calculations are done at the level of the 
Capacity Calculation Regions (CCR). Capacity Calculation Regions (CCR) are described in Section 2.2. 
For this purpose, TSOs should establish a common grid model gathering all the necessary data for the 
long-term capacity calculation and taking into account the uncertainties inherent to the long-term time 
frames.  
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Long-term capacity calculation can be done by applying two approaches: the flow-based approach and 
the coordinated net transmission capacity (NTC) approach. These calculation methods are explained 
in more detail in 5.1.2. The FCA leaves it open as to which approach should be applied, a proposal by 
all TSOs per CCR needs to be submitted and approved by the relevant NRAs (FCA, Art. 10). However, it 
is mentioned that the flow-based approach might be justified where cross-zonal capacities between 
bidding zones are highly interdependent. 
3.2.3 Products	and	pricing	
Two products for long-term cross-zonal transmission capacity rights are described in the FCA; 
definitions are taken from Batlle et al. (2014): 
 
- Physical transmission rights (PTR): ‘A PTR entitles the buyer to the right to transmit a specific 
amount of power between two electricity network nodes during a given period of time. In 
Europe, PTR holders must declare whether they intend to exercise their physical right 
(‘nomination’) before a pre-established deadline, often the day ahead. Where they fail to do 
so, the system operator automatically re-sells the right on the short-term market on behalf of 
the holder, who receives the resale price. This is known as the use-it-or-sell-it (UIOSI) condition.’ 
 
- Financial transmission rights (FTR): ‘An FTR hedges the buyer against the market price 
difference between two or more price zones. These contracts do not have an impact on the 
economic dispatch or on the actual use of the line. Financial transmission rights can be 
obligations or options. Obligations imply that the rights holder receives the value of the 
entitlement when it is positive but must pay the counterparty to the contract if it is less. With 
options, the holder is not obligated to pay the counterparty if the value of the entitlement is 
negative.’ The difference between obligations and options is further illustrated in Box 1. 
 
According to the FCA, both FTRs and PTRs can be applied. However, the allocation of PTR and FTRs in 
parallel at the same bidding zone border is not allowed (FCA, Art. 31(6)). It is also important to note 
that PTRs are directly linked to the physical capacity of the line and the only selling counterparty can 
be the TSO.25 In principle, FTRs can be issued by any market participant (Batlle et al., 2014). However, 
in the European context FTRs are generally also issued by the TSO and linked to congestion rents. This 
implies that the overall amount of PTRs or FTRs is limited to the physical transmission capacity 
(Spodniak et al., 2017).26   
                                                             
25 This means that the TSO (as counterparty) needs to be notified when market participants purchase or transfer 
long-term transmission rights that were already allocated. 
26 Additionally, the ‘netting’ of FTR obligations is also possible (selling contracts bi-directionally in both 
directions). Because of counter-flows, a higher volume than the actual transmission capacity may be issued. FTR 
obligations provide netting, but FTR options do not (Spodniak et al., 2017). 
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Box 1: Financial transmission rights (FTR): obligations vs options, illustrative exercise. 
Imagine the following two situations under a certain energy delivery scenario. Which statement is 
wrong? 
 
 
Figure 7: Energy delivery scenarios to illustrate the difference between obligations and options, 
based on PJM (2011) 
a.) If I hold an FTR-option in situation A, I gain €1000 
b.) If I hold an FTR-obligation in situation A, I gain €1000 
c.) If I hold an FTR-option in situation B, I lose €1000 
d.) If I hold an FTR-obligation in situation B, I lose €1000 
 
The wrong statement: c 
Justification: In situation A, the outcome for an option and an obligation are the same. The holder 
of both FTRs gain (20 €/MWh-10 €/MWh)*100 MWh= €1000. In situation B only the holder of an 
FTR-obligation has to pay (20 €/MWh-10 €/MWh)*-100 MWh= -€1000. A holder of an option will 
not exercise the option in this case and would not lose any money (except the price paid beforehand 
for acquiring the option). In other words, in situation A both FTR-obligations and options are a 
benefit. In situation B, an FTR-obligation is a liability, while an FTR-option is neither a liability nor 
benefit. 
 
Batlle et al. (2014) describe in detail the pros and cons of PTRs and FTRs. They split their analysis into 
two parts. Firstly, an ideal market operation and structure is assumed.27 In that situation, PTRs and 
FTRs are equivalent. Secondly, an analysis is done under the conditions prevailing in real electricity 
markets, paying particular attention to situations where market power can be exercised. In that case, 
there are material differences between both products. The authors conclude that if there is sufficient 
inter-market coordination and liquidity, FTRs should be the preferred product. However, until these 
conditions are not attained, PTRs are the most suitable transitory solution. The advantages of FTRs 
over PTRs are found to be greater transparency, simplification of regulatory supervision and provision 
of a more valuable hedge for minority market share participants. With PTRs market participants with 
physical generation assets are clearly in a better position to engage in trading. This is not the case for 
FTRs, and therefore FTRs would broaden the demand base, enhance competition and increase market 
liquidity. PTRs vs FTRs has been a strongly debated topic in the academic literature for a long time. 
                                                             
27 According to Batlle et al. (2014), an ideal market would imply: the absence of technical conditioning (physical 
flows equal commercial transactions), no regulatory design inefficiencies, unlimited liquidity, no transactions 
costs, no market power and fully rational market participants.  
18 
 
Overall, many arguments are found in favour of FTRs, examples of relevant work are Benjamin (2010), 
Chao and Peck (1996),  Hogan (1992) and Joskow and Tirole (2000). 
 
Box 2: The Nordic approach to long-term transmission rights (based on Spodniak et al. (2017)) 
Since 2000, the Nordic electricity market has its own standard product in use for hedging bidding 
area price differences, called the ‘electricity area price differential’ (EPAD).  EPAD contracts are used 
to build a hedge for a bidding area price in relation to the Nordic system price (a sort of benchmark 
price, there is no similar system price in the rest of Europe), while an FTR contract hedges the price 
difference directly between two adjacent bidding areas. 
 
To hedge the price difference between two adjacent bidding areas with EPADs as an FTR would do, 
a combination of two EPAD contracts (a so-called EPAD Combos) needs to be acquired by a market 
player. Two EPAD Combos are required to cover the hedge ‘both ways’ for each interconnector 
between two bidding zones. Spodniak et al. (2017) note ‘this replication implies that it is theoretically 
and even practically possible to continue with the EPAD-based system by using EPAD Combos in the 
Nordic countries, even if FTR contracts would prevail elsewhere in the EU.’ Additionally, the authors 
do an empirical analysis and show that in practice the pricing of bi-directional EPAD contracts is 
more complex and may not always be very efficient. 
 
A significant difference between FTRs and EPADs is that EPADs are purely financial contracts traded 
on a securities exchange, without a direct link to the transmission capacity of the interconnectors. 
As such, there is also no volume cap in terms of offered transmission rights.  
 
Also in the work of Batlle et al. (2014), FTR-obligations vs FTR-options are discussed. A major difference 
between both is that obligations are allocated simultaneously in both directions (one product, one 
auction), while an option only covers the price risk in one direction (two products, two auctions). 
Although possible higher implementation costs and decreased liquidity can be expected with options, 
it is argued that these are favoured by market participants as in most cases market participants are 
interested in hedging the price risk in solely one direction. 
 
Regarding pricing, the FCA states in Article 28 that marginal pricing should be applied for each bidding 
zone border, direction and market time unit. Marginal pricing implies that all successful bidders pay 
the price of the marginally accepted bid (in this case the lowest accepted bid). The price will equal zero 
if the demand for transmission rights is lower than the offered long-term cross zonal capacity. 
3.2.4 Firmness	
Trust in firmness, defined in the CACM as ‘a guarantee that cross-zonal capacity rights will remain 
unchanged and that a compensation is paid if they are nevertheless changed’, is a necessary condition 
for the successful integration of electricity markets. The potential interruption of exports during 
emergency or scarcity conditions can be a major barrier to the development of (long-term) cross-zonal 
trade (Mastropietro et al., 2015). 
 
In the FCA, two causes for curtailment of long-term transmission rights are distinguished. First, the 
curtailment of transmission rights in the event of force majeure.28 In that case, the holder of long-term 
                                                             
28 A force majeure event is defined in the CACM as any unforeseeable or unusual event or situation beyond the 
reasonable control of a TSO, and not due to a fault of the TSO, which cannot be avoided or overcome with 
reasonable foresight and diligence, which cannot be solved by measures which are from a technical, financial or 
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transmission rights will receive a compensation by the TSO which invoked the force majeure. This 
compensation will be equal to the amount initially paid for long-term transmission rights (FCA, Art. 
56(3)). The national regulatory authority of the TSO invoking the force majeure event shall assess 
whether an event qualifies as force majeure (FCA, Art. 56(5)). Second, long-term transmission rights 
can also be curtailed prior to the day-ahead firmness deadline to ensure that operation remains within 
operational security limits.29 The concerned TSOs on the bidding zone border where long-term 
transmission rights have been curtailed shall compensate the holder of these rights with the market 
spread (FCA, Art. 53(2)).30 Further, the concerned TSOs on a bidding zone border may propose a cap 
on the total compensation to be paid to all holders of curtailed long-term transmission rights (FCA, Art. 
54(1)).31 
 
Mastropietro et al. (2015) argue that congestion is not the only source of price-differentials between 
bidding zones. They state that price-differentials may also originated from a direct regulatory 
intervention with the aim to prioritise national over regional interests. This would be the case if a TSO 
(prompted by a regulator) blocks exports through interconnectors when its system is under scarcity 
conditions. By doing so, a price-differential with no hedge is (artificially) created, and the execution of 
cross-zonal contracts is impeded. Mastropietro et al. (2015) add that, whenever the physical delivery 
is not possible because of an intervention from the TSO, the latter should pay not only the financial 
settlement related to the price differentials but additionally possibly some compensation. This 
compensation would constitute a penalty for non-compliance which a generator located in one bidding 
zone should pay to a demand located in another bidding zone when these two parties have signed a 
contract for the physical delivery of electricity, and the demand is not served.32 The TSO (representing 
the regulator and, eventually, the government) should also be required to deposit warranties 
guaranteeing such payments.  
 
It is of great importance that the risks are properly allocated. Otherwise there is a risk of the TSO 
becoming more risk-averse and offering less long-term capacity than might be efficient or market 
participants might be disincentivised to engage in long-term cross-zonal trade. 
  
                                                             
economic point of view reasonably possible for the TSO, which has actually happened and is objectively 
verifiable, and which makes it impossible for the TSO to fulfil, temporarily or permanently, its obligations in 
accordance with this Regulation (CACM). 
29 ‘Operational security limits’ are defined as the acceptable operating boundaries for secure grid operation such 
as thermal limits, voltage limits, short-circuit current limits, frequency and dynamic stability limits (CACM, Art. 
2(7)). 
30 Market spread refers to the difference between the hourly day-ahead prices of the two concerned bidding 
zones for the respective market time unit in a specific direction. 
31 The cap holds for the accumulated compensations over the relevant calendar year and cannot be lower than 
the total congestion income collected during that same period (FCA, Art. 54(1,2)).  
32 The compensation is related to the difference between the utility value that the demand attributes to its supply 
and the price cap active in the market (Mastropietro et al., 2015). 
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4. Establishing	national	day-ahead	and	intraday	markets	
The CACM is the key regulation outlining the design and integration of the day-ahead (DA) and intraday 
market (IDM). In this chapter, we focus on the establishment of the national DA and IDMs.33 Their 
integration is discussed in Chapter 5. The ‘Target Model’ pursued by the European Commission (Third 
Energy Package, Directive 2009/72/EC) is centred around day-ahead auctions operated by power 
exchanges that implicitly allocate transmission capacity between bidding zones (Neuhoff et al., 2016c). 
Prices obtained in the DAM auction serve as a reference for forward markets (Meeus, 2011). In recent 
years, a strong increase in trading in intraday markets was observed, as is illustrated in Figure 8 (below). 
In that same figure, the trading volumes in the DAM as a share of the hourly consumption for France 
and Germany for a period from 2012 to 2015 are shown. It can be seen that large differences in 
proportional volumes exist between both countries. It can be argued that the centre of gravity of 
electricity trading is slowly moving closer to real-time.  
 
 
Figure 8: The hourly DA and ID market trading volume as share of the hourly consumption for France 
and Germany (Brijs et al., 2017) 
Short-term electricity market design needs to evolve with its context. Originally, these markets were 
designed for large, rather slow ramping, and mostly fossil fuel based generators and inflexible demand. 
The same conditions do not exist now with the penetration of variable renewable energy sources 
(vRES) at all voltage levels and more options for consumers to manage their demand. How to adjust 
market design to this new context is a topic of extensive debate (for e.g. AGORA, 2016; Brijs et al., 
                                                             
33 National DA and IDMs can have for instance additional products (e.g. with a finer time granularity) next to the 
products traded in the single European (coupled) DA and IDM. These products are traded after the cross-zonal 
DA gate closure time and are only national, bilateral or regional but not EU wide. 
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2017; Henriot and Glachant, 2013; Neuhoff et al., 2016, 2015b). In general, it is agreed that flexibility 
is required to allow for efficient operation of the system with higher penetrations of vRES. Short-term 
electricity market design should encourage investment in the right technologies (capacity) and 
incentivise them to offer their full flexibility (capability). A combination of complementary actions is 
needed to achieve this goal. Integration of electricity markets at all market time frames is key to make 
better use of the resource diversity in the EU. Also, the day-ahead market design needs to be adapted, 
for example by introducing better-adapted bidding products. Furthermore, the functioning of markets 
closer to real-time needs to be enhanced, both intraday and balancing markets (treated in Chapter 6).   
 
In this chapter, firstly, a key institution, namely the Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) 
and its functions are described. The DAM and IDM are both managed by power exchanges, which are 
now labelled as NEMOs in the EU, a concept introduced by the CACM. Afterwards, the main 
characteristics of the day-ahead market are discussed. Lastly, several important elements of intraday 
market design are discussed.  
 Nominated Electricity Market Operators (NEMOs) 
Power exchanges traditionally collected and matched bids and offers within different time-frames for 
a certain bidding zone.  Recently, power exchanges have been increasingly organising trade between 
zones in Europe, which was previously mainly the territory of the Over-The-Counter (OTC) electricity 
trading business (Meeus et al., 2005; Meeus, 2011). To make electricity trading over borders happen 
smoothly, an institutional framework for power exchanges is required. Such framework is provided by 
the CACM. In the CACM common requirements for the designation of NEMOs  and for their tasks are 
outlined.34 In short, NEMOs can be seen as power exchanges certified to organise cross-zonal electricity 
trade. 
4.1.1 Scope	and	tasks	
In the CACM, it is stated that each Member State (MS) shall ensure that at least one NEMO is 
designated in its territory (CACM, Art. 4(1,2)). However, if in a MS a national legal monopoly is in place 
by the time the CACM enters into force, that MS may refuse the designation of more than one NEMO 
per bidding zone (CACM, Art. 5(1)). An overview of the active number of NEMOs per MS and the 
institutions which designated the NEMOs is given in Figure 9 (left and middle). In the majority of 
countries only one NEMO is active, and in most cases, the regulator is in charge of their designation.  
 
 
Figure 9: Facts and figures of NEMOs in the EU (excl. Cyprus and Malta). Based on ACER (2015a) 
                                                             
34 A NEMO is defined in the CACM as an entity designated by the competent authority to perform tasks related 
to single day-ahead or single intraday coupling. Market coupling is the auctioning process where collected orders 
are matched and cross-zonal capacity is allocated simultaneously for different bidding zones in a market time 
frame. 
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A complete overview per country can be found in ACER (2015a), in Figure 10 (left) the competitive 
status per country is visualised. In Figure 10 (right) the NEMOs active in MS open to competition for 
NEMOs is shown. Pursuant to Article 4(10) of CACM, the designating authorities shall inform ACER of 
the designation and revocation of NEMOs. ACER shall maintain a list of designated NEMOs, their status 
and where they operate on its website. 
A NEMO can be designated for trading services in the day-ahead market, the intraday market or both. 
Today, all designated NEMOs offer services in both markets (ACER, 2015a). NEMO(s) designated in a 
MS have the right to offer trading services with delivery in another MS without the need for 
designation as a NEMO in that Member State, albeit with exceptions. These exceptions are summed 
up in Article 4(6) of the CACM. 
 
In CACM, Article 7(1) the tasks of the NEMOs are outlined as follows: ‘Their [NEMOs] tasks shall include 
receiving orders from market participants, having overall responsibility for matching and allocating 
orders in accordance with the single day-ahead and intraday coupling results, publishing prices and 
settling and clearing the contracts resulting from the trades according to relevant participant 
agreements and regulations.’ Also, all NEMOs shall, in cooperation with the relevant TSOs, develop a 
proposal on harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices to be applied in all bidding zones.35 A 
proposal shall be made for the DAM and another for the IDM. NEMOs shall carry out market coupling 
operator (MCO) functions jointly with other NEMOs, for this purpose also a close collaboration with 
coordinated capacity calculators is required. 36 
4.1.2 Cost-of-service	regulated	vs	merchant	
Meeus (2011) states that two types of power exchanges can be distinguished in Europe: cost-of-service 
regulated (monopoly) and merchant (competitive) power exchanges. Cost-of-service regulated are 
not-for-profit or regulated-profit institutions which receive an income from regulated fees. They can 
be established by a public initiative (e.g. OMEL in Spain) or by a TSO initiative (e.g. HUPX in Hungary). 
                                                             
35 The clearing price is defined in the CACM as the price determined by matching the highest accepted selling 
order and the lowest accepted buying order in the electricity market (Art. 2(31)). 
36 In short, a coordinated capacity calculator (CCC) is set up jointly by a subset of TSOs (CACM, Art. 2(11)), and 
calculates the available cross-zonal transmission capacity per capacity calculation region (CCR). 
Figure 10: Left – Competitive status of NEMOs in the EU+NO. Right – State of play in MS open to 
competition in NEMOs. Based on ACER (2015a). 
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Typically, they also perform several tasks that go beyond trading services. On the other hand, merchant 
power exchanges are for-profit market institutions whose core business is to provide trading services. 
Their income depends on various user fees and is linked to the volume of trades executed by the power 
exchange for its users. Examples are EPEX Spot (covering Germany, France, GB, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and Luxembourg) and Nord Pool AS (one of the NEMO(s) or single NEMO 
in 15 European countries). Historically, merchants were set up by market parties, financial market 
institutions, TSOs or a combination of private actors. In Figure 9 (right), the competitive status of a 
power exchange in the Member States is shown. In most countries, power exchanges are a competitive 
activity, however, in nine countries (e.g. Italy and Spain) they have a monopoly status.  
 
The CACM does not prescribe whether NEMOs should be a monopoly or competitive activity. However, 
a preference for NEMOs as a competitive activity can be detected in the code. Namely, it is stated that 
‘a national legal monopoly is deemed to exist where national law expressly provides that no more than 
one entity within a Member State or Member State bidding zone can carry out day-ahead and intraday 
trading services’ (CACM GL, Art. 5(2)). However, ‘if the Commission deems that there is no justification 
for the continuation of national legal monopolies or for the continued refusal of a MS to allow cross-
border trading by a NEMO designated in another MS, the Commission may consider appropriate 
legislative or other appropriate measures to further increase competition and trade between and 
within MSs’ (CACM, Art. 5(3)). 
 
Exchanges have natural monopoly characteristics. Firstly, trading systems can benefit from positive 
network externalities (liquidity attracts more liquidity). And secondly, significant economies of scale 
are present (Meeus, 2011). In brief, a trade-off exists. On the one hand, cost-of-service regulated 
power exchanges have fewer incentives to abuse market power and act anti-competitively than 
merchant power exchanges. On the other hand, they also have fewer incentives to provide an efficient 
trading service or to innovate in trading systems. Meeus (2011) argues that it does make sense to have 
merchant power exchanges, especially in the light of the integration of electricity markets. When 
dealing with problems related to cross-zonal trade, the national regulatory authorities frequently do 
not have effective and independent powers to define and enforce the necessary regulation at EU level. 
There could be a ‘regulatory gap’ created with cost-of-service regulated power exchanges. A merchant 
power exchange has a clear incentive to cooperate in the implementation of this model as it can 
generate significant additional trade volumes, and thus income for the power exchange. However, the 
market power of power exchanges should be tempered. This could be done by enhancing transparency 
requirements and introducing governance rules to prevent that cooperation among power exchanges 
would lead to closed cartels. 
 The day-ahead market (DAM) 
In Europe, the day-ahead market is organised as a double-side blind auction. By noon of the day before 
delivery, market parties submit their offers and bids for each hour of the next day to the NEMO to 
adjust their positions held in forward markets. In the simplest form, orders are hourly price-quantity 
pairs. In Figure 11 an example of the clearing of an aggregated demand (blue) and supply curve (red) 
for one hour in a DAM session is given. For each (daily) DAM session 24 such clearings are performed. 
The supply offers (red) with a price lower than the clearing price, thus under the green line, are 
accepted. The accepted supply offers want to supply energy for a price lower than or equal to the 
clearing price. The demand bids (blue) above the clearing price, thus above the green line, are 
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accepted. The accepted demand bids are willing to pay at least the actual clearing price for energy. 
Marginal uniform pricing (pay-as-cleared) applies in the DAM auction, which means that all accepted 
supply offers and all accepted demand bids receive/pay the same (uniform) price, namely the clearing 
price.  
 
Figure 11: Example of the clearing of an aggregated demand (blue) and supply curve (red) for one 
hour of the DAM in Romania on 24/01/2011 (Pérez-Arriaga, 2013) 
In this section, three design dimensions of the day-ahead market are discussed in more depth. Namely, 
the bid formats accepted in the DAM auction, the temporal resolution of the products and the 
maximum and minimum clearing prices. Integration of cross-zonal DAMs is the topic of Section 5.1. 
4.2.1 Bid	formats:	simple,	block	and	complex	bids	
In the literature three types of bids are identified: simple price-quantity bids, (linked) block price-
quantity bids and complex (or multi-part) bids. In an auction with uniform marginal pricing, as is the 
case in the DAM, the optimal bidding strategy for market participants is to bid their marginal cost.37 
Namely, if market participants bid higher than their marginal cost and their bid is not accepted, there 
will be instances where they could have made a profit, while if they bid lower there is a probability 
that they would lose money if they are called to generate. It can be argued that simple bids and an 
optimal bidding strategy are not compatible. The reason for this is that a generator cannot include 
non-convex costs, e.g. start-up cost and minimum run levels. These non-convex costs are becoming 
more prominent as the share of renewables increases in the generation mix. 
 
One remedy which is used today in the DAM is to allow for block bids. Different formats of block bids 
exist, for more details see e.g. Meeus et al. (2009). In short, a block bid can be defined as an all-or-
nothing order of a given amount of electric energy in multiple consecutive hours.38 A minimum revenue 
needs to be obtained for the period of the block bid before acceptance. But, again for block bids, non-
convex costs cannot be explicitly represented, and a mark-up needs to be included.  Also, 
(computational) time needed to find a solution for the clearing algorithm increases with the 
introduction of block bids. The CACM states in Article 40(2) that the products covering one market 
                                                             
37 It should be added that this statement only holds in the absence of market power (i.e. in the absence of ability 
to affect prices). 
38 It is important to mention that block bids can have different meanings.  For example, in the US ‘a block bid’ 
can simply imply a one-hour bid of which also a part of the total quantity offered can be cleared. 
25 
 
time unit (an hour) and multiple market time units (multiple hours) should be accommodated by the 
matching algorithms of the NEMOs. This implies simple and block bids to be within the boundaries of 
the regulation. 
 
Neuhoff et al. (2015a, 2015b) and Neuhoff and Schwenen (2013) provide five arguments in favour of 
complex bids, wherein non-convex costs are explicitly presented, over simple and block bids. Firstly, 
less informed (smaller) participants have greater difficulty determining the optimal mark-up to 
incorporate in their block bids. If mark-ups are not set at an appropriate level, which is probable, the 
efficiency of the market outcome decreases, while transaction costs and the uncertainty for market 
participants increase. Second, market monitoring for block bids is almost impossible as the underlying 
costs structure is not defined. In contrast, complex bids with energy bids and ramping and start-up 
costs nominations follow auditable cost structures. Third, simple and block-bidding do not lend 
themselves easily to the provision of early and reliable unit specific generation patterns. By using 
energy-only bids the flexibility of thermal generation assets cannot be made fully available to the 
market, generation is often optimised within the portfolio of utilities or aggregators with the 
implication that system operators have limited information on the ultimate generation pattern to be 
considered for flow calculations.  Also, it is argued that in contrast to block bids, the reflection of 
technical characteristics in complex bids – instead of combinatorial questions – is more suitable for 
computation of market clearing. Lastly, with block bids, the liquidity in standardised auctions might be 
undermined as bids only are valid conditional on being accepted for longer time durations. Today, 
complex bids are present mostly in the US electricity markets, but also in some European markets, e.g. 
Spain and Poland (Brijs et al., 2017; Neuhoff et al., 2016c).   
 
A commonly used argument against complex bids made by generators is that they would need to 
reveal commercially sensitive information in their bids. Neuhoff et al. (2015b) state that it is expected 
that the level of information sharing will not be extended beyond the level of sharing that is already 
necessary with TSOs. Meeus and Belmans (2007) state that with block-bids the pricing approach in 
dealing with non-convexities is simpler than with complex bids. Arguably, it can be harder to couple 
markets allowing for complex bids because they can apply a different implementation of non-linear 
pricing internally.39 The reason is that it is politically difficult to harmonise the treatment of non-
convexities and especially if the treatment is already fine-tuned, which is less the case with easier-to-
harmonise block bids. The CACM states that NEMOs shall submit a joint proposal concerning products 
that can be taken into account in the single day-ahead market coupling (CACM, Art. 40(1)). It is added 
that the orders resulting from these products should be expressed in euros and make reference to the 
market time. 
4.2.2 Temporal	granularity	
Today, in the European DAM the market time unit of traded products is one hour. This granularity in 
the DAM is not directly seen as problematic in the academic literature, under the condition that 
                                                             
39 Without going into too much technical detail, when allowing for block bids and/or complex bids, it is not always 
feasible to find a clearing price for which all accepted offers are in-the-money (not making losses), or for which 
all rejected offers are out-of-the-money (making money). Broadly speaking, in the US, with complex bids, some 
accepted offers are making losses when considering solely the clearing price. This problem is solved with uplift 
payments. In Europe, with block bids, some rejected block offers could be making money considering the clearing 
price, these are so called ‘paradoxically rejected blocks’ (Meeus et al., 2009). See also, section 2.2.2. in 
Papavasiliou and Smeers (2017). 
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products with finer resolution are offered in intraday markets and/or locally. However, it is clear that 
the finer the granularity, the more volatile the prices. These prices can better reflect and reward the 
value of flexibility in the system. Units can take advantage of price volatility when they can ramp up or 
ramp down faster. Flexible resources need clear signals to encourage investment and to deliver energy 
when needed. A shorter market time-unit can deliver these incentives.  
 
Also, some issues might occur as the settlement period over which market participants are financially 
responsible for having a balanced portfolio is 15 minutes or 30 minutes.40 Therefore, shorter market 
time-units would allow for a better alignment of trading in the DAM and imbalances in real-time (Brijs 
et al., 2017). If demand and supply schedules are scheduled on a shorter time interval, reserve 
requirements might be reduced (Neuhoff et al., 2015a).41 Shorter time-units also help in shifting the 
risks from TSOs to market parties responsible for balancing their demand and supply (Frunt, 2011). 42 
Less intervention from the TSO should be required, and thus fewer costs would be socialised (Henriot 
and Glachant, 2013). In other words, by having more granular products the deterministic imbalances, 
meaning imbalances introduced due to scheduling and not due to unpredictability in 
generation/demand or unforeseen events, are expected to be more limited (Hirth and Ziegenhagen, 
2015). 
 
Counterarguments are that non-convexities are even harder to include in simple bids with finer 
temporal granularity and that the computational time to clear the market might increase significantly 
as more combinations are possible (Henriot and Glachant, 2013). Neuhoff et al. (2016)  explain that 
the finer the granularity of the bids, the greater the need for complex bids. 
4.2.3 Maximum	and	minimum	clearing	prices	
A general remark made in the literature is that price caps and floors should be removed as they distort 
the price signal and limit the ability of peaking units or more flexible resources to recover their capital 
costs, contributing to the ‘missing-money’ problem. There is no theoretical rationale for a limit to price 
floors (Henriot and Glachant, 2013) and with more participation of the demand side, increasing storage 
possibilities and a weaker presence of market power there are fewer reasons to hold on to price caps 
as well. Removing price caps will give market participants a high degree of planning security. 
Additionally, Hogan (2013) argues that higher price caps are a necessary, but not sufficient condition, 
to be consistent with a reasonable market for addressing scarcity conditions. However, in times of 
scarcity, it is difficult or impossible to distinguish real scarcity in supply from the exercise of market 
power. 
 
In the CACM, it is outlined that NEMOs, in cooperation with TSOS, shall develop a proposal on 
harmonised maximum and minimum prices to be applied in all bidding zones which participate in single 
day-ahead coupling (SDAC) (CACM, Art. 41). The CACM provides that the proposal must take into 
account an estimate of the value of lost load, intending to provide for an element of scarcity. In 
November 2017, ACER adopted a decision regarding the proposal of all NEMOs on harmonised 
                                                             
40 For more details, please consult Chapter 6 in which the balancing mechanism is presented.  
41 Shorter market time-units alone are not a sufficient condition for reducing reserves. E.g. shorter intraday gate 
closure times, discussed in Section 4.3.3, seem also to be key to reduce reserves. 
42 So-called ‘Balance Responsible Party (BRP)’, explained in the introduction to Chapter 6. 
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maximum and minimum prices for the SDAC (ACER, 2017a).43 ACER approved that the harmonised 
maximum clearing price for SDAC shall be +3000 EUR/MWh and the harmonised minimum clearing 
price for SDAC shall be -500 EUR/MWh. However, the harmonised maximum clearing price will not be 
static, namely, the harmonised maximum clearing price for SDAC shall be increased by 1,000 
EUR/MWh in the event that the clearing price exceeds a value of 60 per cent of the harmonised 
maximum clearing price for SDAC in at least one market time unit in a day in an individual bidding zone 
or in multiple bidding zones. Therefore, the harmonised maximum clearing price cannot really be seen 
as a ‘true price cap’ blocking scarcity prices from occurring. 
 The intraday market (IDM) 
Higher shares of wind and solar generation result in increasing volumes of intraday trading (see also 
Figure 8 (below) on page 20). Closer to real-time, wind- and solar (but also demand) forecasts are more 
accurate and in intraday markets production schedules can be adjusted accordingly. While the day-
ahead market design is quite harmonised in the EU, the same cannot be said about intraday market 
design. In some countries, e.g. Belgium, France and the Netherlands, shortly after the DAM auction, 
continuous trading with hourly products is possible (Brijs et al., 2017). In other countries, e.g. Spain, 
multiple intraday auctions are held (Hagemann and Weber, 2015). In Germany, a combination of 
continuous trade and auctions is in place (Neuhoff et al., 2016b). As an illustration, in Figure 12 the 
EPEX trading process in Germany is shown in more detail.  
 
Figure 12: Trading process from the DAM to the IDM gate closure in Germany by EPEX (from Neuhoff 
et al., 2016b)44,45 
                                                             
43 A proposal was also approved regarding the harmonised maximum and minimum prices of the single intraday 
coupling (SIDC). The harmonised maximum clearing price for SIDC shall be +9999 EUR/MWh and the harmonised 
minimum clearing price for SIDC shall be -9999 EUR/MWh (ACER, 2017b). The harmonised maximum clearing 
price for the SIDC will be set equal to the SDAC harmonised maximum clearing price if that price would exceed 
+9999 EUR/MWh after adjustments. 
44 In March 2017 also 30-minute products were introduced for continuous trading, these products are not 
displayed in Figure 12 (EPEX SPOT SE, 2017).  
45 15-minute products were introduced in 2011 (continuous trading) and 2014 (auction). Märkle-Huß et al. (2018) 
analyse in their paper the causal impact of 15-minute trading on the EPEX Spot market and find that the 
introduction of 15-minute products caused a reduction of the prices of existing hourly contracts and incentivizes 
renewable energy providers to offer additional electricity. 
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In Germany, first, 3 hours after the day-ahead auction an intraday auction with 15-minute products 
(thus 24*4=96 intervals) is held. It can be argued that not much new information is available for market 
participants from the gate closure of the DAM and this IDM auction. Instead, this auction is primarily 
held to allow for adjustments after the outcome of the DAM and to schedule German generation and 
demand with a finer temporal granularity.46 Just after, the continuous intraday trading with hourly 
products starts. Lastly, one hour later, intraday trading with 15-minute products initiates. 30 minutes 
before real-time delivery the intraday market gate closure takes place, and no more trading is possible. 
The goal of continuous intraday trading is different in this context as trading closer to real-time is 
possible. Its aim is to allow market participants to adjust their positions when better forecasts of 
renewable production and demand are available, or when unexpected plant outages take place.    
 
A ‘hot topic’ in the EU is whether continuous trading, auctions or a combination is the best trading 
mechanism to conduct trades in the IDM. This question is discussed in this section. Afterwards, the 
liquidity in intraday markets is described noting that liquidity cannot be decoupled from the discussion 
about the best trading mechanism. The last subsection concerns the intraday gate closure time, the 
moment when trading is no longer possible and the TSO takes over the balance of the system. 
Regarding maximum and minimum clearing prices the same logic as for the DAM holds in the IDM. 
4.3.1 Continuous	trading	vs	auctions	
Continuous trading has historically been the mechanism in place for intraday trading. In exchange 
based continuous trading, market participants submit limit orders to the order book at any time during 
the trading session. 47 All market participants can see the order book. Orders are matched if a new limit 
order is submitted that is either a buy-order with a higher price than the current best ask or a sell-
order with a lower price than the current best bid (Neuhoff et al., 2016b). Of the matched offers, the 
initially submitted offer sets the price. This implies that buyers/sellers receive the price they bid/offer 
(pay-as-bid) and that each transaction during the intraday trading session can have a different price. 
This is one of the key differences with auctions, whereby when uniform pricing is the clearing rule, all 
buyers/sellers see the same price. In Box 3 the optimal clearing rule is discussed.  
 
The CACM states that continuous trading should be in place in the intraday time frame. The matching 
algorithm should be able to accommodate orders covering one market time unit and multiple market 
time units (blocks). The market time unit is not specified and shall be defined by a proposal submitted 
by the NEMOs (CACM, Art. 53). Next to continuous trading, complimentary regional intraday auctions 
may be implemented if approved by the regulatory authorities (CACM, Art. 63). The CACM also 
requires the pan-European solution based on continuous trading to be complemented by ‘reliable 
pricing of capacity’ (see Section 5.2.2 for more details). 48 
 
                                                             
46 This auction is not opened for cross-zonal generation/demand. 
47 A limit order is a price-quantity pair and allows you to specify the maximum amount you are willing to pay for 
electric energy (when you buy) or the minimum amount you are willing to receive for electric energy (when you 
sell). A market order, also often allowed, solely specifies a quantity and is used to buy or sell immediately at the 
best available price. 
48 In line with Article 55 of CACM, all TSOs have submitted to the National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) a 
methodology for intraday capacity pricing which would introduce an auction at the intraday cross-zonal gate 
opening time in the European Intraday market (ENTSO-E, 2017f).   
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Box 3: The optimal auction clearing rule – Marginal (or uniform) pricing vs pay-as-bid 
With continuous trading, pay-as-bid is implicitly the clearing rule used. With an auction, either pay-
as-bid or uniform pricing can be opted for. In DAM auctions, marginal pricing is in place and in IDM 
auctions in Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal also the marginal pricing rule is implemented. 
However, in the balancing markets (BM) both marginal and pay-as-bid rules are employed in the EU.  
 
One paper is very frequently cited in the literature regarding this matter, namely ‘Uniform pricing or 
pay-as-bid pricing: a dilemma for California and beyond’ by Kahn et al. (2001). The most important 
idea brought forward in the paper is that the common mistake made by people advocating that pay-
as-bid pricing would lead to lower costs compared to uniform pricing is the fact that bidding 
strategies will be very different according to the clearing rule in place. Under pay-as-bid, the market 
participants would no longer have an incentive to bid their avoidable costs but, instead, would base 
their bids anticipating the market price. This would largely remove the hoped-for savings from pay-
as-bid (Littlechild, 2007). The main arguments made in favour of marginal pricing over pay-as-bid 
pricing are (Kahn et al., 2001; Littlechild, 2007; Müsgens et al., 2014): 
 
• Pay-as-bid introduces some inevitable reduction in efficiency as generators depart from 
bidding their marginal costs. Because if they solely bid their marginal cost and their bid is accepted, 
they won’t receive any compensation for their fixed costs or a contribution to profits. With all bids 
exceeding the marginal costs, by amounts that depend upon the varying estimates of the bidders of 
what would be the highest accepted bid, the perfect, total cost-minimizing merit order dispatch is 
no longer assured.  
 
• Another inefficiency introduced by pay-as-bid is the cost of forecasting market prices that it 
would impose on all participants. There are significant economies of scale in the efforts to gather 
the necessary information and make such forecasts on a continuing, hour-by-hour and day-by-day 
basis. The data analytics necessary to forecast market pricing dynamics are complex and costly.  
Under pay-as-bid, large players are more likely to have the resources available to gather better 
insight in bidding strategies and thus gain an advantage by forecasting prices. In short, marginal 
pricing rewards low costs (because all winners get the same price) whereas pay-as-bid rewards good 
(but costly) guesses (because guesses determine the price). 
 
• There is a greater transparency of bidding under uniform pricing than under pay-as-bid 
facilitating attempts to detect uncompetitive behaviour. If the market were competitive, all bidders 
would have the incentive under uniform pricing to bid their marginal costs. Since at least marginal 
generating costs are relatively easily measured, it should be feasible to ascertain whether bid prices 
had exceeded those levels. 
 
• Under pay-as-bid no transparent price to serve as a benchmark for contract markets is 
available. Neuhoff et al. (2016a) argue that a price reference closer to real-time is necessary. 
 
• Under pay-as-bid a supplier with market power can be successful in an auction with a bid 
increased beyond what would have been the bid in a competitive market. Under uniform price the 
monopolistically leveraged price automatically goes to all competitors alike. However, as discussed 
below, with marginal pricing there are also concerns when market power is present. 
 
An argument against marginal pricing is:  
 
• Market power is the main concern when marginal pricing is applied. Namely, if there is 
imperfect competition and marginal pricing in place, suppliers with market power have incentives 
to reduce supply that could otherwise be profitably operated. The reason is that reducing supply 
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may increase the market clearing price and thus the profitability of the infra-marginal units. An 
analogous strategy is not possible with pay-as-bid, because bids on one unit cannot directly influence 
the payments for other units.  
 
Overall, auction theory does not find a unique ranking with respect to efficiency or procurement 
costs regarding the settlement rules (Ausubel and Cramton, 2002). However, considering all 
arguments summarised in this Box, marginal pricing seems to be favoured for auctions in electricity 
markets. 
 
Next to the arguments in Box 3 summing up the benefits of auctions with uniform prices, three 
additional arguments in favour of auctions can be added: 
 
1/ Allocation of cross-zonal transmission capacity (discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.1): One of the 
most important arguments in favour of auctions in the IDM is the fact that auctions would facilitate 
the coupling of the IDM as the DAM is coupled today. One of the challenges with coupling is the 
allocation of cross-zonal transmission capacity. The most efficient solution would be to hold intraday 
auctions which simultaneously allocate transmission capacity (implicit allocation). Combining efficient 
allocation of  transmission capacity with continuous trading is not straightforward (Neuhoff et al., 
2016b). With continuous trading in place, valuable transmission capacity would be allocated on a first-
come-first-served basis, thus possibly favouring more rapid/experienced traders instead of efficient 
ones. Extending this point, auctions would prevent robots capturing increasing shares of bid-ask 
spreads and scarcity value of transmission capacity in the market. 
 
2/ Liquidity (discussed in more detail in the next subsection): The (single) price obtained from an auction 
increases price transparency, this is not the case with continuous trading whereby an average or other 
indices need to be computed. A liquid and transparent intraday price is beneficial especially for hedging 
and ultimately for providing clear price signals to attract investment in flexibility (Neuhoff et al., 
2015b). In contrast, this stretching of liquidity over the whole trading period when continuous trading 
is in place can make the intraday market price volatile and non-transparent (Hagemann and Weber, 
2015). Also, auctions tend to involve significantly lower fees for participants trading in intraday markets 
(Neuhoff et al., 2015b). Additionally, continuous trading is unlikely to deliver the liquidity for different 
types of block-bids to support efficient bilateral matching (Neuhoff et al., 2015b). 
 
3/ Operational security: Auctions are operationally simpler for the exchange and involve lower risk of 
technical malfunctions of market systems (Neuhoff et al., 2016b). Additionally, Neuhoff et al.  (2016a) 
explain that as generation units will mark-up their bids during continuous intraday trading to reflect 
opportunity costs, the market outcome may not reflect an efficient generation schedule. In a 
subsequent real-time balancing auction with uniform pricing, generation units will submit bids 
reflecting their marginal cost and the auction clearing results in a least-cost generation schedule. This 
might imply significant adjustments to the output of individual power stations resulting in greater 
uncertainty regarding flow patterns very close to real time. 
 
An argument in favour of continuous trading is made by Henriot (2012). He argues that continuous 
markets provide participants with a sufficient degree of freedom to express their needs, while discrete 
auctions may lead to inefficiencies due to lost trading opportunities. In this vein, Hagemann and Weber 
31 
 
(2015) mention that continuous markets allow 24/7 trading and thus market participants may trade 
imbalances as soon as they appear. Hence, new information can be used continuously. Additionally, 
Bellenbaum et al. (2014) state that the longer time lag for auction-based trading between gate closure 
and actual delivery tends to lower the informational efficiency.  
4.3.2 Liquidity	in	the	IDM	
Liquidity is necessary to have a clear price signal in the IDM for market participants to offer their 
flexibility in this market on the short term and encourage investment in the long term. At the time of 
writing, liquidity is still a concern in most EU intraday markets. Figure 13 gives an overview of the 
liquidity in the IDM in some European countries using data from 2012. 
An easy inference that could be made from Figure 13 is that an auction-based market design in the 
IDM fosters liquidity.  ID auctions in Spain and Italy show a higher liquidity than IDM of other European 
countries with continuous trading in place. This observation is studied in the paper by Hagemann and 
Weber (2015) and discussed by Chaves-Ávila and Fernandes (2015). Hagemann and Weber (2015) 
conclude that the high volumes observed in auction-based intraday markets cannot be explained by 
the auction-based design but are mainly caused by market peculiarities. They developed an analytical 
method which considers wind and solar power forecast errors, power plant outages with relevance for 
intraday trading, market concentration and portfolio internal netting options as the main drivers of 
trading volume.  
 
Figure 13: Intraday markets in selected European countries with 2012 data (Hagemann and Weber, 
2015) 
Next to these fundamental drivers, one of the most important reasons found for the high liquidity in 
the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese market was that rescheduling of power plants’ generation output 
within one generation portfolio is only possible via trades in the intraday market. No bilateral trade 
after the DAM and internal portfolio netting outside of the market are allowed (Rodilla and Batlle, 
2015). Additionally, Hagemann and Weber (2015) also argue that renewable support schemes have an 
influence on IDM liquidity. In countries with low-risk support schemes, such as a feed-in tariff (FIT), the 
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balancing responsibility is typically transferred to the TSO (or DSO).  TSOs need to trade the imbalances 
on the intraday markets, raising the trading volume. On the contrary, in countries with high-risk 
support schemes, such as feed-in premiums (FIP), the owners of vRES are responsible for their forecast 
errors. Unlike the TSO, these parties can either use controllable generation for internal self-balancing 
or do not manage forecast errors actively in the intraday market if they are too small. 
Chaves-Ávila and Fernandes (2015) and Rodilla and Batlle (2015) also mention three other reasons 
explaining the high liquidity in the Spanish market. Firstly, there is an additional upward regulation 
reserve, which can be called upon, consisting of units which were not dispatched in the DAM. If a unit 
gets selected in this market, it is forced to bid into the IDM in order to get committed. Also, there is a 
national coal support mechanism which has given incentives to some units to avoid being committed 
in the DAM and to bid in the IDM instead. And lastly, price arbitrage opportunities have been identified 
between DAM and IDM in recent years. These might have been (partly) caused by the regulation 
around this upward reserve and the national coal support scheme. 
As mentioned before, in December 2014, an auction with 15-minute products was introduced in 
Germany (Figure 12). Neuhoff et al. (2016b) have observed that the implementation of this auction led 
to increased liquidity. They find that traded intraday volumes with 10-15 GWh have been much higher 
than with continuous trading alone that rarely cleared more than 5 GWh. In contrast with Hagemann 
and Weber (2015) and Chaves-Ávila and Fernandes (2015), Neuhoff et al. (2016b) do not attribute the 
high liquidity levels to market peculiarities, but more clearly argue in favour of intraday auctions over 
continuous trading in the IDM. 
 
Not yet mentioned in this discussion but extremely relevant to this matter is the fact that sufficiently 
high imbalance settlements, paid when a party is found to be unbalanced in real-time, should give an 
incentive for market participants to balance their output on the IDM. If these price signals are not 
strong enough, market participants will not feel the need to trade on the IDM and liquidity will remain 
low. Additionally, if vRES were held responsible (preferably under the same rules as conventional units) 
for their imbalances, they would be forced to trade in the IDM. Also, transparent ‘near-real-time’ 
information about the system state is of crucial importance. If market participants have this 
information, they can estimate potential imbalance settlements and they will be strongly incentivised 
to balance their positions in the IDM, especially when it is highly needed from a system perspective. In 
brief, a well-functioning liquid IDM depends on well-designed imbalance settlement rules.  
4.3.3 IDM	gate	closure:	the	gap	between	trading	and	real-time	operation	
As implicitly stated in Article 59 (2) of the CACM, the length of the IDM gate closure is a trade-off 
between: 
‘(a) a maximisation of market participants' opportunities for adjusting their balances by trading in the 
intraday market time-frame as close as possible to real time;  
and (b) providing TSOs and market participants with sufficient time for their scheduling and balancing 
processes in relation to network and operational security.’ 
Further, it is stated in the CACM that the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time, the gate closure time 
for cross-zonal transmission capacity, shall be at most one hour before real-time (CACM, Art. 59(3)). 
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Intraday energy trading for a given market time unit for a bidding zone border shall be allowed until 
the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time (CACM, Art. 59(4)). 
The closer gate closure to real-time, the better vRES will be able to update their forecasts and the more 
they will be trading in the IDM to avoid imbalances (if imbalance settlements give the required 
incentive to adjust). A gate closure closer to real time will lead to a higher liquidity in the intraday 
market and a better deployment of flexible resources, the only resources, next to (fast) demand 
response (DR), that are able to adjust their output close to real time. Because of a more accurate 
dispatch of flexible peak units, fewer power plants will have to operate (inefficiently) at partial load in 
order to deliver balancing services (Müsgens and Neuhoff, 2006). Also, less reserve power capacity 
may need to be contracted, and less real-time action of the SO should be required, which would lead 
to a lower system cost if borne out.49 
The main driver of the time lag between gate closure and real-time is the fact that grid operators 
require sufficient time after the closure of trades to check system stability and take any necessary 
measures before real-time. It is undeniable that the level of coordination between TSOs and power 
exchanges will become increasingly important to minimise the gap between gate close and real time.  
 Matching markets with grids: redispatch and countertrading 
In Europe, zonal pricing is applied as described in Section 2.1. In short, this means that electricity is 
traded in a bidding zone which is linked to other bidding zones. The physical network within a bidding 
zone is treated as a copper plate (no network constraints), while the limitations of links between 
bidding zones are taken into account when trading. If cross-zonal links are congested between the 
bidding zones, the respective markets are ‘split’; if not, the markets are ‘coupled’. Coupled markets 
imply the aggregation of supply and demand curves for the coupled zones when clearing the market. 
 
Not incorporating grid constraints within bidding zones is a serious simplification. The flows which 
would result from electricity trading do not always lead to feasible flows over all lines within a bidding 
zone (internal congestion). Internal congestion is a structural problem in several regions in Europe, 
aggravated by the rapid increase in renewable generation and more volatile cross-zonal trade  (ACER 
and ENTSO-E, 2012; Dijk and Willems, 2011; Kunz and Zerrahn, 2016; Van den Bergh et al., 2015). 
 
In the short run, network congestion can be relieved by non-costly preventive measures, such as 
changing grid topology or by costlier curative measures, such as countertrading or redispatch. With 
countertrading or redispatch, the TSO arranges an increase in generation at one end of the congested 
grid area, compensated by a decrease at the other end. The costs of these deviations from the spot 
market dispatch are socialised through network tariffs (Kunz and Zerrahn, 2016). If countertrading or 
redispatch opportunities are not available, TSOs may curtail previously allocated cross-zonal 
capacities. In that case, the owners of transmission rights have to be compensated. 
 
Definitions of countertrading and redispatch are found in a presentation by ACER and ENTSOE (2012): 
 
                                                             
49 This claim is related to the discussion around the TSO’s balancing energy activation philosophy described in 
Section 6.4. of this text. 
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• Redispatch: ‘Any measure activated by one or several system operators by altering the 
generation and/or load pattern in order to change physical flows in the Transmission System 
and relieve a physical congestion. The precise generation or load pattern alteration is pre-
defined.’ Redispatching can be: 
o Internal redispatching: the redispatching is performed in the bidding zone where the 
congestion is. 
o External redispatching: the redispatching is performed in bidding zone A whereas the 
congestion is on bidding zone B. 
o Cross-zonal redispatching: the redispatching is carried out in different bidding zones 
• Countertrading: ‘Cross zonal energy exchange initiated by system operators between two 
bidding zones to relieve a physical congestion. The precise generation or load pattern alteration 
is not pre-defined.’ 
 
Redispatch can further be distinguished between preventive redispatch that is used to maintain the 
system in normal state and curative redispatch, which is activated immediately or relatively soon after 
operational security limits are violated (e.g. Netzstabilitätsanlagen in Germany). 
 
In the CACM, Article 35(5) it is stated that the pricing of redispatch and countertrading shall be based 
on: 
 
‘(a) prices in the relevant electricity markets for the relevant time frame; or 
(b) costs of redispatching and/or countertrading resources calculated transparently on the basis of 
incurred costs.’ 
ACER and CEER (2016) report that the remuneration of activated internal or cross-zonal redispatching 
differs among Member States. It is found that the most common method used is the pay-as-bid pricing 
followed by the regulated pricing based on either a market price (e.g. DAM price) or a cost-based 
pricing (e.g. remuneration for the cost of fuel and other costs related to the change in the operating 
schedule of the plant).50 
 
Redispatch and countertrading are short-term solutions to solve internal congestion. In the long run, 
the TSO can build new lines to accommodate the flow patterns. Alternatively, bidding zones can be 
redrawn or nodal electricity markets can be introduced. Nodal pricing is applied in some regions of the 
US (e.g. PJM) and can be considered as an extreme form of zonal pricing, namely each node in the 
transmission network becomes a bidding zone. Dijk and Willems (2011) explain that ‘under nodal spot 
pricing, electricity prices reflect physical constraints, and hence, scarcity of the transmission network. 
In the short run, nodal spot prices, therefore, ensure optimal usage of the transmission network. Over 
the long term, they give the optimal incentives for new investments.’  
 
                                                             
50 It can be argued that the best approximation for a fair redispatch price would be the price of the balancing 
market at the relevant market time unit (and not the DAM price), since redispatch is (or should be) activated 
close to real time. More precisely, the activated energy for redispatch has not been sold in the DA or IDM, hence, 
the market price was lower than the production/opportunity costs. Better pricing of redispatch would lead to 
increased efficiency in the scheduling of available generation/demand units. 
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None of these three solutions is without downsides. Building new transmission lines cost time, just as 
redrawing bidding zones do, and nodal pricing is not in line with the European target model for many 
reasons.51  
 
Lastly, it is generally agreed that closer cooperation in congestion management between TSOs has a 
beneficial impact. More specifically, the sharing of network and dispatch information, cross-zonal 
counter-trading, and multilateral redispatch can reduce overall system costs and allow for more cross-
zonal capacity to be offered to the market (ACER and ENTSO-E, 2012; Kunz and Zerrahn, 2016). For 
that reason, the CACM (Art. 35) strongly advocates more coordinated remedial actions, in particular 
for cross-zonal relevance. For example, TSOs, at least within a capacity calculation region, shall agree 
on a common redispatching and/or countertrading arrangements. Also, Article 74 describes that a 
redispatch and countertrading cost-sharing methodology will be developed as coordinated remedial 
actions can have distributional effects. 
  
                                                             
51 For a discussion of the EU vs US view on electricity market integration, please consult a recording of the FSR 
online debate on this topic:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UerHK6DQH64  
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5. Integrating	day-ahead	and	intraday	markets	
Glachant and Lévêque (2006) identified the improvement of the congestion management of 
interconnectors to be the single priority action to be undertaken to foster the internal EU electricity 
market. After significant progress, ten years later, Glachant (2016) describes the formation of an 
internal electricity market as follows: 
 
‘The EU opened its many national power markets without a “Target Model” of any kind (and then 
without a common “Market Design”) and stayed as such for 13 years (1996–2009). A “Target Model” 
finally emerged, but it had never been defined in any European single regulation or Green Paper. It has 
been produced by qualified European actors through an institutional process originated in the 3rd 
European Energy Package. This “Target Model” has at least three key characteristics:  
 
o 1° It brings a large “merit order” at a European scale from a reference pricing mechanism being 
the one of energy traded in Power Exchanges on Day-Ahead.  
o 2° It simplifies TSO cross-border trading by “zoning” the grids as if each EU TSO grid was some 
type of “national copper plate”; and, by “coupling” the allocation of grid access between these 
“zoned area copper plate” grids with the merit order built into the PXs in Day-Ahead trading. 
This is done only after having chosen a guaranteed inter-zonal capacity calculated ex ante (on 
the same Day-Ahead horizon) by the grid transmission operators (the TSOs).  
o 3° This “Target Model” has its own “last mile” hard task being to open a similar “zones cross-
border” process for the shortest time frames (Intraday & Balancing) as to “Europeanise” the last 
step to power reserve & energy balancing procurement between the TSO grid zones.’ 
 
The network codes and guidelines are developed specifically to smoothly ‘Europeanise’ electricity 
markets. In this section, first the integration of day-ahead markets will be discussed. Arguably, day-
ahead markets are quite well integrated. Overall, we seem to have almost arrived at the ‘last mile’ of 
the ‘EU Target Model’. Second, the integration of intraday markets is discussed. The integration of 
intraday markets can be considered as work-in-progress. 
 Day-ahead market integration 
One of the major accomplishments in the ‘Europeanisation’ of electricity markets is the Price Coupling 
of Regions (PCR). The PCR is a project of European Power Exchanges to harmonise the European 
electricity markets. A single price coupling algorithm, called EUPHEMIA (EU + Pan-European Hybrid 
Electricity Market Integration Algorithm), is used to calculate electricity prices across Europe from 
Portugal to Estonia. EUPHEMIA algorithm is currently operated with one power exchange per country, 
except for GB, where two power exchanges participate in the market coupling (ENTSO-E, 2017e). 
Traded electricity and transmission capacity between bidding zones are allocated simultaneously; this 
process is called implicit allocation of transmission capacity. The integrated European electricity 
market is beneficial due to increased liquidity, transparency, efficiency and social welfare. The 
geographic scope of PCR is shown in Figure 14. For more detailed information about the function of 
EUPHEMIA, please consult the presentation on PCR (2016a).  
 
In Figure 14 a distinction is made between Multi-Regional Coupling (MRC) and 4M Market Coupling (4 
MMC) countries. This is done because at the time of writing, there are two market areas operating 
under the Price Coupling of Regions model, i.e. the MRC market (19 EU countries in early 2017), which 
covers virtually the entire European Union except for Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and 
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the market of four coupled countries known as 4MMC (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania). 
Both areas apply very similar technical solutions which are ultimately to be integrated (TGE, 2015). 
Furthermore, two countries use the same PCR algorithm for calculating the hourly prices of their day-
ahead markets, albeit on an independent basis, namely, Serbia and Switzerland (OMIE, 2015). 
 
Figure 14: State-of-play in Price Coupling of Regions (PCR) as of February 2017 (ENTSO-E, 2017e) 52 
The ultimate goal of market coupling is to maximise welfare or economic surplus; this would be 
achieved through the efficient use of all available resources spread over bidding zones.53 Gains can be 
made as different countries have a different energy mix and imperfect correlated demand and 
renewable production. Key to achieving this goal are interconnectors, connecting different bidding 
zones. Implicit allocation of transmission capacity implies that if there is spare (commercially available) 
interconnector capacity available between two bidding zones their electricity prices converge.54 If not, 
the maximum exchange possible is the capacity of the congested line, and prices can diverge as 
markets are ‘split’.  A price differential between bidding zones during a certain hour results in 
congestion rent for the TSO(s) or independent party operating the interconnector.55,56 
 
Figure 15 shows the level of price convergence in different regions in the EU, comprising multiple 
bidding zones.57 Different regions show various levels of convergence. No clear trend is visible over the 
years for most regions. ‘The optimal level of price convergence’ is very hard to determine, if not 
                                                             
52 The red line highlights that borders are not coupled between Austria, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. 
53 In the CACM GL (Art. 2(46)) economic surplus is defined as the sum of (i) the supplier surplus for the single day-
ahead or intraday coupling for the relevant time period, (ii) the consumer surplus for the single day-ahead or 
intraday coupling, (iii) the congestion income and (iv) other related costs and benefits where these increase 
economic efficiency for the relevant time period, supplier and consumer surplus being the difference between 
the accepted orders and the clearing price per energy unit multiplied by the volume of energy of the orders. 
54 In more technical terms: no cross-zonal transmission constraint is binding.  
55 Congestion rent (€/h) = the price differential (€/MWh) x congested capacity of the interconnector (MW) 
56 For a recent overview of how congestion rent is spent please consult e.g. p.12-14 of ECN et al. (2017) 
57 Here defined as the % of hours the DAM prices were the same for the different bidding zones within a certain 
region. 
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impossible. 100% convergence would mean over-investment in grid infrastructure, very low 
convergence could imply underinvestment in grids or inefficient use of existing interconnector 
capacity.  The criterion in theory, under ideal assumptions, is that for an optimally developed grid the 
total congestion income would recover 100% of the total grid investment costs (Pérez-Arriaga et al., 
1995). In reality, congestion income covers only a fraction of total grid costs. 
 
Figure 15: DAM price convergence from 2008-2015 (ACER and CEER, 2016) 
The following part of this section focuses on the efficient use of cross-zonal transmission capacity. First, 
explicit and implicit allocation of transmission capacity is described in more detail. Then, methods for 
the calculation of transmission capacity available for trade are explained. Lastly, unscheduled flows are 
defined and their origins discussed. 
5.1.1 Explicit	vs	implicit	allocation	of	transmission	capacity	
There are two market-based arrangements for the (short-term) allocation of cross-zonal transmission 
capacity: explicit and implicit allocation of transmission capacity.58  With explicit trading, transmission 
capacity and energy are traded separately. Market participants wanting to sell power over a bidding 
zone border need to acquire the transmission capacity to do so and nominate it. With implicit 
allocation, electricity and transmission capacity are traded simultaneously. Cross-zonal trade is 
possible for market participants without explicitly acquiring transmission capacity under the condition 
that interconnectors are not congested (market coupling). In the PCR for the day-ahead market, 
implicit allocation is in place, as established in the CACM. 
 
Figure 16 shows how price differentials should be when transmission capacity is efficiently allocated. 
If the line between country A and B is not congested the price difference between both should be zero 
(1). However, if the line is congested in the direction of country B (2), then the price in country B should 
be higher than the price of country A, as electricity should flow from low price areas to high price areas. 
The exact difference between the price in country A and country B depends on local supply and 
demand at a certain time. Similarly, if the line is congested in the direction of country A (3), then the 
price in country A should be higher than the price in country B. 
 
                                                             
58 Kristiansen (2007) explains that there are also non-market based cross-zonal congestion arrangements 
possible, but these are not in use in the EU anymore. 
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Figure 16:  Zonal pricing and optimal cross-zonal allocation (FSR, 2014) 
Now, under ideal assumptions, the outcome for explicit allocation and implicit allocation should be the 
same and optimal (as shown in Figure 16). In Figure 17, results are shown for the French-Spanish 
border in 2012. At that time, explicit auctions for cross-zonal transmission were held, PCR was not yet 
in place. The pattern diverges quite strongly from what we would expect with optimal cross-zonal 
allocation. In some cases, the prices differ between the countries while the interconnector is not 
congested. Even more extreme, often the price in France was higher, but the electricity was flowing 
towards Spain (quadrant 1) or vice-versa (quadrant 3). Reasons for the deviation from optimal usage 
are coordination issues (timing, limited information, imperfect forecast) for market participants or 
possibly uncompetitive behaviour. 
 
Figure 17: Explicit cross-zonal allocation: use of net daily capacities on the French-Spanish 
interconnector compared with hourly DAM price differences, data of 2012 (FSR, 2014) 
Figure 18 shows the results for implicit allocation between Belgium and France in 2012. These markets 
were coupled at the time. It can be seen that with implicit allocation cross-zonal capacity is efficiently 
used. With implicit allocation, there are no coordination issues. 
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Figure 18: Implicit cross-zonal allocation : use of net daily capacities on the France-Belgium 
interconnector compared with hourly price differences, data of 2012 (FSR, 2014) 
Efficient allocation of available cross-zonal transmission capacity is an important dimension of well-
functioning integrated electricity markets. Another crucial dimension is the calculation of the total 
transmission capacity that should be allocated to market participants. In other words, in this 
subsection, efficient allocation of cross-zonal capacity was discussed while in the next subsection, the 
question ‘’how much cross-zonal capacity can be made available for trade without putting the system 
at risk?’’ is tackled. Limited available capacity for trade, even when efficiently allocated, does not lead 
to fully integrated markets. 
5.1.2 Cross-zonal	capacity	calculation:	issues	and	approaches	
It is not straightforward to properly calculate the available transmission capacity between bidding 
zones. The reason for this is that electricity doesn’t flow directly from generators to consumers, but 
spreads out over a (meshed AC) network according to the laws of physics (Kirchhoff laws). Energy flows 
across all paths in proportion to their admittance. This implies that one line can be constrained by 
other lines before reaching its maximal thermal capacity.59 Several other issues, directly or indirectly 
related to the physical nature of electricity and zonal pricing, make it impossible to fully offer the 
thermal capacity of lines for trade (Nabe and Neuhoff (2015), Schavemaker and Beune (2013) and Van 
den Bergh et al. (2016)): 
 
• Calculating cross-zonal capacity for trade is a chicken-and-egg-issue. Namely, the transmission 
capacity available for commercial transactions between pricing zones depends on the 
generation and load pattern within a bidding zone. However, the generation and load pattern 
within a bidding zone is a function of the market outcome and as such is influenced by the 
volume of transmission capacity made available by TSOs for cross-zonal trade. This implies that 
safety margins need to be introduced to compensate for the approximations and 
simplifications made. 
• Transit flows: Some cross-zonal capacity of one bidding zone will be used by parallel flows 
resulting from trade between other bidding zones. For example, trade between Germany and 
                                                             
59 For an illustrative example please see Pérez-Arriaga (2013), more precisely section 6.1.3 ‘The Transmission 
Grid: Technical Considerations’.  
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France can flow through Belgium. As such, the cross-zonal transmission capacity available for 
trade between Belgium and its neighbours will be impacted. Transit flows can be unallocated 
when the exchange causing the flow is cross-zonal and the capacity calculation is not 
coordinated with the zone facing the flow. If the cross-zonal capacity calculation is coordinated 
between the zones causing and the zone facing the transit flow, it is called an allocated transit 
flow (Schavemaker and Beune, 2013). 
• Loop flows:  Transactions within a bidding zone can have an impact on the flows through 
adjacent bidding zones. For example, if there is a commercial transaction between the North 
and the South of Germany, it is possible that electricity would flow through Poland to reach its 
destination. As such, the cross-zonal transmission capacity available for trade between Poland 
and its neighbours (mostly Germany in this case) will be impacted.  
 
Both loop flows and transit flows are so-called unscheduled flows. With an unscheduled flow the 
physical flow in the network differs from the scheduled flow. Scheduled flows result from commercial 
exchanges between consumers and producers within a bidding zone or between two different bidding 
zones (ACER, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 19: Scheduled flows (black), transit flows (white-left) and loop flows (white-right) 
(Schavemaker and Beune, 2013) 
Today, two methods are in place in Europe to perform the cross-zonal capacity calculation. The 
conventional coordinated Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) approach or the more sophisticated flow-based 
approach. The calculation is done by a coordinated capacity calculator per capacity calculation region 
as explained in Section 2.2. 60 The CACM says in recital (7) that: 
 
‘There are two permissible approaches when calculating cross-zonal capacity: flow-based or based on 
coordinated net transmission capacity. The flow-based approach should be used as a primary approach 
for day-ahead and intraday capacity calculation where cross-zonal capacity between bidding zones is 
highly interdependent. The flow-based approach should only be introduced after market participants 
have been consulted and given sufficient preparation time to allow for a smooth transition. The 
coordinated net transmission capacity approach should only be applied in regions where cross-zonal 
capacity is less interdependent and it can be shown that the flow-based approach would not bring 
added value.’ 
 
Furthermore, in Article 20(2) of CACM it states that ‘no later than 10 months after the approval of the 
proposal for a capacity calculation region in accordance with Article 15(1), all TSOs in each capacity 
calculation region shall submit a proposal for a common coordinated capacity calculation methodology 
                                                             
60 When they are all in place, RSCs are going to take over this role. 
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within the respective region.’ A methodology for both day-ahead and intraday capacity calculation shall 
be proposed. A delayed submission was permitted with respect to certain CCRs (CACM, Art. 20(3,4)). 
In the summer of 2017, the TSOs representing the Hansa, CORE, Nordic, Channel, SWE and IU CCRs 
submitted a proposal for a common coordinated capacity calculation methodology within the 
respective regions. See Figure 4 (left) for a depiction of these CCRs. At a later point it is intended that 
the capacity calculation of two or more adjacent CCRs in the same synchronous area shall be integrated 
if all CCRs implement a flow-based capacity calculation methodology (CACM, Art. 20(5)). 
 
In the remainder of this Subsection, first, the conventional NTC approach is explained. Then, the flow-
based approach is described. Lastly, possible remedies are mapped against issues with cross-zonal 
capacity calculation. 
Coordinated	Net	Transfer	Capacity	(NTC)	approach	
In the literature, the approach used to calculate NTC values is denominated the Available Transfer 
Capacity (ATC) approach (Plancke et al., 2016; Van den Bergh et al., 2016). Van den Bergh et al. (2016) 
explain that in the ATC approach the link between the physical network and commercial transactions 
is heavily simplified. Bidding zones are represented by one equivalent node, and only cross-zonal links 
are considered as shown in Figure 20 (left) for three bidding zones. 
 
Figure 20: Grid model under the ATC approach (left) and flow domain (right) (Van den Bergh et al., 
2016) 
With ATC, the cross-zonal capacity offered for one link (the so-called ATC value) is independent of the 
flows on other cross-zonal links as can be seen in Figure 20 (right). TSOs use a heuristic to calculate the 
cross-zonal capacity available for trade based on assumptions of the market outcome (2-days ahead) 
and associated physical flows. As such, capacity allocation takes place ex ante, completely separated, 
from the market clearing.  
 
At the time of writing, the ATC approach is used in European markets, except for Central-West Europe, 
where flow-based market coupling was introduced in May 2015 (ACER and CEER, 2016). Van den Bergh 
et al. (2016) add: ‘given the strong assumptions inherent to the ATC method, the ATC value needs to be 
conservative to avoid overloading physical lines.’ The ATC approach is compatible with both explicit 
and implicit allocation of transmission capacity. 
Flow-based	(FB)	approach	
In contrast, the FB approach is only compatible with implicit allocation of cross-zonal transmission 
capacity or market coupling; hence, the method is often also directly called flow-based market 
coupling (FBMC). In FBMC, although still simplified, more physical transmission constraints are taken 
into account in the market clearing. Plancke et al. (2016) explain that to arrive at the simplified network 
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model without having to consider all individual lines, each TSO defines Critical Network Elements 
(CNEs) for its control area. CNEs are also called Critical Branches in the literature and include cross-
zonal lines, but can also include internal lines or transformers that are significantly impacted by cross-
zonal exchanges.  
 
It can be said that with FBMC the cross-zonal capacity allocation happens partly ex ante and partly 
simultaneously with the market clearing as the (simplified) transmission constraints are taken into 
account in the market clearing. In other words, there is an interaction between cross-zonal capacity 
allocation and market clearing. In Figure 21 (left) a simplified representation of a grid model under 
FBMC is shown. In the calculation, cross-zonal lines are considered together with internal critical 
network elements. 
 
 
Figure 21: Grid model under FB approach (left) and flow domain (Van den Bergh et al., 2016) 
Combining all main inputs from the TSOs and flow equations, a feasible FB trading domain is obtained 
as shown in Figure 21 (right). With FBMC, the cross-zonal capacity offered to the market on one line is 
no longer independent from other cross-zonal flows. Actually, in the FB approach, the entire (in most 
cases larger) flow domain is offered to the market. In contrast to the ATC approach, with the FB 
approach the market, driven by bids and offers, decides on the allocation of transmission capacity 
among market participants.  
 
As stated before, with FBMC cross-zonal capacity allocation happens partly ex ante and partly 
simultaneously with market clearing. In the previous paragraph, the simultaneous part was discussed. 
The ex ante part refers to the main inputs from TSOs which are combined on a regional level and 
needed to determine the flow domain. The FBMC is a process, not a one-step calculation, which starts 
two days before real-time (‘Base Case’) and ends the morning one day ahead. At that moment, the 
coordinated capacity calculators deliver the necessary parameters to the NEMO who is in charge of 
the day-ahead market clearing algorithm. The FB-parameters incorporated in the market clearing 
algorithm are challenging to determine (Plancke et al., 2016; Van den Bergh et al., 2016).61  They consist 
of: 
• Zonal Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs):  
                                                             
61 For transparency reasons, the way they are determined should be described in detail in the capacity calculation 
methodology per CCR (CACM, Art. 21(1)). This was already the case for the CWE FBMC, this data is published on 
the website of the JAO (www.jao.eu -> Support-> CWE FBMC). 
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o What? Zonal PTDFs describe the linear relationship between the physical flow in a 
critical branch and the net exchange position of a specific bidding zone.62 They are 
formulated in a (sparse) matrix form with on one dimension all the bidding zones and 
on the other dimension all the cross-zonal interconnectors. 
o How are they derived? With zonal pricing, nodes are grouped per zone. This implies 
that in order to correctly represent flows between zones, zonal PTDFs need to be 
approximated from what happens at nodal level within a zone. Generation Shift Keys 
(GSKs) ‘translate’ changes in generation/consumption at nodal level to impacts on the 
net exchange level of a zone. GSKs are not easy to determine as they are based on 
predictions of the market outcome and subject to forecast errors. Each TSO calculates 
the GSKs for his control area. Van den Bergh et al. (2016) describe that the way TSOs 
derived GSKs in the past was not harmonised. The CACM establishes in Article 24 that 
the common capacity calculation methodology (per capacity calculation regions) shall 
include a proposal for a methodology to determine a common way to derive 
generation shift keys for each bidding zone. Additionally, the common grid model 
plays a crucial role in obtaining optimal forecast to increase the accuracy of GSKs. 
 
• Available Margins (AM) on Critical Network elements (CNE): 
o What? The AM is the maximal flow (a fraction of the thermal limit) that can be carried 
by CNEs due to flows induced by day-ahead trade. In the literature, the Available 
Margin is also referred to as the Remaining Available Margin (RAM). 
o How are they derived? The determination of 1.) what the critical network elements 
are within a control zone and 2.) the contingencies (critical outages) to be considered 
for system security are key for the determination of this FB-parameter. Van den Bergh 
et al. (2016) find that the exact method to derive the AM is confusing and 
inconsistently formulated in consulted FBMC reports. In general, AM are derived as 
the maximal flow an element can carry minus 3 flows: 
§ The Reference Flow on a CNE: the reference flow is caused by transactions 
between or within bidding zones other than the DA market, such bilateral 
transactions or transactions in forward markets. 
§ A Final Adjustment value: a margin which is TSO specific and depends on, for 
example, complex remedial actions. To determinate this value it is important 
to ensure that there is no discrimination between internal and cross-zonal 
flows (CACM, Art. 29(7)(d)). 
§ A Flow Reliability Margin: a safety margin compensating for approximations 
made in the FB-approach 
Also, regarding the calculation of the AM and its components, the CACM tends to 
create transparency and harmonisation with Article 29. 
 
Van den Bergh et al. (2016) state that by better representing the physical characteristics with the FB 
approach, the cross-zonal capacity offered to the market can be determined in a less conservative way. 
Plancke et al. (2016) agree that the FB is more sophisticated than the ATC approach, resulting in 
(theoretically) higher cross-zonal capacity offered to the market. However, the authors add that 
operational challenges could arise due to the increased complexity.  
                                                             
62 The net exchange position of a bidding zone is equal to the total production within the zone minus the total 
consumption within a zone. If the production is higher than the consumption, the zone will be a net exporter. 
Vice-versa the zone would be a net importer. 
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Limited	commercial	cross-zonal	capacity:	causes	and	issues	
ACER and CEER (2017, 2016) find in their Market Monitoring Report (MMR) that, in recent years, the 
volume of tradable cross-zonal capacities in the EU has remained relatively limited. Improvement was 
anticipated after investments in transmission networks were made and some progress in capacity 
calculation methods was seen. Important variation between regions are found, but on most EU borders 
only a small proportion of the physical capacity is offered to the market. The MMR analysis shows that 
on average 84% of HVDC and 28% of HVAC interconnector’s thermal capacity was used for trading in 
2015 (ACER and CEER, 2016).  
 
However, the thermal capacity of a line is not the best metric to assess whether a reasonable 
proportion of the capacity is offered to the market. Therefore a new metric is introduced in the latest 
ACER and CEER MMR of 2016, published in 2017.63 This new metric, called ‘the benchmark capacity’, 
is the maximum capacity that could be made available to the market on a given border if the recent 
Agency’s Recommendation on capacity calculation were to be followed.64 What this means is that i) 
cross-zonal capacity is only limited by cross-zonal network elements and that ii) the full capacity of 
these network elements is fully available for cross-zonal exchanges. In other words, it is assumed that 
no internal flows or loop flows are prioritised over offering cross-zonal capacity for trade; the 
remaining congestion within bidding zones is assumed to be addressed via remedial actions. 
Additionally, it assumed that the thermal capacity of all individual cross-zonal network elements is 
reduced by 15% to cope with uncertainty (RM) and with a residual amount of UFs that would remain 
in any ‘close-to-ideal’ configuration of bidding zones. Furthermore, the methodology for calculating 
benchmark capacity respects the N-1 security criterion.  Lastly, the methodology requires that the 
values of benchmark capacity on different borders must be simultaneously feasible.65  
 
The results of the ACER and CEER assessment for 2016 show that an average of 47% of the HVAC 
benchmark capacity was made available for trading, showing considerable room for improvement. As 
expected, the share of the benchmark capacity made available for trading was much higher (over 85% 
on average) for HVDC interconnectors. The results for different regions are shown in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: Ratio between the available cross-border capacity for trade and the benchmark capacity 
of HVAC interconnectors per region in 2016 (ACER and CEER, 2017) 
                                                             
63 If 100% of the physical capacity of an HVAC line would be offered to the market, it would mean that: no margin 
for security is foreseen, the network is perfectly built (no ‘bottlenecks’ due to Kirchhoff’s laws) and bidding zones 
are perfectly demarcated.  
64 This is the Recommendation of the Agency No 02/2016 of 11 November 2016 (ACER, 2016b). 
65 For a more detailed explanation of the methodology to calculate benchmark capacities for cross-zonal 
exchange, please consult Annex 2 of ACER and CEER (2017). 
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A first reason described in ACER and CEER (2016,2017) which could explain the low utilisation rates of 
cross-zonal capacity is a lack of coordination between TSOs concerning the cross-zonal capacity 
calculation. For 40 out of 48 assessed borders, either a bilateral or partly coordinated capacity 
calculation method is applied (ACER and CEER (2016)). Additionally, on many borders during certain 
market time frames, capacity calculation is simply not applied by at least one of the TSOs. The CACM 
is tackling this issue by establishing coordinated capacity regions (CACM, Art. 15(1)) and demanding a 
common capacity calculation methodology per CCR (Art. 20(2)). Also, by 31 December 2020, all regions 
shall use a harmonised capacity calculation methodology, which is described in more detail in Article 
21(4) of the CACM. 
 
A second reason explaining the low utilisation rates of cross-zonal transmission capacity, stated in the 
same reports, is the controversial claim that due to the lack of correct and adequate incentives for 
TSOs, the latter prefer, during the capacity calculation process, to limit ex ante cross-zonal capacities 
in order to limit the costs of redispatching and countertrading required to accommodate internal flows. 
It is hard to prove that TSOs demonstrate such behaviour. Glachant and Pignon (2005) demonstrate, 
using a theoretical example, that such behaviour could be both feasible and would necessitate only a 
slight manipulation of the data. In the CACM, it is clearly stated that internal and cross-zonal flows 
should be treated equally. More precisely, it is stated that there should be no undue discrimination 
between internal and cross-zonal flows. In Article 23 of the CACM it is written that:66 
 
 (1) Each TSO shall respect the operational security limits and contingencies used in operational security 
analysis.  
 
(2) If the operational security limits and contingencies used in capacity calculation are not the same as 
those used in operational security analysis, TSOs shall describe in the proposal for the common capacity 
calculation methodology the particular method and criteria they have used to determine the 
operational security limits and contingencies used for capacity calculation.  
 
 (3) If TSOs apply allocation constraints, they can only be determined using: 67 
 (a) constraints that are needed to maintain the transmission system within operational 
 security limits and that cannot be transformed efficiently into maximum flows on critical 
 network elements; or  
 
 (b) constraints intended to increase the economic surplus for single day-ahead or intraday 
 coupling. 
                                                             
66 ACER (2016) repeats point 3 of Article 23 of CACM in their recommendation on the common capacity 
calculation and redispatch and countertrading cost sharing methodologies to not take into account internal 
congestion when calculating cross-zonal capacity (it should in principle be resolved with remedial actions in the 
short term and other solutions in the long term), except temporarily, if:  
(a) it is needed to ensure operational security; and 
(b) it is economically more efficient than other available remedies (taking into account the EU-wide welfare 
effects of the reduction of cross-zonal capacity) and minimises the negative impacts on the internal market in 
electricity. 
67 Allocation constraints are defined in the CACM (Art. 2(6)) as the constraints to be respected during capacity 
allocation to maintain the transmission system within operational security limits and which have not been 
translated into cross-zonal capacity or are needed to increase the efficiency of capacity allocation; 
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Next to increased coordination between TSOs and equal treatment of internal and cross-zonal flows, 
there are other issues directly related to zonal pricing, the (mainly political) choice made in the EU 
Target Model.68  
 Intraday market integration 
The Target Model for the intraday market has been laid down in the CACM and is based on continuous 
trading where cross-zonal transmission capacity is allocated through implicit continuous allocation. 
Implicit allocation implies that the common IT system will accommodate the continuous matching of 
bids and orders from market participants in one bidding zone with bids and orders coming from its 
own bidding zone and from any other bidding zone while cross-zonal capacity is still available. By 
integrating intraday markets, the opportunities for market parties to trade close to real-time can be 
significantly increased as they also can benefit from the available liquidity in other zones next to their 
bidding zone, which increases matching probabilities. This initiative is called the Cross-Border Intraday 
Market Project (XBID). Currently, the XBID project is comprised of members from 15 European 
countries, as illustrated in Figure 23. Accession countries are future members of the XBID project. The 
complex XBID project is a work-in-progress and plans to go live in the beginning of 2018.69 
  
XBID will not only support implicit continuous intraday trading but also explicit intraday cross-zonal 
allocation of transmission capacity. Both are in line with the CACM. More precisely, Article 64 says 
that: 
 
‘Where jointly requested by the regulatory authorities of the Member States of each of the bidding zone 
borders concerned, the TSOs concerned shall also provide explicit allocation, in addition to implicit 
allocation, that is to say, capacity allocation separate from the electricity trade, via the capacity 
management module on bidding zone borders.’ 
 
However, explicit allocation of cross-zonal transmission capacity is only transitional as implied by 
Article 65, titled ‘Removal of explicit allocation’. More precisely: 
  
‘The NEMOs concerned shall cooperate closely with the TSOs concerned and shall consult market 
participants in order to translate the needs of market participants linked to explicit capacity allocation 
rights into non-standard intraday products.’ 70 
 
                                                             
68 The reasons the EU Target Model chose for zonal pricing over nodal pricing (applied in several parts of the US) 
is beyond the scope of this report. 
69 As stated on the website of Nord Pool AS, link https://www.nordpoolgroup.com/TAS/intraday-
trading/intraday-upgrade/ consulted on 22/12/’17. 
70 Non-standard intraday products offered through implicit allocation. 
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Figure 23: State-of-play of XBID as of February 2017 (ENTSO-E, 2017e) 
A major difference between the DAM integration and IDM integration is the fact that the former is 
based on ‘coupling’ auctions of bidding zones (single merit order if no transmission constraints are 
present), while the latter is based on ‘merging’ order books for continuous trading. It is generally 
agreed that it is more straightforward to efficiently allocate cross-zonal capacity with auctions. The 
pros and cons of auctions vs continuous trading have already been discussed in Section 4.3.1. In this 
section, the implications for the allocation of cross-zonal capacity of both options are further 
elaborated on. 
5.2.1 Integration	with	continuous	trading	
Bellenbaum et al. (2014) describe in their paper six methods to allocate cross-zonal capacity in the 
intraday market frame. Three methods are based on continuous trading, two on auctions and one 
hybrid method combining both. 
 
In this Subsection we focus only on one method based on continuous trading, namely, continuous 
cross-zonal trading with implicit allocation of cross-zonal transmission capacity. This method will be in 
place when the XBID goes live. Trading is based on an order book and is possible every day around the 
clock until intraday gate closure, e.g. one hour before delivery. Bids are continuously matched, 
disregarding the time of order placement, and cross-zonal capacities (calculated using the NTC 
approach) are automatically updated after each executed trade. Two problems arise with this method: 
 
1.) No market-based allocation of cross-zonal transmission capacity: Transmission capacity is allocated 
on a first-come-first-serve and is not priced. Neuhoff et al. (2016a) explain that the first mover receives 
the potential scarcity value of transmission capacity. In short, this allocation favours quick trades, 
rather than efficient ones. Pricing of transmission capacity could be introduced within this method: 
capacity prices could be administratively set ex ante or ex post or through explicit auctions. Both 
approaches introduce inefficiencies. 
 
2.) Suboptimal calculation of available cross-zonal transmission capacity: It is impossible to apply a 
flow-based capacity calculation approach with continuous trading. This implies that TSOs, not the 
49 
 
market, will repartition ex ante available cross-zonal capacity over borders. As a result, less cross-zonal 
capacity might be offered by the market. 
5.2.2 Continuous	trading	complemented	with	(regional)	intraday	auctions	
As previously mentioned, the CACM (Art. 63) also allows for regional auctions complementing 
continuous intraday trade if requested by the relevant NEMOs and TSOs on bidding zone borders. 
Furthermore, it is stated that continuous trading may be stopped for a limited period of time to hold 
the auction.  
 
With intraday auctions (IDAs), the two problems mentioned with continuous intraday trading could be 
resolved. CACM requests that intraday cross-zonal capacity should be priced efficiently and reflect 
market congestion, based on actual orders (ENTSO-E, 2017f). In the proposal by all TSOs for a single 
methodology for pricing intraday cross-zonal capacity that was submitted for public consultation in 
April 2017, it is stated that it is not possible to efficiently price intraday cross-zonal capacity solely with 
continuous trading. Therefore, a hybrid model is proposed in which continuous trading is combined 
with IDAs. On 10 August 2017 an updated proposal was submitted by all TSOs to all NRAs and the 
Agency (ENTSO-E, 2017g).   
The proposal of April 2017 put forward that at least two Pan-European intraday auctions are held, one 
initial IDA on the day before delivery (D-1) and one on the day of delivery. The auction on day D-1 shall 
contain MTUs of the day of delivery. The other auction, held on the day of delivery, contains all MTUs 
from its first delivery hour until the end of day D. In the updated proposal of August 2017 only one IDA 
was kept, the IDA held at D-1 for all MTUs of day D with a deadline for bid submission at 22:00. In 
capacity calculation regions where the intraday cross-zonal gate opening time is set up to be before 
the IDA at 22:00, regional cross-zonal opening auctions may be held before the IDA. The within-day (D) 
auction has been removed. However, it is signalled that once further details of the intraday capacity 
become available, the introduction of the within-day IDAs shall be reassessed. In those proposals, it is 
stated that cross-zonal intraday capacity for all market time units (MTUs) shall be initially offered to 
an IDA. The initial IDA will therefore price the initial intraday cross-zonal capacity calculated by the 
TSOs. In case offered cross-zonal intraday capacity does not get allocated within the respective IDA, it 
will be offered through the subsequent continuous trading. 
Neuhoff et al. (2016a) describe an additional benefit of intraday auctions in this context. They state 
that intraday auctions allow TSOs to reduce the capacity made available before by repurchasing cross-
zonal transmission capacity. This additional flexibility allows for a less conservative provision of 
commercial transmission capacity.  
However, it is not so clear-cut how cross-zonal capacity would be optimally divided between 
continuous trading and the intraday auctions. Avoiding gaming between both trading remains a 
concern as during continuous implicit trading there would be no capacity price, while in an implicit 
auction a capacity price could be determined based on energy price differences. Also, the integration 
of intraday-auctions requires a cross-zonal consensus on the optimal frequency and exact timing of 
regional or national intraday auctions. If those are not aligned, efficient integration is not possible. 
Lastly, there are concerns regarding the impact of complementary auctions on the liquidity in 
continuous trading. In many countries, intraday markets are only just emerging and it is argued that 
splitting liquidity between auctions and continuous trading could impede this development.  
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6. Establishing	national	balancing	markets	
In a power system, demand should equal supply at all times. In more technical terms, the system 
frequency must be maintained close to its nominal value (50 Hz in Europe). If the system frequency 
deviates significantly, generators can trip off (to protect it from damage) which in itself causes further 
frequency deviation, thus a cascade of generation tripping off the system can occur.  This is what is 
meant by a ‘system collapse’, and it can result in a widespread blackout. Each TSO is responsible for 
the real-time balance in its control area to avoid such a collapse, and the balancing mechanism is in 
place to manage this process. At the time of writing, the organisation of the balancing mechanism (incl. 
balancing markets) is not harmonised in the EU.  
 
Two network codes aim to support the harmonisation of balancing and are of particular importance in 
this chapter: the EBGL and the SOGL. The EBGL is primarily intended to harmonise market 
arrangements related to balancing: the design of balancing markets and the imbalance settlement 
mechanism.71 However, as balancing happens in real-time, balancing market arrangements cannot be 
fully decoupled from system operation and security. Therefore, the SOGL is also relevant for this 
chapter. The SOGL primarily addresses three other aspects of balancing: the harmonisation of reserve 
categories, the activation strategy for balancing energy in real-time and the sizing of reserves.  
 
The SOGL defines four types of reserve products which can be grouped under three processes. The 
reserve categories are Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR), Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) 
and Replacement Reserves (RR). Previously, different denominations existed. To avoid confusion, 
frequently used terms are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 Frequency 
containment 
process 
Frequency restoration process Reserve 
replacement 
process 
Operational reserves 
defined by SOGL 
Frequency 
Containment 
Reserve (FCR) 
Automatic Frequency 
Restoration Reserves 
(aFRR) 
Manual Frequency 
Restoration 
Reserves (mFRR) 
Replacement 
Reserve (RR) 
ENTSO-E CE 
Operation handbook 
Primary Control Secondary Control Tertiary Control Tertiary Control 
Table 1: Terminology for reserve products (based on E-Bridge consulting GmbH and IAEW, 2014) 
These types of reserves meet different operational needs, in practical terms they differ mainly in 
response time and maximum duration of delivery. The activation of different reserves after a 
frequency drop/spike are shown in Figure 24.72,73 From the moment the frequency drops/spikes, FCR 
is almost instantaneously activated to stabilise the drop/spike. FCR are the fastest types of reserves 
                                                             
71 Balancing services are also often referred to as ancillary services for frequency control. Examples of ancillary 
services for non-frequency control (grid services) are voltage support and congestion management. 
72 A frequency drop is due to a deficit of energy in the system finding its cause in more consumption or less 
generation than scheduled in real-time. Vice-versa, frequency would rise. In the EBGL terminology: the aggregate 
of the (contractual) positions, meaning the declared energy volume of a balance responsible party (BRP) to the 
TSO at intraday gate closure, is lower than the total located volume attributed to the BRPs. The allocated volume 
means an energy volume physically injected/withdrawn from the system and attributed to a BRP. A BRP is a 
market party or its representative responsible for imbalances. A BRP can be an individual generator or industrial 
consumer connected to the transmission grid or a portfolio of generators/consumers (balancing groups).  
73 It should be noted that the activation process shown in this Figure is the typical activation process for a TSO 
with a reactive approach to the activation of balancing energy. This concept is further explained in Section 6.4 
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and operated using a joint process involving all TSOs of the synchronous area, as described in Section 
2.3. Within a couple of minutes, the frequency restoration process (FRP) starts. First, aFRR and later 
mFRR are activated. aFRR are reserves activated automatically by a controller operated by the TSO, 
mFRR are activated upon a specific manual request from the TSO. FRR aims to restore the frequency 
to its nominal value. In more technical terms, the frequency restoration control error (FRCE) is 
regulated towards zero. Finally, after about 15 minutes or more, RR, the slowest type of reserves, can 
be activated to support or replace FRR. Not all systems have RR as this process is not made mandatory 
by the SOGL.  
 
 
Figure 24: A frequency drop and the reserve activation structure (Elia and TenneT, 2014) 74 
Although the same categories of reserve products exist in the EU, the exact product definition and the 
methodologies used for sizing or activation can still differ strongly from one control area to another. 
Also, the way balancing resources are procured in balancing markets can differ and the exact working 
of imbalance settlement mechanism can vary. These aspects are discussed in the following sections, 
which are structured to reflect the four building blocks of the balancing mechanism as displayed in 
Figure 25. 
                                                             
74 Inertia as the first source of energy limiting frequency drop is not depicted in the Figure. Inertia is an inherent 
physical property of e.g. turbines. Inertia slows down a frequency drop/spike immediately after a mismatch of 
supply and demand and does not need any control signal. In other words, with little inertia a small difference in 
supply and demand can cause a large direct frequency drop/spike. Inertia was always valuable for the system, 
but as it was abundant in the recent past it was mostly provided for free. Now with DER penetration and 
particular times during which not many thermal power plants are connected, system inertia and thus reliability 
decreases. This is especially a concern for isolated systems. To limit such issues there are also methods being 
developed to obtain inertia from other sources than thermal plants, e.g. by energy storage (so-called ‘synthetic 
inertia provision’) as discussed in Delille et al. (2012).   
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Figure 25: The four building blocks of the balancing mechanism, financial and physical relationships 
and relevant network codes (adapted from Hirth and Ziegenhagen, 2015) 
The different building blocks are financially or physically interlinked. The design of different blocks is 
covered by network codes EBGL and/or SOGL. It should be noted that the way balancing mechanisms 
are designed strongly influences trade in other short-term markets, e.g. high imbalance prices 
encourage rebalancing by trading in the intraday market or high reserve requirements can reduce the 
supply in short-term markets. The EBGL and SOGL also outline how to integrate balancing markets; 
this topic falls out of the scope of this chapter and is picked up in the next chapter. 
 Reserve sizing  
Sizing of reserves is an exercise done by TSOs. The amount of balancing capacity needed is a function 
of: 
 
• The expected system imbalances in real-time. The more BRPs are incentivised (high real-time 
imbalance prices) or able (adequate market design of and liquidity in the intraday and day-
ahead market) to balance their positions, the less reserve capacity is required. 
• The amount of non-contracted flexibility available in real-time: the more generation/demand 
is available simply in response to high balancing energy prices, the less need for capacity 
reservation. 
• The activation strategy of the TSO: the more a TSO makes use of preventive actions, the higher 
the volume of activated energy and the greater the need for reserved capacity. 
 
The way reserve sizing is conducted determines the demand and frequency of balancing capacity 
markets, which in its turn can create barriers to certain technologies’ participation in these markets. 
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Hirth and Ziegenhagen (2015) describe that, broadly, TSOs can apply two methods for reserve sizing: 
static or dynamic sizing. Static sizing implies that reserves are acquired for long periods, such as a 
month or a year, while with dynamic sizing the reserve requirements are more frequently updated and 
have a stronger link with the actual state of the system. In general, static reserves are mostly calculated 
using a deterministic approach (e.g. ‘the worst-case event’, N-1 procedure) and dynamic reserves using 
a probabilistic approach (e.g. probability density functions of events and correlations). 
 
It is argued by Hirth and Ziegenhagen (2015); Just and Weber (2015); Neuhoff et al. (2015a) that 
countries with high shares of vRES need to allow for short-term procurement of reserves to lower the 
entry barriers for these generation assets to participate in the balancing capacity market. The same 
holds true for demand response. Unlike conventional generation, whose bids will vary as a function of 
variable running costs which are relatively stable and predictable over longer periods of time, 
renewable generators’ and demand response resources’ bids are primarily based on opportunity costs 
rather than direct ones. Shorter-term procurement will make it easier for these market parties to 
correctly estimate their opportunity cost to bid in the balancing capacity market, which should lead to 
a better allocation of resources across the system as a whole. Brijs et al. (2017) add that there is less 
uncertainty of vRES or DR resources’ availability with shorter time periods. This availability risk can also 
be (partly) mitigated by splitting the total procured volume into shorter blocks which are procured 
separately. Finally, by holding more frequent auctions for shorter time periods, the need for balancing 
capacity could be lowered, leading to efficiency gains. Daily auctions with a contract duration of one 
hour are proposed by Hirth and Ziegenhagen (2015), similar to day-ahead spot auctions. This setup is 
already used in Nordic and some Eastern European countries (ENTSO-E, 2015c). 
 
However, TSOs are reluctant to move to shorter time periods, as they are concerned that the risk of 
failing to contract their reserve requirements increases with a shorter window in which to source 
reserves. TSOs can have some reservations about a dynamic, daily adjusted procurement volume since 
this requires an additional probabilistic assessment of the forecast errors and ramps of the next day. 
Nabe and Neuhoff (2015) state that ‘TSOs have the incentive to be “on the very safe side” since they do 
not benefit from lower prices of reserves but would be accounted for insufficient reserve 
procurement.’75 Brijs et al. (2017) note that an argument in favour of longer contract periods might be 
that they make it easier to finance investments in flexibility.  
 
Sizing of reserves is mainly covered by the SOGL. The dimensioning rules for FCR, FRR and RR are 
described in Article 153, 157 and 160 of the SOGL, respectively. In summary, it is outlined that: 
 
• FCR 
o Should be dimensioned at least on an annual basis 
o The geographic scale of dimensioning is the synchronous area 
o The dimensioning rule shall take into account a reference incident (3000 MW in 
positive and negative direction in CE) 
                                                             
75 This statement does not always hold. For example, in GB there is a NRA approved incentive scheme for the 
TSO that rewards the TSO financially for reducing the costs to consumers – they share in the benefit and 
conversely share in any over-procurement costs. This aims to align the TSO with the interests of the customer if 
the incentive is designed correctly. For more details, see e.g. ‘System Operator Incentives’, link: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/gas/wholesale-market/market-efficiency-review-and-reform/system-operator-
incentives consulted on 22/12/2017. 
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o CE and Nordic synchronous area have the right to (additionally) define a probabilistic 
approach.  
o Each TSO has an FCR requirement proportional to the net generation and consumption 
in its control area. 
• FRR 
o The geographic scale of dimensioning is the LFC Block 
o A probabilistic approach should be applied using historical data 
o Per LFC Block the TSOs will determine the ratio of aFRR over mFRR 
o The FRR procured shall not be less than the dimensioning incident and cover all 
imbalances (based on the probabilistic assessment) for at least 99% of the time in its 
respective direction (positive or negative). 76 
• RR 
o The geographic scale of dimensioning is the LFC Block 
o If procured, the dimensioning process should be done jointly with FRR 
o If procured, in the CE and Nordic synchronous area there should be enough 
positive/negative RR to restore positive/negative FRR. 
o If procured, in the GB and IE/NI synchronous area there should be enough 
positive/negative RR to restore positive/negative FRR and FCR. 
 
Additionally, the EBGL sets out high-level principles regarding the procurement of FRR and RR in 
balancing capacity markets, which cannot be decoupled from reserve sizing. In Article 32(2) it is stated 
that:   
 
(a) the procurement method [of balancing capacity] shall be market-based for at least the frequency 
restoration reserves and the replacement reserves; 
(b) the procurement process shall be performed on a short-term basis to the extent possible and where 
economically efficient; 
(c) the contracted volume may be divided into several contracting periods. 
 
But procuring reserves closer to real-time and dividing the contracted volume into several contracting 
periods is not enough to allow vRES and DR to participate in balancing capacity markets. Technical 
requirements and the prequalification process for reserve products also impact balancing capacity 
market entry barriers.77 Other parameters of the balancing capacity market which are more market 
design related are discussed in the next section. 
 The balancing markets: capacity and energy 
The TSO organises and is the single buyer on the balancing capacity and balancing energy markets. On 
the supply side, balancing service providers (BSPs), market participants with reserve-providing units or 
reserve-providing groups, offer balancing services to TSOs. The amount of balancing capacity procured 
is determined by the balancing reserve requirement. The amount of balancing energy activated 
depends on system imbalances. The activation strategy of balancing energy can influence the demand 
                                                             
76 A dimensioning incident is defined in SOGL Art. 157(2.d) as ‘the largest imbalance that may result from an 
instantaneous change of active power of a single power generating module, single demand facility, or single 
HVDC interconnector or from a tripping of an AC line within the LFC Block.’ A dimensioning incident is determined 
both in the negative (deficit of energy) and positive (excess of energy) direction. 
77 Technical minimum requirements and the prequalification process of FCR, FRR and RR are described in Art. 
154 and 155 for FCR, Art. 158 and 159 for FRR and Art. 161 and 162 for RR in the SOGL. Additionally, for FCR 
details regarding the exact provision are given in Art. 156 of the SOGL. 
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for balancing energy and prices. It is not an understatement to say that balancing markets are not 
harmonised in the EU today (AGORA, 2016; Brijs et al., 2017). EBGL outlines market design rules to 
allow for harmonisation. 
 
In this section, firstly the balancing capacity market and its key design parameters are described. After, 
the balancing energy market and its market design parameters are introduced.  
 
Box 4:  The participation of resources connected to the distribution grid in balancing markets and 
the power of the DSO 
In recital (8) of the EBGL it is declared that a level-playing field should be in place for all market 
participants, including demand-response aggregators and assets located at the distribution level, to 
offer balancing services and ensure adequate competition. 
 
The SOGL specifies in Art. 182(3) that the prequalification process for balancing resources connected 
to the distribution level shall rely on rules concerning information exchanges and the delivery of 
active power reserves between the TSO, the reserve-connecting DSO and the intermediate DSOs78. 
Each reserve-connecting DSO and each intermediate DSO, in cooperation with the TSO, shall have 
the right to set limits to or exclude the delivery of active power reserves located in the distribution 
system during the prequalification process. Reasons for limitations or exclusion should be technical, 
such as the geographical location of the reserve providing units and reserve providing groups (SOGL, 
Art. 182(4)). 
 
Further, each reserve-connecting DSO and each intermediate DSO can set temporary limits to the 
delivery of active power reserves before their activation. Procedures need to be agreed upon with 
the respective TSO (SOGL, Art. 182(5)). It is not decided yet to whom the costs of such an action 
should be allocated.  In Art. 15(3) of the EBGL it is stated that each TSO may, together with the 
reserve-connecting DSOs within the TSO’s control area, jointly elaborate a methodology for 
allocating costs resulting from the exclusion or curtailment of active reserves connected to the 
distribution level. 
 
6.2.1 Balancing	capacity	market	and	its	key	market	design	parameters	
Balancing capacity is defined as a volume of reserve capacity that a BSP has agreed to bid in the 
balancing energy market for the duration of the contract. This implies that a BSP cannot commit this 
capacity is preceding markets. In the balancing capacity market, BSPs offer upward or downward 
balancing capacity with certain product characteristics to the TSO.79 In general, there are different 
markets for the different reserve products procured in a market-based way (possibly FCR, aFRR, mFRR 
and, if procured, RR). The demand for reserves procured in the balancing capacity market is 
determined in the reserve sizing process, described previously, and these two building blocks of the 
balancing mechanism cannot be fully decoupled. There are many market design parameters which can 
differ from one balancing capacity market to another, for a full and recent overview please consult 
ENTSO-E (2017h). Two key differentiators touched upon previously are: 
 
                                                             
78 No formal definition of ‘intermediate DSO’ was found. 
79 Upward balancing capacity means that a BSP will reserve a margin to be able to inject balancing energy into 
the system when activated. Upwards balancing energy is needed when there is less electricity supply than 
demand (energy deficit). Vice-versa for downward balancing capacity. 
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• The time-lag between the balancing capacity auction and the start of the contract period in 
which the balancing capacity must be offered as balancing energy in the real-time market: this 
time-lag can vary from a day to months and may differ by reserve product. The time lag has an 
effect on how easy it is for market parties to estimate their opportunity cost and how well a 
TSO can estimate its reserve needs. 
 
• The (length of) the contract period: if a BSP’s balancing capacity offer is accepted, the BSP is 
obliged to offer (a certain volume of) balancing energy during a certain period. The contract 
period can vary from a year to a couple of hours. Variations are also possible such as e.g. a 
balancing capacity contract that states that the BSP should offer balancing capacity at peak 
hours for a particular week. The length of the contract period has an influence on the extent 
to which vRES, storage and DR may be able to participate in the balancing capacity market. 
 
One other important point is whether upward and downward balancing capacity should be procured 
jointly, in what are called ‘symmetric balancing capacity products’ (AGORA, 2016). Rodilla and Batlle 
(2015) argue that by linking the upward and downward reserve requirements vRES and DR are 
excluded from participation. Hirth and Ziegenhagen (2015) argue that during hours of high renewable 
production the energy price decreases, which increases the opportunity costs of thermal plants to 
provide negative balancing power. More precisely, thermal generation offering downward reserves 
will have to be running at minimal load plus downward reserve power. Therefore, thermal plants will 
have to bid in the DA or IDM with this quantity. If the marginal costs of the thermal plant are higher 
than the DA or IDM price it will be making losses because of its commitment to provide downward 
energy. The lower the prices in the DA or IDM get, the higher its losses, thus the higher its opportunity 
cost to offer downward balancing. In other words, during the hours vRES is able to supply, thermal 
generators have high costs. Thus, during such hours it would be efficient to use vRES for downward 
balancing. Therefore, it is important that Art. 32(3) of the EBGL requires that the procurement of 
upward and downward balancing capacity for at least FRR and RR shall be carried out separately. 
However, each TSO may submit a proposal (including an economic justification) to the regulatory 
authority for a temporary exemption to this rule.  
 
Another non-trivial design parameter is the minimum bid volume. In DAM and IDM this parameter is 
not considered restricting as it is set low enough (AGORA, 2016). However, in balancing capacity 
markets, limits are often a lot higher, e.g. for aFRR, the minimum bid size ranges from more than 5 
MW in Norway to 1 MW in Belgium. A lower minimum bid size lowers the entry barriers for new players 
in the balancing market. It should be added that higher minimum volume requirements can be 
compensated for in the market design if aggregation is allowed. Art. 25(4) of the EBGL provides a list 
of characteristics for standard products in the balancing capacity (and energy) market.80 Examples of 
characteristics listed other than minimum (and maximum) bid size, are e.g. the ramping period, the 
full activation time and the minimum and maximum duration of the delivery period. All TSOs have to 
come up with a proposal for parameter values of these characteristics of standard products (EBGL, Art. 
25(2). Standard product will allow a more fluid integration of balancing markets. The less standard 
products, the more liquidity. However, a trade-off exists between minimising the number of standard 
                                                             
80 Next to fixed standard characteristics, there are also variable characteristics of a standard product to be 
determined by the BSP during the prequalification or when submitting the standard product bid. One of these 
variable characteristics is of course the price, others are divisibility, location and the minimum duration between 
the end of the deactivation period and the following activation. (EBGL, Art. 25(5)). 
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products to increase liquidity and having enough standard products to satisfy the wide range of 
technical needs of the different TSOs. This trade-off is one of the reasons that besides standard 
products, each TSO may develop a proposal defining specific products which could be used in parallel 
with standard products in their control area. These specific products should be demonstrated to be 
necessary and non-distortive. Every two years an assessment is made about whether these conditions 
still hold (EBGL, Art. 26). 
 
Last, but not least, the settlement rule for the balancing capacity auctions provides a point of 
discussion. Two options are possible: pay-as-bid or marginal pricing (pay-as-cleared). In Box 3 (in 
Section 4.3.1) the optimal trading setup in the intraday market is discussed: continuous trading (which 
implies pay-as-bid) or auctions (can be pay-as-bid or marginal pricing). More general arguments also 
apply for balancing capacity markets. Additionally, Müsgens et al. (2014) argue that specific 
complexities of balancing markets tend to strengthen the case for uniform pricing. They state that: 
‘More precisely, bidders on the capacity balancing market will take into account their expected 
revenues from calls on the energy balancing market. This necessitates accurate estimates of the 
revenues from the energy market. These are difficult to determine under uniform pricing. However, we 
will argue that they are even harder to predict with pay-as-bid. Let us consider the situation under 
uniform pricing first. Under uniform pricing, bidders can simply bid their variable cost on the energy 
market. However, the expected revenues from the energy market are needed when calculating the 
optimal capacity bid because bidders have to subtract these revenues from their capacity bid. Hence, 
suppliers have to estimate market prices on the energy market for different levels of calls and the 
associated probabilities. It is especially challenging to estimate the probability function empirically. Yet 
these estimations are even more complex under pay-as-bid. Recall that bidders do not reveal their 
variable costs on the energy market with pay-as-bid. Instead, to simplify, bidders try to guess the most 
expensive accepted bid. The determination of the most expensive accepted bid requires an estimation 
of the probability distribution for calls of different energy levels, however. Bids on the capacity market 
depend on the expected profit on the energy market, which makes an accurate estimation regarding 
the energy market even more important. These estimates become harder when strategic bidding is an 
additional part of the equation.’ 
 
Box 5: The scoring rule for balancing markets 
Another discussion related to balancing markets is whether the balancing capacity and energy bids 
should be cleared separately (as was assumed so far) or jointly. In other words, should the bids with 
the lowest capacity cost be accepted or the bids with the lowest expected total cost (capacity and 
expected energy costs)? This is called the scoring rule in Müsgens et al. (2014). 
 
In their paper, Müsgens et al. (2014) state that the expected total cost can be gamed, even in 
competitive markets. They claim that scoring should be based on capacity bids, as in line with the 
EBGL. It is stated that: ‘[capacity] bids will reflect all relevant costs, including the variable costs of 
delivering balancing power. To be more precise, rational bidders’ capacity bids in competitive 
markets equal the foregone expected profit on the wholesale electricity market minus the expected 
profit from called energy – this is the reserve price when offering balancing power.’ 
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Neuhoff et al. (2016c) oppose and state that due to shorter contracting periods of reserves81 the 
interaction between energy and reserve markets increases. As such, efficiency improvements can 
be made by a joint clearing of balancing energy and capacity. 
 
In the EBGL (Art. 16(6)), it is stated that exceptional the balancing energy price can be 
predetermined in the balancing capacity contract if proposed by a TSO, however only for specific 
balancing products and when this approach can be demonstrated to deliver greater economic 
efficiency. There is a clear trade-off between accommodating specific products with more complex 
structures and liquidity as markets would be fragmented with fewer BSPs per product category. 
 
No settlement rule is specified for balancing capacity markets in the EBGL. In practice, the settlement 
rule applied in most EU markets is pay-as-bid over uniform pricing. Also, in some countries prices for 
balancing capacity of certain reserve products are regulated and not set by an auction, e.g. for aFRR in 
France (ENTSO-E, 2017h). Regulated prices for FRR and RR are not permitted in the EBGL (EBGL, Art. 
32(2)). 
6.2.2 Balancing	energy	market	and	its	key	market	design	parameters	
The balancing energy market is cleared (in most cases) very near to or in real-time.82 Real-time system 
imbalances drive the demand for the activation of balancing energy which is selected from a merit 
order.83 Balancing energy bids for aFRR, mFRR and RR have to be submitted before the balancing 
energy gate closure time (GCT).84 The balancing energy GCT should be harmonised at the Union level.85 
In terms of timing, the balancing energy GCT should not be before the intraday cross-zonal GCT and as 
close as possible to real-time (EBGL, Art. 24).  
 
BSPs contracted in the balancing capacity market are obliged to offer balancing energy for their 
contract duration. It is important to note that the price of the balancing energy bid should not be 
predetermined in the contract of balancing capacity (EBGL, Art. 16(6)). 86 Brunekreeft (2015) remarks 
that if a bid is selected on the balancing capacity market and its bidder is thus obliged to bid in the 
balancing energy market, this balancing energy market  bid can be very high in order to avoid 
commitment. This way the relevant bidder still earns a balancing capacity payment.  Other BSPs 
without contracted balancing capacity may also bid in the balancing energy market. TSOs also have the 
                                                             
81 For the good reasons mentioned in Section 6.1. 
82 In the EBGL in Art. 29(2) it is stated that ‘TSOs shall not activate balancing energy bids before the corresponding 
balancing energy gate closure time, except in the alert state or the emergency state when such activations help 
alleviate the severity of these system states and except when the bids serve purposes other than balancing 
pursuant to paragraph 3’. A methodology for classifying all purposes for the activation of balancing energy has 
to be developed by all TSOs one year after the entry into force of EBGL (EBGL, Art. 29(3)). In the draft of this 
methodology it is found that other purposes could be the activation of balancing energy to solve system 
constraints, such as redispatch actions to deal with load flow or voltage constraints (ENTSO-E, 2016). 
83 The real-time system imbalance is determined by the aggregated imbalances of all BRPs (no network 
congestion assumed). If the system imbalance is negative, meaning a deficit of electricity in the system, upward 
balancing energy is activated by the TSO to restore the balance. Conversely, if the system imbalance is positive, 
meaning a surplus of electricity in the system, downward balancing energy is activated by the TSO. 
84 In most cases the activation of FCR is not remunerated, only its reservation is paid. In case the activation of 
FCR is not remunerated, FCR is symmetric (offering fast upwards and downward energy) and because of (short 
and fast) activations in both directions payments would eventually be cancelled out (Van den Bergh et al., 2017). 
85 It is unclear whether there can be a different harmonised Pan-European balancing energy gate closure per 
reserve type. This query requires a legal view on EBGL Article 24(1). 
86 Exceptionally for specific balancing energy products it can be requested that this rule is not applied. 
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right to compel BSPs to offer their unused generation capacity or other balancing sources as balancing 
energy when justified (EBGL, Art. 18(7)). 
 
In Figure 26, the Net Regulated Volume (NRV) over 15 minutes as a share of the consumption over the 
same 15 minutes is shown. The NRV is calculated as the net of the overall activated downward and 
upward balancing energy volume. The share of balancing energy activated over consumption is 
declining in both countries.87 Lower volumes are observed because of better functioning intraday 
markets and more efficient TSO cooperation in the activation of balancing energy. 
 
 
Figure 26: Duration curves of the net regulated volume (NRV) in France and Germany for 2012-2015 
(Brijs et al., 2017) 
Displaying the NRV per 15 minutes is not a random choice. 15 minutes equals the imbalance settlement 
period (ISP) in some scheduling areas (e.g. Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands).88 Art. 53 of the EBGL 
outlines that the ISP should be harmonised over scheduling areas. More precisely, it is stated that the 
ISP should equal 15 minutes in all scheduling areas by three years after the regulation enters into force. 
An exemption is possible per synchronous area if the TSOs of that synchronous area can justify an 
alternative duration. Further, for each ISP at least one balancing energy price should be determined 
for each imbalance settlement period (EBGL, Art. 30(1.c)).89 
 
Standard products are also envisioned in the balancing energy market (EBGL, Art. 25(1)). In that regard, 
the same characteristics as for balancing capacity markets hold for balancing energy markets. Specific 
balancing energy products per TSO are allowed (EBGL, Art. 26). However, they need to be justifiable 
and are temporary. 
 
The settlement rule in the balancing energy market is another serious point of controversy. A profound 
discussion concerning the settlement rule for balancing energy markets was found in Littlechild (2007). 
Littlechild (2007) favours uniform pricing but is aware that some characteristics of the balancing energy 
                                                             
87 The German case is described in more detail in Box 10 of the following chapter. 
88 For a state of play of the duration of the ISP in the EU in 2014, please consult Exhibit 2 on p. 11 of Frontier 
Economics (2016). 
89 ‘At least one’ could mean that multiple balancing energy prices should exist if both upward and downward 
energy is activated in the same ISP in one scheduling area (that can happen due to a change of the system 
imbalance within the duration of one ISP or internal congestion) or could mean different prices for different types 
of reserves activated in the same direction. 
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market make it more difficult to apply this rule in some situations. In his paper, he mentioned a 
paragraph taken from the original proposals for NETA (Review of Electricity Trading Arrangements: 
Proposals, Offer, July 1998, para 4.49.) wherein an argument in favour of pay-as-bid in the balancing 
market is given: ‘The balancing market will be open for several hours, including real time operation. 
During this period conditions on the system will be continuously changing. Trades may be accepted at 
particular times at prices that are quite different from the average price of accepted trades over the 
period as a whole. Consequently, there is no obvious definition for the marginal or market clearing price 
throughout the period. To pay a uniform accepted price on all increments of generation and decrements 
of demand, which would presumably have to be the highest price accepted from any one of them, 
would not obviously be more efficient and could be expensive.’ 90 Littlechild  (2007) adds that the weight 
of this argument depends on the gap between the gate closure time and real operation, which has 
been decreasing since then, and the duration of the settlement period, which has tended to decrease 
as well. 91 
 
Box 6: The settlement rule in balancing energy markets – specific technical difficulties and 
implementations in the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain 
A problem specific to balancing energy markets arises when different products of different reserve 
types, for example, aFRR and mFRR, are used at the same instance. In the Netherlands, uniform 
pricing is applied, and the price is set by the highest bid of the two reserve types, even if this most 
expensive unit has only been activated for a very short fraction of the ISP (E-Brige Consulting, 2014).  
 
Another practical example illustrating why an adequate settlement rule is difficult to define for the 
balancing market is the aFRR balancing market in Belgium (as it was in 2014). For technical reasons, 
the aFRR was activated on a pro-rata basis.92 A monthly tender for balancing capacity was organised 
to contract aFRR capacity. The selection of the balancing energy bids took place D-1 at 18:00, pre-
contracted parties were obliged to offer their contracted bids, other parties could place a bid 
voluntarily. Elia selected up to 150 MW (upwards and downwards) according to their price starting 
with the lowest one. Then all bids that had been selected day-ahead were activated according to 
their participation factors for pro-rata activation and paid their bid price (E-Brige Consulting, 2014). 
Using the marginal pricing rule in this particular case seems counter-intuitive. Today the selection 
of FRR bids is done using a merit order (Elia, 2017), making it more suitable for marginal pricing.  
 
In Spain, aFRR was also deployed on a pro-rata basis and the pricing issue was solved by valuing the 
net energy usage (positive or negative) at the marginal price of RR that would have been applied in 
the settlement period to replace the FRR energy delivered (Rodilla and Batlle, 2015). 
 
                                                             
90 In Littlechild (2015) a similar argument is made, but phrased differently, it is stated that ‘in the balancing 
mechanism near real-time, the system operator does not see a nice stack of energy trades but rather chooses 
from a plethora of up and down actions each with different dynamic characteristics in the presence of noisy need. 
Some might be attractive enough to keep for several trading periods. Others will need to be reversed in favour of 
new opportunities or will come to an end because of self-dispatched movements.  In such a context, the concept 
of marginal cost is a tenuous one. The most expensive 1 MWh bought or sold (even after flagging, tagging and 
offsetting) is not necessarily representative of the cost of a slight increase or reduction in capacity with respect to 
the half-hour as a whole.’ 
91 It could be argued that there are almost no significant material changes for the supply-side dispatchable 
resources, except for contingencies, in e.g. the hour up to real-time. Renewables are obviously different and also 
the demand side may be a different matter.   
92 On a discussion between pro rata activation and merit order selection of balancing energy, please consult E-
Bridge and IAEW (2016). EBGL prescribes merit order selection of balancing energy bids. 
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In the EBGL (Art. 30(1.a)) it is clearly stated that the balancing energy market should be based on 
marginal pricing. However, if all TSOs identify inefficiencies in the application of marginal pricing, they 
may request an amendment and propose an alternative pricing method if proven more efficient (Art. 
30(5)). Art. 30(1.b) adds that the methodology to determine prices for balancing energy shall ‘define 
how the activation of balancing energy bids activated for purposes other than balancing affects the 
balancing energy price, while also ensuring that at least balancing energy bids activated for internal 
congestion management shall not set the marginal price of balancing energy.’ This Article tackles a 
concern of  Littlechild (2007) who states that ‘marginal pricing may lead to erratic prices, especially 
where the price order ‘stack’ can be distorted or ‘polluted’ by system actions taken by the System 
Operator.’ 
 
Finally, cap and floor prices for balancing energy are optional. If applied they should be harmonised 
and take into account the caps and floors applied in the day-ahead and intraday market (EBGL, Art. 
30(2)). 
 Imbalance settlement mechanism 
This Section discusses how the imbalance price or charge, the price an unbalanced BRP needs to pay 
(or receive), should be set.93 In real-time, the allocated volume (physical real-time energy 
consumption/generation by a BRP) is not exactly the same as the contractual position for a given 
imbalance settlement period. Two situations can occur: 
• The BRP can have a positive imbalance (long), this implies that:  
o If the BRP is a net buyer, he consumes less electricity than its position. 
o If a BRP is a net seller, he produces more electricity than its position. 
• The BRP can have a negative imbalance (short), this implies that: 
o If the BRP is a net buyer, he consumes more electricity than its position. 
o If a BRP is a net seller, he produces less electricity than its position 
 
EBGL (Art. 55) specifies that each TSO shall set up rules to calculate the imbalance price and that an 
imbalance price shall be calculated for each imbalance settlement period, each imbalance price area 
and each imbalance direction. The financial flows between TSOs and BRPs are displayed in Table 2. 
Individual BRPs receive/pay an imbalance settlement depending on the direction of their imbalance. 
By convention, if the imbalance is positive the BRP will receive the imbalance price multiplied by the 
volume of its imbalance. If the imbalance is negative, the BRP will pay the imbalance price multiplied 
by the volume of its imbalance. The imbalance price is a function of the direction and volume of the 
overall system imbalance and can be positive, negative or zero. 94 
 
 
                                                             
93 Also called ‘cash-out price’ in GB. 
94 Negative balancing prices are frequently incurred when the system balance is positive and can be explained as 
follows. The imbalance price is based (in most cases) on the cost of balancing energy needed to restore the 
system balance, as discussed in more detail later in this section. In the case the system balance is positive, 
downward balancing energy will need to be activated. In that case BSPs will bid to be selected to reduce their 
electricity generation (or increase their demand). In the case they reduce their generation they actually ‘win’ the 
avoided fuel cost. Therefore, they would be willing to pay a price equal or lower than their avoided fuel cost to 
offer downward balancing energy. As such, the imbalance price becomes negative. 
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 Imbalance price positive Imbalance price negative 
Positive imbalance BRP Payment from TSO to BRP Payment from BRP to TSO 
Negative imbalance BRP Payment from BRP to TSO Payment from TSO to BRP 
Table 2: Financial flows between TSOs and BRPs for imbalances (EBGL, Art. 55(1)) 
Also, important to add is that the EBGL states in Art. 18(6.c) that: 
 
‘All balance responsible parties shall be financially responsible for their imbalances, and that the 
imbalances shall be settled with the connecting TSO.’ 
 
In the past, it was not unusual that vRES were exempt from being financially responsible for their 
imbalances as an implicit subsidy for their deployment. 
 
Hirth and Ziegenhagen (2015) remark that TSOs and regulators often view the imbalance settlement 
primarily from a cost allocation perspective, i.e. as a mechanism to recover balancing cost. However, 
looking at it from an efficiency perspective, its crucial role is to give an economic incentive to BRPs to 
avoid (or not avoid) being imbalanced. The imbalance settlement discussion is split up into three parts, 
each part answering an interrelated question: 
 
1. Pricing rule: Should the imbalance settlement be determined by the average balancing energy 
costs made to solve the imbalances or should it reflect the marginal cost of the system?  
 
2. Balancing capacity cost allocation: How should the costs for the reservation of balancing 
capacity be allocated? Should imbalance settlement prices rise if balancing capacity utilisation 
reaches a certain level to reflect scarcity? 
 
3. Single vs dual imbalance pricing: Should positive and negative schedule deviations be charged 
the same price? Related to this, can market parties aggregate their imbalances over their 
portfolio or should they be held accountable at plant/demand facility level? 
 
6.3.1 Pricing	rule	for	imbalance	charges	
The price signals sent by the imbalance charge should be strong enough to incentivise BRPs to balance 
their injections and offtakes. As such, the actions of the TSO to solve imbalances in real-time and the 
volume of reserves that need to be procured are minimised. Chaves-Ávila et al. (2014); Hirth and 
Ziegenhagen (2015) and Littlechild (2015, 2007) all argue that that efficient resource allocation 
requires the imbalance price to represent the marginal cost of balancing and that imbalance 
settlements based on average costs may increase incentives for market parties to intentionally deviate 
from their schedule. 
 
This discussion of whether the average cost for balancing energy or the marginal balancing energy cost 
should set the imbalance price cannot be decoupled from the settlement rule for balancing energy. 
Two cases can be distinguished: 
 
1.) Pay-as-bid for balancing energy: In this case, BSPs who are activated receive the price of their bid. 
This means that the average balancing energy cost (average price paid to all BSPs) will be lower than 
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the cost of the marginal balancing action. 95 A choice can be made whether the imbalance price should 
equal the average balancing energy cost or the cost of the marginal action. In the former, a zero-sum 
situation is created. The latter results in a surplus which can be allocated to the TSO or other parties 
(e.g. divided among BRPs).  
 
2.) Marginal pricing of balancing energy: In this case, BSPs who are activated all receive the price of 
the marginal bid. This means that the average balancing energy cost (price paid to all BSPs) equals the 
cost of the marginal balancing action. Therefore, in this case the answer is trivial; it does not matter 
whether the average or marginal cost of balancing energy sets the imbalance price as they are the 
same. As mentioned previously, marginal pricing of balancing energy is also put forward in the EBGL.96 
 
Box 7: The ‘Price Average Reference Volume (PAR)’ approach in GB (based on ACER and CEER (2016) 
Littlechild (2015, 2007) and Ofgem (2015)) 
In GB, a hybrid methodology is in place: the so-called chunky marginal concept is introduced to come 
to a cost in between the average and marginal cost. The reasoning goes as follows. As balancing 
energy may be activated for different purposes, and due to the heterogeneity of balancing energy 
bids activated (for example in terms of duration), it is not easy to determine the real marginal cost 
of balancing actions. As a result, some sort of ‘representative’ figure for the cost of balancing actions 
needs to be found. 
 
As a solution, the imbalance price is set equal to the average cost of the most expensive X MWh of 
balancing purchases during a settlement period, defined as the Price Average Reference Volume 
(PAR)). As such, a sliding scale is obtained between at one end, applying the average cost, and at the 
other end, applying the marginal cost of balancing actions to set the imbalance price. The setting of 
PAR determines whether the imbalance price leans more towards the average or marginal cost. 
 
Historically the PAR was set to 500 MWh. It was proposed to gradually reduce the average cost of 
the most expensive 500 MWh balancing actions to the most expensive 50MWh (PAR50) in 
November 2015, before reducing it to 1MWh (PAR1) in the winter of 2018. 
 
Furthermore, in EBGL Art. 55 (4,5) it is specified that: 
 
‘4. The imbalance price for negative imbalance shall not be less than, alternatively:  
 
(a) the weighted average price for positive activated balancing energy from frequency restoration 
reserves and replacement reserves;  
(b) in the event that no activation of balancing energy in either direction has occurred during the 
imbalance settlement period, the value of the avoided activation of balancing energy from frequency 
restoration reserves or replacement reserves.  
 
5. The imbalance price for positive imbalance shall not be greater than, alternatively:  
 
(a) the weighted average price for negative activated balancing energy from frequency restoration 
reserves and replacement reserves;  
 
                                                             
95 Or equal in an extreme case. 
96 However, if all TSOs identify inefficiencies in the application of marginal pricing, they may request an 
amendment and propose an alternative pricing method if proven more efficient (Art. 30(5)). 
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(b) in the event that no activation of balancing energy in either direction has occurred during the 
imbalance settlement period, the value of the avoided activation of balancing energy from frequency 
restoration reserves or replacement reserves.’ 
6.3.2 Balancing	capacity	cost	allocation 
Before starting the discussion about how to allocate the cost of balancing capacity, it is important to 
have an insight on how significant this cost is relative to the balancing energy cost. In Figure 27 the 
overall balancing cost and its components over the national electricity consumption for the year 2015 
are shown. Additionally, it is also shown what proportion of the balancing costs are covered by 
imbalance charges.  
 
 
Figure 27: Overall cost of balancing (energy plus capacity) and imbalance charges over the electricity 
consumption per country in 2015 (ACER and CEER, 2016) 97 
Three observations can be made from Figure 27: 
 
• The total balancing costs over national electricity consumption are very heterogeneous. 
• For almost all countries the balancing capacity cost is significantly higher than the balancing 
energy cost. 
• Total imbalance charges are in most countries similar to balancing energy cost, but far from 
enough to cover the total cost of balancing. 
 
In this section, we focus on observations 2 and 3, more precisely on how to allocate the balancing 
capacity cost which is shown to be a strong driver of overall balancing costs. ACER and CEER (2016) put 
forward two important solutions to lower the cost of balancing capacity. Firstly, the integration of 
balancing markets which would allow for the joint procurement and sharing of reserves.98 And 
secondly, the maximum participation of all technologies in the provision of balancing capacity, 
including vRES, storage and DR. The EBGL seeks to support the realisation of both complementary 
solutions to lower the balancing capacity cost.  
 
Traditionally, and still in place in most EU countries today, the balancing capacity procurement costs 
are socialised. Network users pay these through network charges, or these costs are allocated to BRPs 
                                                             
97 For the purpose of this calculation, the unit cost of activating balancing energy is defined as the difference 
between the balancing energy price of the relevant product and the DA market price.  
98 This is further elaborated upon in Section 7.2.2. 
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in proportion to their consumed or produced energy volumes (ACER and CEER, 2016). It can be argued 
that by socialising the cost of reserving balancing capacity the wrong signals are being sent to market 
parties.  
 
First, by socialising capacity costs, the large generators (or e.g. a large HVDC interconnector) which 
actually motivate the scale of the reserves might be insufficiently charged for the costs they cause to 
the system. Neuhoff et al. (2015a) describe this problem as: ‘this [the allocation the cost of balancing 
capacity procurement to those that cause the need for these reservations] does not imply that the costs 
of paying for availability of reserves should be allocated to the imbalance of the specific hour, e.g. by 
spreading the availability costs for the hour across the parties that are in imbalance in this hour. 
Otherwise, imbalance prices may be very high at times of low imbalance volumes (example Germany). 
Most availability costs for reserves are thus born by demand and intermittent generation that creates 
frequent but small-scale deviations rather than large generators that may cause large imbalances that 
motivated the scale of reserve provision, but are only infrequent in imbalance.’ Also Vandezande et al. 
(2010) state that the capacity costs for reserves should not be socialised, but borne by those BRPs that 
cause the need for reservation. 
 
At the same time, BSPs who could provide flexibility at moments of stress (which are exactly the 
moments wherefore balancing capacity is procured) are not incentivised if prices are not high enough. 
The same holds for BRPs not being sufficiently incentivised to be balanced at those particular 
moments.  
 
A solution, called Operating Reserve Demand Curves (ORDC), is brought forward in the literature (see 
e.g. Hogan (2013) and  Papavasiliou and Smeers (2017)) and already implemented in some parts of the 
US (e.g. in Texas, see e.g. Levin and Botterud (2015)) and in GB (ACER and CEER, 2016). Please note 
that implementation in GB differs from that in Texas (and details matter), but the philosophy behind 
the approach is similar. The rationale behind ORDC is to introduce an incentive component when 
balancing reserves are depleted to a certain level, and the probability of the loss of load becomes non-
negligible. This makes sense as by being imbalanced at moments of high system stress, there is not 
only an energy cost related to solving the imbalance itself but also an increased probability of loss of 
load. To put a price on this incentive component, the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) and the Loss of Load 
Probability (LOLP) mapped on the volume of available reserves need to be estimated. Determining a 
‘correct’ VOLL is difficult and necessarily implies an administrative intervention, making this procedure 
more of a challenge to implement.  
 
By applying ORDC, imbalance prices could rise higher than the marginal cost of delivering balancing 
energy. If only imbalance prices rise and not balancing energy prices (as in the GB implementation), 
the balancing capacity procurement costs could be (partly) recuperated. With rising imbalance prices 
BRPs are strongly incentivised to be balanced at moments of system stress. But, a decision could be 
made to let both the imbalance prices and the balancing energy prices rise at moments of system stress 
by applying ORDC (as in the US implementation). In this case, not only would BRPs be motivated to be 
balanced, but BSPs would also have a stronger incentive to be available in real-time at moments they 
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are needed the most.99 In this case, a similar outcome could be achieved by not having balancing 
energy price caps. However, as stated by Hogan (2013), it would be very difficult if not impossible to 
distinguish scarcity prices from the exercise of market power. Closing the loop, both implementations, 
to varying degrees, could lower the need for high volumes of balancing capacity to be procured, leading 
to lower total balancing capacity costs to be recuperated. 
 
Please note the difference between ORDC and a penalty added to the imbalance price, as also 
described in Vandezande et al. (2010). First, a penalty is typically applied to the imbalance price in one 
imbalance direction, not on both imbalance directions. Second, a penalty is in most cases triggered 
when a certain threshold of balancing energy is activated in real-time. Activation of high volumes of 
balancing energy does not necessarily imply a situation of system stress as there might be high volumes 
of reserves available. 
 
Related to the allocation of balancing capacity procurement costs, in Art. 44(3) of the EBGL it is stated 
that:  
 
‘Each TSO may develop a proposal for an additional settlement mechanism separate from the 
imbalance settlement, to settle the procurement costs of balancing capacity (pursuant to Chapter 5 of 
this Title), administrative costs and other costs related to balancing.100 The additional settlement 
mechanism shall apply to balance responsible parties. This should be preferably achieved with the 
introduction of a shortage pricing function. If TSOs choose another mechanism, they should justify this 
in the proposal. Such a proposal shall be subject to approval by the relevant regulatory authority.’ 
6.3.3 Single	vs	dual	imbalance	pricing	
Imagine an imbalance settlement period wherein the system is short of power. In that case, the 
imbalance price is expected to be positive as it is related to the activated upward balancing power. 
Now, in that case, should a BRP which has a negative imbalance (short), thus contributing to the system 
imbalance, be charged an imbalance price equal to that which a positively imbalanced BRP (long), 
which is thus helping the system, receives? 
 
In the case of single imbalance pricing, this is what happens in practice while with dual imbalance 
pricing, the short BRP would be charged a different imbalance price to that which the long BRP would 
receive. In EU countries today both single, dual and hybrid pricing is in place (ENTSO-E, 2017h). Single 
pricing is often favoured over a dual pricing in the academic literature (Chaves-Ávila and Fernandes, 
2015; Hiroux and Saguan, 2010; Littlechild, 2007; Neuhoff et al., 2015a; Newbery, 2006). Under dual 
pricing, the reverse price (individual imbalances in the opposite direction of the system imbalance) is 
often linked or capped by a reference or day-ahead market price, while the imbalance in the direction 
of the system imbalance is linked to the cost of balancing energy. 
 
                                                             
99 Or even stronger, this approach could (partly) solve the missing money problem as giving an additional 
incentive for flexible generation to be installed.  
100 Chapter 5 of this title (‘Settlement of balancing capacity’) refers to EBGL Article 56: Procurement within a 
scheduling area 
1. Each TSO of a scheduling area using balancing capacity bids shall establish rules for the settlement of at least 
frequency restoration reserves and replacement reserves pursuant to the requirements set out in Article 32. 
2. Each TSO of a scheduling area using balancing capacity bids shall settle at least all procured frequency 
restoration reserves and replacement reserves pursuant to the requirements set out in Article 32. 
67 
 
Art. 32(2) of the EBGL is relevant to this matter. It states that single pricing should be applied. However, 
a TSO may propose to the NRA to apply dual pricing under certain conditions and with the necessary 
justification. More precisely:  
 
‘By one year after entry into force of this Regulation, all TSOs shall develop a proposal to further specify 
and harmonize at least: 
…. 
 (c) the use of single imbalance pricing for all imbalances pursuant to Article 55, which defines a single 
price for positive imbalances and negative imbalances for each imbalance price area within an 
imbalance settlement period; and 
 
(d) the definition of conditions and methodology for applying dual imbalance pricing for all imbalances 
pursuant to Article 55, which defines one price for positive imbalances and one price for negative 
imbalances for each imbalance price area within an imbalance settlement period, encompassing: 
 
 (i) conditions on when a TSO may propose to its relevant regulatory authority in accordance 
 with Article 37 of Directive 2009/72/EC the application of dual pricing and which justification 
 must be provided; 
 
 (ii) the methodology for applying dual pricing.’ 
 
Many arguments in favour of single pricing are found in the academic literature. An important 
argument is the fact that dual imbalance pricing discriminates against smaller generation units where 
companies can aggregate imbalances within a portfolio (Neuhoff et al., 2015a). This is especially the 
case if there is no liquid intraday market to trade imbalances (Chaves-Ávila et al., 2014). Also, a single 
imbalance price would constitute a suitable liquid reference price. Further, the dual price imbalance 
design is reputed to be less cost-reflective than the single price design (Newbery, 2006). Littlechild 
(2007) explains it as follows: ‘[with dual pricing] the reverse price (individual imbalances in the opposite 
direction of the system imbalance in a dual price system) has been ‘deliberately delinked’ from the 
System Operator’s costs. It is difficult to see how this is consistent with the stated philosophy of setting 
imbalance prices to reflect the System Operator’s costs. And by linking the imbalance prices with the 
short-term market prices the risk of distorting the traded market by introducing incentives to influence 
that market price in order to influence imbalance price is run.’  
 
Another important argument brought up by Littlechild (2007) in favour of single pricing is that under 
that mechanism both short and long BRPs participants can contribute to balancing the system, but the 
dual pricing encourages only one set of market participants to do so.101 This argument relates to Hirth 
and Ziegenhagen (2015) who see two types of balancing: active and passive balancing. When TSOs 
deploy balancing energy, they actively balance the system. However, when the imbalance price 
provides the right incentive to BRPs, these can ‘passively’ balance the system by purposely deviating 
from the schedule. This is also called self-balancing. Three preconditions are needed for effective 
                                                             
101 Littlechild (2007) states: ‘the significant gap between system buy and sell price seems likely to have distorted 
decisions on how far each participant decides to balance its own position rather than use the facilities of the 
System Operator. Not surprisingly, many market participants seem to have taken the view that being short is to 
be avoided at almost all costs. This is unlikely to be efficient.’ 
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passive balancing: single pricing, a timely publication of the system imbalance and its price, and the 
legal ability for BRPs to respond to the price signal (which has not been the case for Germany in the 
past). 102 
 
There are also arguments in favour of dual pricing over single pricing. Brijs et al. (2017) and Vandezande 
(2011) note that speculation of BRPs about the direction of the system imbalance would be avoided 
with dual pricing. In that same line, if BRPs do not passively balance themselves, it would be easier for 
the TSO to estimate real-time system imbalances and anticipate power flows. This is of particular 
importance when internal grid congestion is a frequent issue. An interesting point is made by Chaves-
Ávila et al. (2014). In their paper, they mention the fact that a single pricing scheme for a whole country 
can lead to misleading imbalance prices in the context of internal congestion splitting the scheduling 
zone into two areas. In that case, market parties can be incentivised to worsen their local imbalance if 
the imbalance direction is opposite in the different areas. A similar remark is made by Brunekreeft 
(2015). He states that if the imbalance within one settlement period changes from positive to negative 
(or the other way around), for one of these imbalances, the imbalance price would be wrong and would 
set the wrong incentives. In fact, everything would go the other way around, and the system would 
destabilise. Chaves-Ávila et al. (2014) argue that a nodal or zonal pricing would solve the issue, but that 
this solution is hard to implement today because of technical and political reasons. A temporary 
solution would be to use a hybrid pricing rule, more precisely using single pricing when there is a 
unique direction of regulation and dual pricing when both upward and downward reserves are 
activated. Chaves-Ávila et al. (2014) conclude that such a scheme can result in a lower efficiency of 
cost allocation, but that it prevents adverse actions destabilising price signals. This is also the regulation 
put in place in the Dutch system today (Brunekreeft, 2015). 
 
The last point, directly related to single or dual pricing is whether market parties should be responsible 
for their imbalances at plant/demand facility level or whether aggregation of their imbalances over 
their portfolio is allowed, defined as balancing groups by Neuhoff et al. (2016c). Today in Europe this 
rule is not harmonised (ENTSO-E, 2017h). Balance responsibility on an individual level is compatible 
with the single pricing, as mentioned before; the financial outcome when imbalances are accounted 
for individually or on an aggregated scale will not differ. On the contrary, if dual pricing is implemented 
aggregation will make a difference in the total cost, favouring large portfolios. Additionally, Neuhoff et 
al. (2016c) argue that balancing groups have a cost for the system as it lowers the liquidity in the 
balancing market by encouraging balancing within groups and could have the effect that the TSO over-
contracts balancing capacity as it does not have a good oversight of balancing resources available in 
the system. The authors argue that the design of the imbalance price can only partially compensate 
for this effect and that the problem is aggravated if transmission capacity within a scheduling zone is 
scarce.  
 
In Art. 54(3) of the EBGL it is left to the individual TSOs to decide whether aggregation of imbalances 
over a portfolio is allowed. More precisely, it is stated that ‘each TSO shall calculate the final position 
of a balance responsible party using one of the following approaches: 
 
                                                             
102 EBGL (Art. 12(3.a)) states that each TSO shall publish: ‘Information on the current system imbalance of its 
scheduling area, as soon as possible but no later than 30 minutes after real-time.’ 
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(a) balance responsible party has one single final position equal to the sum of its external commercial 
trade schedules and internal commercial trade schedules; 
 
(b) balance responsible party has two final positions: the first is equal to the sum of its external 
commercial trade schedules and internal commercial trade schedules from generation, and the second 
is equal to the sum of its external commercial trade schedules and internal commercial trade schedules 
from consumption;’ 
 The activation of balancing energy: two approaches 
Two approaches to the activation of balancing energy are identified in the EU, reactive balancing and 
proactive balancing (Elia and TenneT, 2014; Haberg and Doorman, 2016; Pentalateral Energy Forum, 
2016). The key difference between the two approaches is that with reactive balancing the TSO 
activates balancing energy to counteract imbalances in real-time, while with proactive balancing the 
TSO activates balancing energy before real-time based on forecasts of imbalances.103 The activation 
strategy of balancing energy cannot be decoupled from the reliance of a TSO on BRPs to self-balance 
and thus the imbalance settlement mechanism. With a reactive approach, the TSO relies more heavily 
on the engagement of decentralised (proactive) market players in managing the system imbalance. 
Therefore, shorter imbalance settlement periods and single imbalance pricing fit well with this 
approach.  
Conversely, the proactive approach relies more strongly on active balancing by the TSO and generally 
gives weaker incentives to the BRPs. The flexibility of the available generation mix, which is in its turn 
in most cases a function of the size of the system and its interconnectivity, has an influence on the 
applied activation strategy. A proactive approach is often believed to increase system security in the 
case of more isolated systems (with little flexible capacity) possibly combined with a high share of vRES 
generation resulting in unpredictable electricity flows. An overview of a selection of EU countries and 
their approach to the activation of balancing energy is shown in Figure 28. Additionally, in the same 
Figure, the relationship between BRP incentives and the activation strategy is displayed. It can be seen 
that there are also countries (e.g. Denmark) applying an approach in between reactive and proactive 
balancing.  
                                                             
103 At least one hour before real-time is mentioned by Pentalateral Energy Forum (2016). 
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Figure 28: Classification of European balancing markets based on activation strategy in balancing 
energy and BRP incentives (Haberg and Doorman, 2016). Additionally, Portugal and Spain are 
identified as proactive by the Pentalateral Energy Forum (2016). 
In a document by the Pentalateral Energy Forum (2016) the rationale behind both approaches is 
summarised as: ‘The objective of the proactive approach is to minimize the overall balancing costs by 
reducing the average balancing energy price, whereas in the reactive approach, the objective is to 
minimize the overall balancing cost by reducing the volume of balancing energy.’ Another distinction 
is that TSOs applying the reactive approach generally do not procure RR, while TSOs applying a 
proactive approach do and can activate manual reserves (mFRR or RR) to intervene before real-time 
(Elia and TenneT, 2014).  
It is important to add that the reactive approach relies on a liquid and well-functioning intraday market 
and intraday gate closure near real-time, making it possible for BRPs to trade their imbalances. As such, 
the need for the activation of large volumes of balancing energy in real-time is minimised. In contrast, 
it can be argued that a proactive approach distorts the functioning of the intraday market. Two issues 
can be identified. First, the resources that are procured for proactive balancing (RR) are not available 
anymore to trade in the intraday market, lowering supply in that market. Second, by minimising the 
real-time imbalance and as a consequence also the balancing prices and imbalance charges, BRPs have 
less incentive to trade in the intraday market to be balanced, thus reducing demand in that market. 
Actually, by applying proactive balance BRPs do not receive price signals indicating system stress. 
Instead, price signals are dampened by intervention before real-time. The cost of this real-time 
intervention then needs to be recuperated in other, less cost reflective ways. 
The EBGL and SOGL do not explicitly favour one approach to the activation of balancing energy over 
the other. It seems that within these regulations both approaches are allowed, although ‘very’ 
proactive balancing seems to be restricted. There are several articles of importance with respect to 
this matter. Most importantly, in Art. 29(2,3) of the EBGL it is stated that: 
‘2. TSOs shall not activate balancing energy bids before the corresponding balancing energy gate 
closure time, except in the alert state or the emergency state when such activations help alleviate the 
severity of these system states and except when the bids serve purposes other than balancing pursuant 
to paragraph 3.  
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3. By one year after the entry into force of this Regulation, all TSOs shall develop a proposal for a 
methodology for classifying the activation purposes of balancing energy bids. This methodology shall:  
(a) describe all possible purposes for the activation of balancing energy bids;  
(b) define classification criteria for each possible activation purpose.’ 
 
Looking back at Art. 24(1,2) of the EBGL, regarding the balancing energy GCT, it is stated that: 
‘1. As part of the proposals pursuant to Articles 19, 20 and 21, all TSOs shall harmonise the balancing 
energy gate closure time for standard products at the Union level, at least for each of the following 
processes: 
(a) replacement reserves; 
(b) frequency restoration reserves with manual activation; 
(c) frequency restoration reserves with automatic activation. 
2. Balancing energy gate closure times shall: 
(a) be as close as possible to real time; 
(b) not be before the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time; 
(c) ensure sufficient time for the necessary balancing processes.’ 
Furthermore, in the CACM (Art. 59(3)), concerning the intraday cross-zonal GCT, it is stated:  
‘One intraday cross-zonal gate closure time shall be established for each market time unit for a given 
bidding zone border. It shall be at most one hour before the start of the relevant market time unit and 
shall take into account the relevant balancing processes in relation to operational security.’ 
These articles imply that the balancing GCT will be at most one hour before real-time and would mean 
that proactively activating balancing energy long (a couple of hours) before real-time will not be 
allowed unless in an alert on emergency state. However, on the other hand, procurement of RR and 
having in place a Reserve Replacement Process (RRP), compatible with the proactive balancing 
approach, is a right described in EBGL (Art. 19) and SOGL (Art. 140(2)). In Art. 144(1) of SOGL it is stated 
that: 
 
‘The control target of the RRP shall be to fulfil at least one of the following goals by activation of RR:  
(a) progressively restore the activated FRR;  
(b) support FRR activation;  
(c) for the GB and IE/NI synchronous areas, to progressively restore the activated FCR and FRR.’  
Box 8: Self-dispatch vs central dispatch models 
Several articles in the EBGL and the SOGL mention that (slightly) different provisions hold for self-
dispatch or central dispatch systems, the two dispatch models applied in the EU. Self-dispatch 
models can be reactive or proactive in their activation of balancing energy. If a similar label should 
be put on central dispatch models, they can be categorised as extremely proactive in their balancing 
approach. 
 
The self-dispatch model is the most common and defined ‘as a scheduling and dispatching model 
where the generation schedules and consumption schedules as well as dispatching of power 
generating facilities and demand facilities are determined by the scheduling agents of those 
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facilities’ (EBGL, Art. 2(17)). On the contrary, with a central dispatch model ‘the generation schedules 
and consumption schedules as well as dispatching of power generating facilities and demand 
facilities, in reference to dispatchable facilities, are determined by a TSO within the integrated 
scheduling process’ ((EBGL, Art. 2(17)). An integrated scheduling process means that balancing, 
reserve procurement and congestion management are done concurrently (Marneris and Biskas, 
2015). 
 
In short, under the self-dispatch model different markets are organised for different purposes 
(balancing energy, balancing capacity and congestion management) and market parties with their 
economic incentives are more important, while under central dispatch an integrated process is 
executed with a much greater role for the TSO. Currently, the central dispatch model is in place in 
e.g. Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland (Marneris and Biskas, 2015). Ireland is in a transition from a 
central dispatch to a self-dispatch model. 
 
The self-dispatch model is more in line with the European Target model (see also ACER (2015b) and 
Gorecki (2013)) and is seen as ‘default’ in the EBGL as can be deducted from Art. 14(2): 
 
‘Each TSO shall apply a self-dispatching model for determining generation schedules and 
consumption schedules. TSOs that apply a central dispatching model at the time of the entry into 
force of this Regulation shall notify to the relevant regulatory authority in accordance with Article 37 
of Directive 2009/72/EC in order to continue to apply a central dispatching model for determining 
generation schedules and consumption schedules. The relevant regulatory authority shall verify 
whether the tasks and responsibilities of the TSO are consistent with the definition in Article 2(18).’ 
 
Therefore, the working of the balancing mechanism described in this Chapter and the next Chapter 
refers to the self-dispatch model. Otherwise, it is explicitly stated.  
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7. Integrating	balancing	markets	
Great efficiency gains and an increase in security of supply can be achieved by integrating balancing 
markets. For example, see the report by Mott MacDonald (2013) in which it is estimated that the 
theoretical benefit of the full integration of balancing markets with hypothetical scenarios of the 
European system in 2030 is up to 3 billion € per year, or the study by Artelys et al. (2016) in which it is 
shown that most monetary gains can be made by joint dimensioning and procurement of reserves 
(open for DR and RES) at EU level. However, balancing mechanisms are complex and different national 
approaches have grown organically to best fit local needs. As a result, it is not straightforward to 
integrate this segment of the electricity market sequence. An important difference between the 
integration of DA and ID markets and balancing market is highlighted by Neuhoff and Richstein 
(2016b). They state that for DA and ID markets the focus was mainly on a harmonisation of products, 
timelines and transmission capacity allocation, while with balancing one important challenge is added, 
namely the harmonisation of operational paradigms. In other words, in itself the alignment of markets 
is not enough – certain relevant elements of system operation must also be aligned. 
 
The two important network codes in this regard are the EBGL and SOGL. The EBGL described the 
principles, market rules and proposals which need to be followed, implemented or developed to allow 
balancing markets to integrate. In parallel to the development of these rather ‘top-down’ regulations, 
different balancing pilots have been launched since 2013. Balancing pilots are voluntary initiatives 
which aim to gain bottom-up experience for the implementation of different aspects of the integration 
of European balancing markets. In Figure 29 an overview of the different balancing pilots in Europe is 
given. Balancing pilots are dynamic projects and their active members can evolve as can be seen from 
the Figure.  
 
Figure 29: Overview of the balancing pilot projects (ENTSO-E, 2017i) 
This chapter is split into two sections. First, a discussion is held on what market design blocks or 
operational paradigms need to be harmonised to allow the efficient integration of balancing markets. 
There seems to be no consensus for the moment. Second, four complementary ways of cross-zonal 
cooperation in balancing are described: imbalance netting, the exchange of balancing energy, the 
exchange of balancing capacity and sharing of reserves. That section also deals with cross-zonal 
transmission capacity allocation for balancing purposes. 
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 How far should harmonisation go to allow for integration? 
In earlier drafts of the EBGL, e.g. the version 3.0 published on the 30th of August 2014, a concept called 
Coordinated Balancing Areas (CoBAs) was mentioned. 104 In that version of the EBGL, CoBAs are defined 
as ‘a cooperation with respect to the Exchange of Balancing Services, Sharing of Reserves or operating 
the Imbalance Netting Process between two or more TSOs.’ The main idea behind CoBAs was a phased 
approach toward the full integration of balancing markets. First, regional initiatives (as with the 
balancing pilots), allowing for more flexibility in design, would emerge which would then slowly be 
merged. ACER (2015c) also confirmed that a regional implementation is an unavoidable interim step 
to single EU-wide integration. However, CoBAs were removed in the final version of the EBGL 
(approved by the MSs on 16 March 2017), and the focus was laid more strongly on the (single) 
European Target Model. However, the line of thought behind CoBAs has not been fully discarded, and 
regional initiatives are still deemed the way forward as stated by TenneT et al. (2016).  
 
Box 9: Two regional balancing initiatives – TERRE and EXPLORE 
Two regional balancing initiatives often referred to are TERRE and EXPLORE. TERRE moved from 
being a pilot to an implementation project for the European platform for the exchange of 
replacement reserves (EBGL, Art. 19). EXPLORE is not an official balancing pilot but a joint initiative 
of four TSOs interested in more balancing cooperation. In July 2017, the PICASSO project (Platform 
for the International Coordination of the Automatic frequency restoration process and Stable 
System Operation) was initiated.105 The PICASSO project builds further on the work done in EXPLORE 
and is the implementation project for the European platform for the exchange of aFRR (EBGL, Art. 
21). 
 
TERRE stands for ‘Trans European Replacement Reserves Exchange’ and has 8 active partners: two 
TSOs in Great Britain, the TSOs from France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland and Greece. The TSOs 
from Ireland and Northern Ireland are observers. ENTSO-E (2017j) described the objective of TERRE 
as: ‘setting up and operating a multi-TSO platform capable of gathering all the offers for 
Replacement Reserves (RR) and to optimise the allocation of RR across the systems of the different 
TSOs involved. It is moving towards cross-national exchange of RR.’ It is no coincidence that all TSOs 
involved in the project apply a rather proactive approach to the activation of balancing energy. 
Neuhoff and Richstein (2016b) add that the TERRE countries provide room for the continuation of 
national procedures as the operational paradigms between these countries, although all rather 
proactive, still significantly differs. 
 
EXPLORE stands for ‘European X-border Project for LOng-term Real-time balancing Electricity 
market design’ and is an initiative of the TSOs of four countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands. The objective of the EXPLORE study is to investigate how to exchange most optimally 
Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) while taking into account interactions with other balancing 
processes and the spot market. All countries participating in this project apply a reactive approach 
to the activation of balancing energy and, in contrast to the TERRE countries, show more 
commonalities in their approach to the balancing mechanism as also confirmed by Neuhoff and 
Richstein (2016). 
 
                                                             
104Link: 
https://www.entsoe.eu/Documents/Network%20codes%20documents/NC%20EB/140806_NCEB_Resubmissio
n_to_ACER_v.03.PDF consulted on 21/12/2017.  
105 The website of the Picasso project: https://electricity.network-codes.eu/network_codes/eb/picasso/ 
consulted on 21/12/2017. 
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In a document by the Pentalateral Energy Forum (2016), it is remarked that ACER and ENTSO-E hold 
different views on the degree of harmonisation needed across regional initiatives. ACER reasons that 
a sufficient degree of harmonisation is needed in order to avoid getting stuck with incompatible 
regions, while it is stated in that document that ENTSO-E is of the opinion that regional balancing 
initiatives can start without complete harmonisation. It can be said that the final version of the EBGL 
leans more towards ACER’s view. 
 
Standardised balancing products and a harmonised balancing energy gate closure time (GCT) are the 
two dimensions whose harmonisation both parties agree is absolutely necessary for integration. The 
EBGL outlines that standard balancing products need to be defined in Art. 25. However, as also 
described in the previous Chapter, if requested by a TSO and justified, temporarily specific balancing 
products might be in place in parallel with standard products (Art. 26(1)). The EBGL also states that 
these standardised balancing energy products for mFRR, aFRR and RR need to be exchanged on 
European trading platforms (EBGL, Art. 19, 20 and 21). Regarding the balancing energy GCT, Art. 24(1) 
of the EBGL firmly states the GCT for standardised products should be harmonised for at least mFRR, 
aFRR and RR processes. 
 
Two no-regret options needed for the integration of balancing markets as stated by Neuhoff and 
Richstein (2016), and also agreed upon by ACER (2015c), are the harmonisation of the imbalance 
settlement period (ISP) and the agreement on the pricing rule in balancing energy markets. Regarding 
the former and as already mentioned in the previous chapter, the EBGL states clearly that the ISP 
should be 15 minutes in all control areas (EBGL, Art.53(1)).106 Art. 53(2, 3) of the EBGL states that an 
exemption can be requested by all TSOs of a synchronous area. In that case the relevant NRAs have to 
approve. Or, the relevant NRAs of the synchronous area can decide to exempt themselves. In both 
cases the relevant NRAs have to conduct a CBA (at least every 3 years) in cooperation with ACER to 
show whether it is reasonable not to harmonise the ISP with other synchronous areas and/or within 
their own synchronous area. 
 
Also, the pricing rule in balancing energy markets was already discussed in the previous chapter and is 
determined in the EBGL. In Art. 30(1.a) of the EBGL it is stated that marginal pricing should be applied. 
TSOs might propose an amendment or alternative to this rule if they can identify inefficiencies in the 
application of this methodology (EBGL, Art. 30(5)). 
 
In addition to the four mentioned dimensions of balancing markets, ACER (2015c) argues that there is 
a need to go further to avoid divergent regional designs. Additional dimensions identified are principles 
for (activation) algorithms and TSO-TSO settlement rules.107 In the document by the Pentalateral 
Energy Forum (2016) the need to harmonise the activation purposes of balancing energy is added to 
the view of ACER.  
 Inter-TSO cooperation in balancing  
Four complementary forms of coordinated balancing are identified in the EBGL and SOGL. In the 
following, they are described in pairs. First, imbalance netting and the exchange of balancing energy 
                                                             
106 It is no secret that not all MSs agree with this view. Also, a CBA performed for ENTSO-E by Frontier Economics 
(2016) is not in favour of such full harmonisation. 
107 TSO-TSO settlement rules are discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
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are bundled as they more directly affect the balancing energy market. Then, the exchange of balancing 
capacity and sharing of reserves are jointly discussed. These forms of coordinated balancing have a 
more direct impact on the balancing capacity market. The exchange of balancing capacity and sharing 
of reserves adds a layer of difficulty as cross-zonal transmission capacity must be reserved or 
anticipated to serve these purposes. In contrast, for imbalance netting and the exchange of balancing 
energy, cross-zonal capacity must be available as these processes take place in real-time. 
 
Box 10: ‘The German Paradox’ – more renewables but less and cheaper reserves? 
Generally, with an increased share of vRES in the system the reserve requirements would intuitively 
be expected to increase as well. But this is not necessarily the case. While in Germany the vRES 
capacity has tripled since 2008, reserve requirements had been reduced by 15%, and costs by 50% 
by 2014. (Hirth and Ziegenhagen, 2015). This indicates that other factors can be quantitatively more 
important than vRES in determining the reserve requirement.  
 
Ocker and Ehrhart (2017) investigate this paradox in their paper and attribute the reduction in 
reserve requirement, next to better forecasting techniques of vRES generation, to two factors: 
 
International and national cooperation: from 2009 to 2010 the four German TSOs introduced a 
common balancing market.108As a result, counteracting activations of balancing energy in different 
balancing areas could be avoided and fewer reserves needed to be procured, leading to significant 
savings (see also Haucap et al. (2014)). Additionally, the International Grid Control Cooperation 
(IGCC) was founded, and as a consequence significant amounts of balancing energy was saved. 109 
 
Adaptations to the German energy market design: a strong increase in intraday trading was 
witnessed from 2006-2014. Intraday trade leads to a reduced need for balancing. Additionally, it is 
argued that the introduction of the intraday action with 15-minute products in December 2014 
helped to allow more precise scheduling of vRES and other generation technologies. 
 
7.2.1 Lower	volumes	of	cheaper	balancing	energy:	imbalance	netting	and	the	exchange	of	
balancing	energy		
Imbalance netting is defined in Article 3(128) of the SOGL as ‘a process agreed between TSOs that 
allows avoiding the simultaneous activation of FRR in opposite directions, taking into account the 
respective FRCEs as well as the activated FRR and by correcting the input of the involved FRPs 
accordingly.’ Put simply, if for example, two neighbouring LFC Areas have an opposite system 
imbalance at a point in time, the TSOs can agree to exchange the imbalance, and thus avoid the 
activation of counteracting balancing energy (FRR in this case) in both LFC Areas. This process leads to 
an overall reduction in the total volume of activated balancing energy and thus a cost reduction.110 
ACER and CEER (2016) report that imbalance netting continued to be the most successfully applied 
tool to exchange balancing services in 2015, e.g. in the Netherlands imbalance netting avoided almost 
50% of the balancing needs for that year. 
                                                             
108 The project, called the German Grid Control Cooperation (GCC), consists of 4 modules: 1) Prevent 
counteracting reserve activation; 2) Common dimensioning of reserves; 3) Common procurement of FRR; 4) Cost-
optimised activation of reserves. For more information, please consult Regelleistung.net (2017). 
109 The IGCC is further developed in the next Section. 
110 There could be (rare) situations where the savings triggered by the activation of downward reserves (fuel cost 
savings) are larger than the cost of activating upwards reserves. 
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Art. 22(1) of the EBGL outlines that a proposal for the implementation framework for a European 
Platform for imbalance netting shall be developed. In Art. 22(5) it is further stated that: ‘by one year 
after the approval of the proposal for the implementation framework for a European platform for the 
imbalance netting process, all TSOs performing the automatic frequency restoration process pursuant 
to Part IV of Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/000 [SO] shall implement and make operational the 
European platform for the imbalance netting process. They shall use the European platform to perform 
the imbalance netting process, at least for the Continental Europe synchronous area.’ ENTSO-E (2017k) 
describes that TSOs have gained experience with imbalance netting through pilot projects including 
‘International Grid Control Cooperation’ (IGCC), ‘e-GCC’ and the ‘Imbalance Netting Cooperation’ 
(INC). It was later agreed the IGCC would be used as the starting point for the implementation of the 
European process. 111 It is important to add that the EBGL also outlined that common settlement rules 
for imbalance netting shall be developed by all TSOs in Art. 50(1.d). For IGCC the volumes of exchange 
energy of each IGCC member are settled by calculating the opportunity costs, reflecting the value of 
netted imbalances (see IGCC Settlement Principles (ENTSO-E, 2017k)) for the rules and Verpoorten et 
al. (2016) for a case study). 
 
A second way to lower overall balancing cost is by the exchange of balancing energy across scheduling 
areas. The exchange of balancing energy is defined in Article 2(24)) of the EBGL as ‘the activation of 
balancing energy bids for the delivery of balancing energy to a TSO in a different scheduling area than 
the one in which the activated balancing service provider is connected.’ Two models are possible when 
exchanging balancing energy: TSO-TSO or the TSO-BSP model. In the TSO-TSO model, the balancing 
service provider provides balancing services to the TSO it is connected with, which then provides these 
balancing services to the TSO requesting the balancing energy. In the TSO-BSP model, the BSP provides 
balancing services directly to the contracting TSO, which then provides these balancing services to the 
requesting TSO. The contracting TSO is defined as ‘the TSO that has contractual arrangements for 
balancing services with a BSP in another scheduling area’ (EBGL, Art. 2(44)). 
 
The EBGL clearly states that the TSO-TSO model should be preferred. More precisely, Art. 19(2), 20(2) 
and 21(2) state that a European platform for RR, mFRR and aFRR needs to be developed which shall 
apply a multi-lateral TSO-TSO model with common merit order lists to exchange all balancing energy 
bids from all standard products. Exceptions from the TSO-TSO model are possible. Namely, two or 
more TSOs may on their initiative or at the request of their relevant regulatory authorities develop a 
proposal for the temporary application of the TSO-BSP model (EBGL, Art. 35 (1)). Also, current practices 
applying a TSO-BSP model are allowed in cases where the connecting TSO has not implemented a 
certain product process, for instance, the Reserve Replacement Process, to allow cross-zonal exchange 
of this product (EBGL Art. 35 (6)). The TSO-TSO model with common merit order list can lead to savings 
in the procurement of balancing energy as resources can be more efficiently allocated. Figure 30 
illustrates the workings of a common merit order list. 
 
                                                             
111 IGCC finds its origin in the cooperation of balancing services by the four German TSOs. Currently IGCC involves 
11 TSOs from 8 countries. These are the TSOs from Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, France and the Netherlands (ENTSO-E, 2017k). 
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Figure 30: Illustration of the efficiency gains with a common merit order list for the activation of 
balancing energy under no congestion. ‘p’: price, ‘q’: quantity and ‘d’: demand (Elia et al., 2013). 
Also, the EBGL outlines in Art. 50(1.a-c) that common settlement rules shall be developed by all TSOs 
in the case of the exchange of balancing energy. Two remarks about the exchange of balancing energy 
need to be added. First, the total balancing volume a TSO may request for activation from the common 
merit order list is limited by its own contribution of balancing energy bids to the list (for more details, 
see EBGL Art. 29(12)). Exceptions to this rule can be proposed by TSOs, provided that all other TSOs 
are informed (EBGL, Art. 29(13)). Second, a TSO can declare a balancing energy bid submitted to the 
activation function of the common merit order list unavailable for the activation by other TSOs only in 
case of internal congestion or due to operational constraints within the connecting TSO’s scheduling 
area (EBGL, Art. 29(14)). 
 
In order to conduct imbalance netting or the exchange of balancing energy, available transmission 
capacity between scheduling areas or LFC Areas is a prerequisite.112 In relation to this, Art. 36(1) 
requires that all TSOs shall use the available cross-zonal capacity after the cross-zonal intraday gate 
closure for the exchange of balancing energy or for operating the imbalance netting process. Two 
situations can exist, assuming there is spare capacity in both directions between two LFC Areas:  
 
• The imbalances in both areas are opposing: First, imbalance netting will take place. Then, if the 
imbalance in one of the areas persists and the transmission line is not congested, the exchange 
of balancing energy can take place.  
 
• The imbalances in both areas are in the same direction: No imbalance netting will take place. 
The exchange of balancing energy can take place. 
 
A methodology per Capacity Calculation Region (CCR) will be developed to calculate the available 
cross-zonal capacity within the balancing time frame (EBGL, Art 37(3)). It is not mentioned in the EBGL 
                                                             
112 An exemption to this statement holds for the exchange and operation of FCR (EBGL, Art. 38(4)). FCR can be 
exchanged using the reliability margin, calculated as described by CACM, Art. 22. This exemption does not hold 
if the interconnector is a DC line. 
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whether cross-zonal capacity can be reserved specifically for imbalance netting or the exchange of 
balancing energy.113  
7.2.2 More	 efficient	 reserve	 procurement	 and	 sizing:	 exchange	 of	 reserves	 and	 reserves	
sharing	
Next to imbalance netting and the exchange of balancing energy, the exchange of reserves and reserve 
sharing are also outlined in the EBGL as important to lower overall balancing procurement costs. 
 
The exchange of balancing capacity is defined in Art. 2(25) of the EBGL as ‘the provision of balancing 
capacity to a TSO in a different scheduling area than the one in which the procured BSP is connected.’ 
An example is a project for cross-zonal exchange of FCR capacity which started in late 2015 and 
involved the German, Austrian, Dutch and Swiss TSOs. ACER and CEER (2016) report that the exchange 
of balancing capacity allowed a reduction of approximately 14% in the overall balancing capacity 
procurement costs for FCR in 2015 when comparing with 2014 for these four countries recorded. 
 
The same two models for the exchange of balancing capacity are possible as with the exchange of 
balancing energy: TSO-TSO and the TSO-BSP model. Also, in this case, the EBGL states that the 
exchange shall always be performed based on a TSO-TSO model unless the same exceptions as with 
the exchange of balancing energy hold (EBGL, Art. 33(2)). As all TSOs engaged in exchanging balancing 
capacity submit all balancing capacity bids from standard products to a common capacity procurement 
optimisation function (EBGL, Art. 33(3)), a more efficient allocation of resources will result. Overall 
balancing capacity reservation costs can be lowered, and BSPs can benefit from access to an enlarged 
market without new pre-qualification procedures or contracts.  
 
However, as remarked by Doorman and Van Der Veen (2013), it might be more difficult to convince 
TSOs to exchange balancing capacity than to exchange balancing energy. Namely, a TSO with low-cost 
balancing resources may see an increase in its balancing procurement cost when sharing these 
resources with areas with higher cost resources. In the case of balancing energy, potential cost increase 
for a TSO will be passed on to BRPs causing the imbalances. In most cases, this will be a zero sum for 
the TSO as discussed before. However, in the case of reserve capacity, these costs are often included 
in the grid tariffs, and increasing them might prove to be more difficult. This reasoning could serve as 
an additional argument to include balancing capacity cost in imbalance prices. 
 
It can be said that sharing of reserves goes one step further than the exchange of balancing capacity. 
Namely, with reserve sharing more than one TSO takes the same reserve capacity (FCR, FRR or RR) into 
account to fulfil its respective reserve requirements (SOGL, Article 3(97)).114 Sharing of reserves can 
lead to lower overall volumes of balancing capacity, which is not the case with the exchange of 
balancing capacity in the strict sense. However, to make sharing of reserves feasible, difficult estimates 
need to be made about the probability that TSOs would need the same balancing resource at the same 
moment. A very important example of sharing of reserves, which is already in place, is the joint 
dimensioning of FCR. As also discussed by Van den Bergh et al. (2017), FCR is dimensioned to cover the 
                                                             
113 However, as discussed in the next subsection, cross-zonal transmission capacity can be reserved for the 
exchange of balancing capacity or for the sharing of reserves. And thus, indirectly also for balancing energy 
exchange. 
114 By definition this balancing capacity is cross-zonal for all TSOs involved except for the connecting TSO. 
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worst-case event (e.g. tripping of the largest generator unit). However, the probability that a worst-
case event happens in several EU countries is very low. Therefore, FCR is dimensioned at the scale of 
the synchronous area with a key determining how much each control area should contribute. This 
arrangement obviously leads to significant savings for all countries. 
 
Unlike imbalance netting and the exchange of balancing energy, the exchange of balancing capacity 
and sharing of reserves are voluntary initiatives between two or more TSOs (EBGL, Art. 33(1) and 
38(1)). However, a balancing report shall be published at least every two years by each TSO wherein 
the opportunities for the exchange of balancing capacity and sharing of reserves should be analysed. 
Additionally, an explanation and justification for the procurement of balancing capacity without the 
exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves should be given (EBGL, Art.60(2.e- f)). 
 
In order to exchange balancing capacity or share reserves, the availability of transmission capacity in 
real-time between scheduling areas needs to be anticipated. Article 36(2.c) and more precisely Article 
38(5) of the EBGL describe that cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing 
of reserves can be allocated.  Cross-zonal capacity allocated for the exchange of balancing capacity or 
sharing of reserves shall be used exclusively for FRR and for RR (EBGL, Article 38(4)). The reserved 
capacity shall be limited depending on the way the reserved capacity is calculated (Article 40 (1.d), 
41(2) and 42(2)). It should be added that all TSOs exchanging balancing capacity or sharing of reserves 
shall regularly assess whether the cross-zonal capacity allocated for the exchange of balancing capacity 
or sharing of reserves is still needed for that purpose as it means that this capacity is no longer offered 
to wholesale markets (Article 38(8)).  
 
Capacity allocation for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves is a stochastic problem 
as described by Van den Bergh et al. (2017). What is meant by this is at the time the transmission 
capacity is allocated, the state of the system and thus the need for the activation of balancing energy 
in a certain direction is uncertain, as is the remaining interconnection capacity. This renders it difficult 
to estimate the optimal volume and direction of the transmission capacity to be reserved. In the EBGL 
three methods to obtain estimates for the optimal cross-zonal capacity for the purpose of the 
exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves are enumerated: an approach based on 
economic efficiency analysis, a market-based approach and a co-optimisation approach.  
 
The three approaches can be described as follows: 
 
- Approach based on economic efficiency analysis: a method based on a comparison of the 
forecasted market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing capacity or 
sharing of reserves, and the forecasted market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange 
of energy (EBGL, Art. 42 (3)).115 Cross-zonal capacity is reserved before the transmission 
capacity auction for the exchange of energy takes place. This method, if in place, applies for 
the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves with a contracting period of more 
than one day and where the contracting is done more than one week in advance of the 
provision of the balancing capacity (EBGL, Art. 42(1)). 
  
                                                             
115 ‘The forecasted market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of energy between bidding zones shall 
be calculated based on the expected differences in market prices of the day-ahead and, where relevant and 
possible, intraday markets between bidding zones.’ (EBGL, Art. 39(5)) 
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- Market-based approach: a method based on a comparison of the actual market value of cross-
zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves and the forecasted 
market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of energy, or on a comparison of the 
forecasted market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing capacity or 
sharing of reserves, and the actual market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of 
energy (EBGL, Art. 41(3)).116 Cross-zonal capacity can be reserved just before or just after 
allocation for the exchange of energy. This method, if in place, applies for the exchange of 
balancing capacity or sharing of reserves with a contracting period of not more than one day 
and where the contracting is done not more than one day in advance of the provision of the 
balancing capacity (EBGL, Art. 41(1)). 
 
- Co-optimisation approach: a method based on a comparison of the actual market value of 
cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves and the 
actual market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of energy (EBGL, Art. 40(2)). 
Allocation of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves 
is done simultaneously with the capacity allocation for the exchange of energy. This method 
shall apply for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves with a contracting 
period of not more than one day and where the contracting is done not more than one day in 
advance of the provision of the balancing capacity (EBGL, Art. 40(1)). 
 
A summary of the three approaches is given in Table 3; it can be seen that the co-optimisation 
approach is the most advanced method, integrating best cross-zonal transmission capacity allocation 
for the exchange of balancing capacity and sharing of reserves with the capacity allocation for the 
exchange of energy. 
 
 Based on a comparison of Timing 
calculation vs 
timing of the 
allocation for 
the exchange 
of energy 
Method shall apply to 
 Market value of 
the exchange of 
energy 
Market value of the 
exchange of 
balancing capacity or 
sharing of reserves 
Contracting 
period 
reserves 
Time lag 
between 
contracting 
and delivery 
of reserves 
Economic 
efficiency 
analysis 
Forecasted Forecasted Before > 1 day > 1 week 
Market-based 
approach 
Forecasted/Actual Actual/Forecasted Just 
before/after 
<= 1 day <= 1 day 
Co-optimisation 
approach 
Actual Actual Simultaneous <= 1 day <= 1 day 
Table 3: Summary of the three approaches for cross-zonal capacity calculation for the exchange of 
balancing capacity or sharing of reserves. 
It can be derived from the EBGL that the preferred approach is the co-optimised allocation process. 
Namely, for an approach based on economic efficiency analysis and a market-based approach, a 
                                                             
116 Art. 39(4) of the EBGL describes that ‘the actual market value of cross-zonal capacity for the sharing of reserves 
shall be calculated based on the avoided costs of procuring balancing capacity.’ 
Art. 39(2) of the EBGL describes that ‘the actual market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of energy 
shall be calculated based on the bids of market participants in the day-ahead markets, and take into account, 
where relevant and possible, expected bids of market participants in the intraday markets.’ 
Art. 39(3) of the EBGL describes that ‘the actual market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of 
balancing capacity shall be calculated based on balancing capacity bids submitted to the capacity procurement 
optimisation function.’ 
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harmonised methodology may be proposed by all TSOs (Article 41(1) and 42(1)); while for a co-
optimised approach a harmonised methodology shall be proposed by all TSOs (Article 40(1)). The latter 
method is the one best in line with the idea to optimally integrate capacity allocation over time frames 
and also with the provision to procure balancing capacity on a short-term basis (EBGL, Art. 32(2.b)). 
  
83 
 
Bibliography  
ACER, 2017a. ACER’s decision on the NEMOs proposal for harmonised minimum and maximum clearing 
prices for the day-ahead coupling. Decis. ACER No 04/2017. 
ACER, 2017b. ACER’s decision on the NEMOs proposal for harmonised minimum and maximum 
clearing prices for the single intraday coupling. Decis. ACER No 05/2017. 
ACER, 2016a. Decision of ACER No 06/2016 on the electricity transmission system operators’ proposal 
for the determination of capacity calculation regions. 
ACER, 2016b. ACER Recommendation No 02/2016 on common capacity calculation and redispatching 
and countertrading cost sharing methodologies. 
ACER, 2015a. List of NEMO designations [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/electricity/FG_and_network_codes/CACM/Pages/NEMO-
Designations.aspx 
ACER, 2015b. ACER Recommendation No 03/2015 on the Network Code on Electricity Balancing. 
ACER, 2015c. ACER path towards the balancing market integration. Present. Balanc. Stakehold. Gr. 
27/11/2015. 
ACER, 2015d. ACER path towards the balancing market integration. Present. Balanc. Stakehold. Gr. 
27/11/2015. 
ACER, 2015e. ACER Opinion No 09/2015 on the compliance of NRAs’ decisions approving methods of 
cross-border capacity allocation in the CEE region. 
ACER, 2013. Loop Flows Workshop - High-Level Conclusions. 
ACER, CEER, 2017. Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas 
Markets in 2016 October. doi:10.2851/14037 
ACER, CEER, 2016. Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity Markets in 2015. 
ACER, ENTSO-E, 2012. Regulatory framework for cross- border redispatching and countertrading. 
Present. Florence Forum. 
AGORA, 2016. Refining Short-Term Electricity Markets to Enhance Flexibility. Stock. as well as Options 
Reform Pentalateral Energy Forum Reg. 
Artelys, COWI, Frontier Economics, 2016. Integration of electricity balancing markets and regional 
procurement of balancing reserves. Carried out Eur. Comm. (DG ENER B1). 
Ausubel, L., Cramton, P., 2002. Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions. Work. Pap. 
Univ. Maryl. doi:10.1093/restud/rdu023 
Batlle, C., Mastropietro, P., Gómez-Elvira, R., 2014. Toward a Fuller Integration of the EU Electricity 
Market: Physical or Financial Transmission Rights? Electr. J. 27, 8–17. 
doi:10.1016/j.tej.2013.12.001 
Bellenbaum, J., Bucksteeg, M., Kallabis, T., Pape, C., Weber, C., 2014. Intra-day cross-zonal capacity 
pricing. Study on behalf of Ofgem. 
Benjamin, R., 2010. A further inquiry into FTR properties. Energy Policy 38, 3547–3556. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.02.032 
84 
 
Brijs, T., De Jonghe, C., Hobbs, B.F., Belmans, R., 2017. Interactions between the design of short-term 
electricity markets in the CWE region and power system flexibility. Appl. Energy 195, 36–51. 
doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.03.026 
Brunekreeft, G., 2015. Empirics of Intraday and Real-time Markets in Europe: The Netherlands. 
Chao, H., Peck, S., 1996. A market mechanism for electric power transmission. J. Regul. Econ. 10, 25–
29. 
Chaves-Ávila, J.P., Fernandes, C., 2015. The Spanish intraday market design: A successful solution to 
balance renewable generation? Renew. Energy 74, 422–432. doi:10.1016/j.renene.2014.08.017 
Chaves-Ávila, J.P., van der Veen, R.A.C., Hakvoort, R.A., 2014. The interplay between imbalance pricing 
mechanisms and network congestions - Analysis of the German electricity market. Util. Policy 28, 
52–61. doi:10.1016/j.jup.2013.11.005 
Chawla, M., Pollitt, M.G., 2013. Global Trends in Electricity Transmission System Operation: Where 
does the future lie? Electr. J. 26, 65–71. 
Delille, G., François, B., Malarange, G., 2012. Dynamic frequency control support by energy storage to 
reduce the impact of wind and solar generation on isolated power system’s inertia. IEEE Trans. 
Sustain. Energy 3, 931–939. doi:10.1109/TSTE.2012.2205025 
Dijk, J., Willems, B., 2011. The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets. Energy 
Policy 39, 1764–1773. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.01.008 
Doorman, G.L., Van Der Veen, R., 2013. An analysis of design options for markets for cross-border 
balancing of electricity. Util. Policy 27, 39–48. doi:10.1016/j.jup.2013.09.004 
E-Bridge, IAEW, 2016. Impact of merit order activation of automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves 
and harmonised Full Activation times. Study on behalf of ENTSO-E. 
E-Brige Consulting, 2014. Potential cross-border balancing cooperation between the Belgian , Dutch 
and German electricity Transmission System Operators. 
ECN, DCision, Trinomics, 2017. Study supporting the Impact Assessment concerning Transmission 
Tariffs and Congestion Income Policies. 
Elia, 2017. Marktwerkingsregels voor de compensatie van de kwartuuronevenwichten - 
Inwerkingstreding volgend op de beslissing van de CREG (B) 1632 van 06/07/2017. 
Elia, TenneT, 2014. Design of a Harmonised Reactive Balancing Market with Cross Zonal Optimisation 
of Frequency Restoration between LFC Blocks. TenneT Elia Final Rep. step 2 XB Balanc. Proj. BE-
NL 1–111. 
Elia, TenneT, KEMA, 2013. Cross-Border Exchange of Balancing Energy and Operational Reserves : 
Benefits and Issues. Potential Cross-Border Balanc. Coop. between Elia Tennet. Present. a 
Stakehold. Work. Brussels. 
ENTSO-E, 2017a. Time to team up and create value - presentation by Bente Hagem on the network 
code conference (4 May 2017). 
ENTSO-E, 2017b. Regional Security Coordinators [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/RSC/Pages/default.aspx 
ENTSO-E, 2017c. All TSOs ’ proposal for harmonised allocation rules for long-term transmission rights 
85 
 
in accordance with Article 51 of FCA GL. 
ENTSO-E, 2017d. All TSOs ’ proposal for the establishment of a Single Allocation Platform ( SAP ) in 
accordance with Article 49 and for the cost sharing methodology in accordance with Article 59 of 
FCA GL. 
ENTSO-E, 2017e. Report on the progress and potential problems with the implementation of Single 
Day- Ahead and Intraday Coupling. 
ENTSO-E, 2017f. All TSOs’ proposal for the single methodology for pricing intraday cross-zonal capacity 
in accordance with Article 55 of CACM. Publ. 7 April 2017. 
ENTSO-E, 2017g. All TSOs ’ proposal for the single methodology for pricing intraday cross-zonal 
capacity in accordance with Article 55 of CACM. Publ. 10 August 2017. 
ENTSO-E, 2017h. Survey on ancillary services procurement, balancing market design 2016. Present. by 
ENTSO-E Work. Gr. Ancillary Serv. 
ENTSO-E, 2017i. Cross Border Electricity Balancing Pilot Projects [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/network-code-implementation/cross-border-electricity-
balancing-pilot-projects/Pages/default.aspx 
ENTSO-E, 2017j. Balancing code early implementation: TSOs consult on the TERRE pilot project [WWW 
Document]. URL https://www.entsoe.eu/news-events/announcements/announcements-
archive/Pages/News/balancing-code-early-implementation-TSOs-consult-on-the-TERRE-pilot-
project.aspx 
ENTSO-E, 2017k. Imbalance netting [WWW Document]. URL https://www.entsoe.eu/major-
projects/network-code-implementation/electricity-balancing/igcc/Pages/default.aspx 
ENTSO-E, 2016. Activation purposes of Balancing Energy bids - Draft version 5. WG Ancillary Serv. – SG 
Act. Purp. 
ENTSO-E, 2015a. All TSOs’ proposal for Capacity Calculation Regions (CCRs) in accordance with Article 
15(1) of the CACM GL. 
ENTSO-E, 2015b. Capacity Calculation Regions [WWW Document]. URL 
https://consultations.entsoe.eu/system-operations/capacity-calculation-regions/consult_view/ 
ENTSO-E, 2015c. Survey on Ancillary services procurement, Balancing market design 2014 [WWW 
Document]. URL https://www.entsoe.eu/Documents/Publications/Market Committee 
publications/150127_WGAS_Survey_2014.pdf 
ENTSO-E, 2014a. ENTSO-E Policy Paper Future TSO Coordination for Europe. 
ENTSO-E, 2014b. Supporting Document for the Network Code on Operational Planning and Scheduling. 
EPEX SPOT SE, 2017. 30-Minute Continuous Intraday Trading Successfully Launched in France, 
Germany and Switzerland. Press Release 30 March 2017. 
Frontier Economics, 2016. CBA of a change to the imbalance settlement period. A Rep. ENTSO-E. 
Frunt, J., 2011. Analysis of balancing requirements in future sustainable and reliable power systems. 
TU Eindhoven. 
FSR, 2014. Electricity markets ( principles ). CEER-FSR Train. Introd. to Fundam. Energy Regul. 
86 
 
FTI-Compass Lexecon, 2016. Options for the future of power system regional coordination. Rep. 
ENTSO-E. 
Genoese, F., Drabik, E., Egenhofer, C., 2016. The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS 
Spec. Rep. No. 135. 
Glachant, J.M., 2016. Taking stock of the EU Power Target Model’’... and steering its future course. 
Energy Policy 96, 673–679. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2016.03.010 
Glachant, J.M., Lévêque, F., 2006. Electricity Reform in Europe: Towards a Single Energy Market. 
Edward Elgar. 
Glachant, J.M., Pignon, V., 2005. Nordic congestion’s arrangement as a model for Europe? Physical 
constraints vs. economic incentives. Util. Policy 13, 153–162. doi:10.1016/j.jup.2004.12.009 
Gorecki, P.K., 2013. Ensuring compatibility of the all-island electricity system with the target model: 
Fitting a square peg into a round hole? Energy Policy 52, 677–688. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.028 
Haberg, M., Doorman, G., 2016. Classification of balancing markets based on different activation 
philosophies: Proactive and reactive designs. Int. Conf. Eur. Energy Mark. EEM 2016–July. 
doi:10.1109/EEM.2016.7521272 
Hagemann, S., Weber, C., 2015. Trading Volumes in Intraday Markets - Theoretical Reference Model 
and Empirical Observations. 
Haucap, J., Heimeshoff, U., Jovanovic, D., 2014. Competition in Germany’s minute reserve power 
market: An econometric analysis. Energy J. 35, 137–156. doi:10.5547/01956574.35.2.7 
Henriot, A., 2014. Market design with centralized wind power management: handling low-
predictability in intraday markets. Ene 35, 99–117. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2481918 
Henriot, A., Glachant, J.M., 2013. Melting-pots and salad bowls: The current debate on electricity 
market design for integration of intermittent RES. Util. Policy 27, 57–64. 
doi:10.1016/j.jup.2013.09.001 
Hiroux, C., Saguan, M., 2010. Large-scale wind power in European electricity markets: Time for 
revisiting support schemes and market designs? Energy Policy 38, 3135–3145. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.030 
Hirth, L., Ziegenhagen, I., 2015. Balancing Power and Variable Renewables: Three Links. Renew. 
Sustain. Energy Rev. 50, 1035–1051. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2015.04.180 
Hogan, W.W., 2013. Electricity Scarcity Pricing Through Operating Reserves. Econ. Energy Environ. 
Policy 2, 65–86. doi:10.5547/2160-5890.2.2.4 
Hogan, W.W., 1992. Contract networks for electric power transmission. J. Regul. Econ. 4, 211–242. 
Jamasb, T., Pollitt, M., 2005. Electricity Market Reform in the European Union : Review of Progress 
toward Liberalization & Integration. Energy J. 26, 11–41. 
Joskow, P., Tirole, J., 2005. Merchant Transmission Investment. J. Ind. Econ. 53, 233–264. 
Joskow, P., Tirole, J., 2000. Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks. RAND 
J. Econ. 31, 450–487. 
87 
 
Just, S., Weber, C., 2015. Strategic behavior in the German balancing energy mechanism: incentives, 
evidence, costs and solutions. J. Regul. Econ. 48, 218–243. doi:10.1007/s11149-015-9270-6 
Kahn, A.E., Cramton, P.C., Porter, R.H., Tabors, R.D., 2001. Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing. Electr. 
J. 14, 70–79. doi:10.1016/S1040-6190(01)00216-0 
Kristiansen, T., 2007. Cross-border transmission capacity allocation mechanisms in South East Europe. 
Energy Policy 35, 4611–4622. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.03.020 
Kunz, F., Zerrahn, A., 2016. Coordinating cross-country congestion management: Evidence from 
Central Europe. Energy J. 37, 32. doi:10.5547/01956574.37.SI3.fkun 
Levin, T., Botterud, A., 2015. Electricity market design for generator revenue sufficiency with increased 
variable generation. Energy Policy 87, 392–406. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2015.09.012 
Littlechild, S., 2015. Reflections on cash-out arrangements. Lett. to 1Roger Witcomb 1–13. 
Littlechild, S., 2007. Electricity Cash Out Arrangements. 
Märkle-Huß, J., Feuerriegel, S., Neumann, D., 2018. Contract durations in the electricity market: Causal 
impact of 15 min trading on the EPEX SPOT market. Energy Econ. 69, 367–378. 
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2017.11.019 
Marneris, I.G., Biskas, P.N., 2015. Integrated Scheduling Model for Central Dispatch systems in Europe. 
2015 IEEE Eindhoven PowerTech, PowerTech 2015 1–6. doi:10.1109/PTC.2015.7232641 
Mastropietro, P., Rodilla, P., Batlle, C., 2015. The unfolding of regional electricity markets: measures 
to improve the firmness of cross-border trading. IIT Work. Pap. IIT-14-160A. 
Meeus, L., 2011. Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context? 
Energy Policy 39, 1470–1475. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.019 
Meeus, L., Belmans, R., 2007. Is the prevailing wholesale market design in Europe and North America 
comparable? 2007 IEEE Power Eng. Soc. Gen. Meet. PES. doi:10.1109/PES.2007.385523 
Meeus, L., Purchala, K., Belmans, R., 2005. Development of the internal electricity market in Europe. 
Electr. J. 18, 25–35. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2005.06.008 
Meeus, L., Verhaegen, K., Belmans, R., 2009. Block order restrictions in combinatorial electric energy 
auctions. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 196, 1202–1206. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.04.031 
Mott MacDonald, 2013. Impact Assessment on European Electricity Balancing Market. Rep. EC. 
Contract EC DG ENER/B2/524/2011. 
Müsgens, F., Neuhoff, K., 2006. Modelling Dynamic Constraints in Electricity Markets and the Costs of 
Uncertain Wind Output. Energy. 
Müsgens, F., Ockenfels, A., Peek, M., 2014. Economics and design of balancing power markets in 
Germany. Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst. 55, 392–401. doi:10.1016/j.ijepes.2013.09.020 
Nabe, C., Neuhoff, K., 2015. Intraday- and real time activity of TSOs: Germany. DIW Res. Rep. 
Neuhoff, K., Batlle, C., Brunekreeft, G., Konstantinidis, C.V., Nabe, C., Oggioni, G., Rodilla, P., Schwenen, 
S., Siewierski, T., Strbac, G., 2015a. Flexible Short-Term Power Trading: Gathering Experience in 
EU Countries. Discuss. Pap. 1494. doi:10.13140/RG.2.1.1578.1609 
88 
 
Neuhoff, K., Richstein, J., 2016. Coordinated Balancing of the European Power System. Res. Rep. 
Neuhoff, K., Richstein, J., May, N., 2016a. Auctions for intraday- Trading impacts on efficient power 
markets and secure system operation. DIW Res. Rep. 
Neuhoff, K., Ritter, N., Salah-Abou-El-Enien, A., Vassilopoulos, P., 2016b. Intraday markets for power: 
Discretizing the continuous trading? DIW Discuss. Pap. No. 1544. 
Neuhoff, K., Ritter, N., Schwenen, S., 2015b. Bidding Structures and Trading Arrangements for 
Flexibility across EU Power Markets. Rep. from Futur. Power Mark. Work. 2015, held Ofgem, 
London, June 26. doi:10.1007/s10273-011-1262-2 
Neuhoff, K., Schwenen, S., 2013. Beyond gate closure. 2nd Rep. Futur. Power Mark. Work. DIW Berlin. 
Neuhoff, K., Wolter, S., Schwenen, S., 2016c. Power markets with renewables: New perspectives for 
the European Target Model. Energy J. 37, 23–38. doi:10.5547/01956574.37.2.kneu 
Newbery, D., 2016. Missing money and missing markets: Reliability, capacity auctions and 
interconnectors. Energy Policy 94, 401–410. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2015.10.028 
Newbery, D., 2006. Market design. CWPE 0615 EPRG 0515. 
Ocker, F., Ehrhart, K.M., 2017. The German Paradox’’ in the balancing power markets. Renew. Sustain. 
Energy Rev. 67, 892–898. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2016.09.040 
Ofgem, 2015. Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) P305: Electricity Balancing Significant Code Review 
Developments. 
Ofgem, 2014. Bidding Zones Literature Review. 
OMIE, 2015. Corporate report 2015. 
Papavasiliou, A., Smeers, Y., 2017. Remuneration of Flexibility using Operating Reserve Demand 
Curves: A Case Study of Belgium. Energy J. Forthcomin. doi:10.5547/01956574.38.6.apap 
PCR, 2016. EUPHEMIA: Description and functioning (July 2016). 
Pentalateral Energy Forum, 2016. Balancing. Penta Flex. Work stream – Penta SG3 – Tech. Backgr. Pap. 
- Balanc. 
Pérez-Arriaga, I.J., 2013. Regulation of the Power Sector. Springer. 
Pérez-Arriaga, I.J., Rubio, F.J., Puerta, J.F., Arceluz, J., Marin, J., 1995. Marginal pricing of transmission 
services: An analysis of cost recovery. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 10, 546–553. 
doi:10.1109/59.373981 
PJM, 2011. Energy Markets - FTRs & ARRs. Presentation for the Interconnection Training Program- 
Module EM6. 
Plancke, G., De Vos, K., De Jonghe, C., Belmans, R., 2016. Efficient use of transmission capacity for 
cross-border trading: Available Transfer Capacity versus flow-based approach. IEEE Int. Energy 
Conf. ENERGYCON. doi:10.1109/ENERGYCON.2016.7513974 
Rakhmah, T.F., Yanfei, L., 2016. A review on Institutional Framework , Principles , and Key Elements for 
Integrated Electricity Market : Implications for ASEAN. ERIA Discuss. Pap. Ser. ERIA-DP-2016-26. 
Regelleistung.net, 2017. Grid Control Cooperation [WWW Document]. Internetplattform zur Vergabe 
89 
 
von Regelleistung. URL https://www.regelleistung.net/ext/static/gcc?lang=en 
Rodilla, P., Batlle, C., 2015. Empirics of Intraday and Real-time Markets in Europe: Spain. 
Schavemaker, P.H., Beune, R.J.L., 2013. Flow-based market coupling and bidding zone delimitation: 
Key ingredients for an efficient capacity allocation in a zonal system. Int. Conf. Eur. Energy Mark. 
EEM. doi:10.1109/EEM.2013.6607366 
Spodniak, P., Collan, M., Makkonen, M., 2017. On long-term transmission rights in the Nordic electricity 
markets. Energies 10, 1–19. doi:10.3390/en10030295 
TenneT, Elia, 50Hz, APG, Amperion, Transnet BW, 2016. EXPLORE: Target model for exchange of 
frequency restoration reserves. 
TGE, 2015. Polish Power Exchange (TGE) Becomes a Member of the European Multi-Regional Coupling 
(MRC) Market [WWW Document]. URL https://www.tge.pl/en/27/news/611/polish-power-
exchange-tge-becomes-a-member-of-the-european-multi-regional-coupling-mrc-market 
Van den Bergh, K., Boury, J., Delarue, E., 2016. The Flow-Based Market Coupling in Central Western 
Europe: Concepts and definitions. Electr. J. 29, 24–29. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2015.12.004 
Van den Bergh, K., Bruninx, K., Delarue, E., 2017. Cross-border reserve markets : network constraints 
in cross-border reserve procurement. TME Work. Pap. - Energy Environ. Last Updat. April 2017. 
Van den Bergh, K., Couckuyt, D., Delarue, E., D’Haeseleer, W., 2015. Redispatching in an 
interconnected electricity system with high renewables penetration. Electr. Power Syst. Res. 127, 
64–72. doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2015.05.022 
Van Hertem, D., Ghandhari, M., 2010. Multi-terminal VSC HVDC for the European supergrid: Obstacles. 
Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 14, 3156–3163. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2010.07.068 
Vandezande, L., 2011. Design and integration of balancing markets in Europe. PhD Thesis - KU Leuven. 
Vandezande, L., Meeus, L., Belmans, R., Saguan, M., Glachant, J.M., 2010. Well-functioning balancing 
markets: A prerequisite for wind power integration. Energy Policy 38, 3146–3154. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.034 
Verpoorten, K., Jonghe, C. De, Delarue, E., Belmans, R., 2016. Reservation of interconnection capacity 
for imbalance netting : case for the Belgian-Dutch border. Work. Pap. KU Leuven. 
Wikiwand, 2017. Deutsches Übertragungsnetz von 50Hertz, Amprion, EnBW und TenneT [WWW 
Document]. URL http://www.wikiwand.com/de/Regelleistung_(Stromnetz) 
 
ISBN:978-92-9084-601-7
doi:10.2870/70331
Q
M
-02-18-076-EN
-N
